

Making Canada's Immigration System and Borders More Secure

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In this volume, our contributors have examined the relationship between terrorist threats—particularly those from Islamist extremists—and Western countries, and the extent to which such threats have been made more real because of the nature of current immigration, asylum, and border control policies. The foregoing does not mean that all such threats are the direct result of inadequate selection or screening of immigrants, asylum seekers, and visa applicants. However, there is sufficient evidence of interconnections between threats and current policies, as described in the preceding chapters, that these policies need to be carefully examined and revised where appropriate.

Security implications of current Canadian immigration policies

A number of major themes that emerged in this book addressed the relationship between immigration and security. According to Mark Krikorian, mass immigration is essentially incompatible with security in the present era because it overwhelms our efforts (both American and Canadian) to screen out security threats, and it creates large immigrant communities that serve as the sea, as Mao might have said, “within which the terrorists

swim as fish.” In Krikorian’s view, bringing security standards up to what is required because of current threats would require a huge increase in the resources devoted to screening immigrants. Krikorian argues that it would make more sense to reduce immigration levels substantially so as to bring them in line with the resources available for screening. Daniel Stoffman comes to a similar conclusion.

James Bissett notes that a large number of newcomers to Canada are from Muslim countries whose populations contain significant numbers of Islamist radicals. For example, he points out that between 1996 and 2005, Canada accepted over 118,000 immigrants from Pakistan, 62,000 from Iran, and 25,000 from Algeria, relatively few of whom received adequate security screening.

Stoffman also expresses concern over the large numbers of newcomers and the difficulty of screening them properly. He notes that, in the past, large-scale immigration came in waves. The periods in between these waves allowed newcomers and, in particular, their children to become integrated into Canadian society. However, immigration levels are relentlessly high (the highest per capita in the world), year after year, bringing immigrants from the same places to the same places. As a result, large, self-contained communities are developed and are constantly replenished, thereby reducing the need and opportunities for these immigrants to integrate into mainstream society.

Stoffman also points out that, while Canadians rightly pride themselves on the cultural diversity of their major cities, the reality is that Canadian cities are not diverse enough. Out of 194 countries in the world, just 10 of them account for 62% of current immigration to Canada. If the immigration intake were more diverse, the ethnic communities in Canada might be more numerous, but they would also be smaller and, perhaps, more integrated into the broader community.

In this respect, a Statistics Canada report issued in 2004 (Hou and Picot, 2004) revealed that, between 1981 and 2001, a significant change occurred in the number of visible minority neighbourhoods in Canada. The report indicated that the number of such neighbourhoods increased from six in 1981 to 254 in 2001. It also noted that such residential concentrations of minority groups may result in social isolation and reduce

the incentives for those in such communities to learn the language of the host country or gain work experience and educational qualifications. Moreover, the report revealed that neighbourhoods with large concentrations of visible minorities tended to have a poor economic status and low income rates.

We completely agree with Stoffman when he points out that the majority of residents of immigrant communities are good people who want to build prosperous lives for their families as Canadian citizens. But some of them are not, and the larger an immigrant community is, the easier it is for groups that are hostile to Canada and the West to operate secretly within them and to develop support networks. In this regard, Krikorian adds that such enclaves not only shield terrorists, but they also facilitate the recruitment and incubation of new ones. Krikorian, along with Stoffman, asserts that continuous mass immigration seriously slows down the integration of newcomers.

With respect to criminal activity, he notes that during the great wave of immigration around the beginning of the twentieth century, and for some time after immigration was stopped in the 1920s, law enforcement had very little luck with penetrating the Mafia. This was because many immigrants lived in enclaves, had limited knowledge of English, were suspicious of government institutions, and clung to Old World prejudices and attitudes such as “omerta” (the Sicilian code of silence). When mass immigration ended, the assimilation of Italian immigrants and their children accelerated, and the offspring of these immigrants developed a sense of genuine membership and ownership in America. This is what John Fonte of the Hudson Institute calls “patriotic assimilation.” This process drained the water within which the Mafia had been able to swim, allowing law enforcement to do its job more effectively and to eventually cripple the Mafia.

Krikorian notes that Muslim immigrant communities are not alone in exhibiting characteristics that may shield or even incubate criminality. For instance, as criminologist Ko-lin Chin has written, “the isolation of the Chinese community, the inability of American law enforcement authorities to penetrate the Chinese criminal underworld, and the reluctance of Chinese victims to come forward for help all conspire to enable Chinese

gangs to endure.” On this subject, Krikorian refers to William Kleinknecht, author of *The New Ethnic Mobs*, who notes that “if the mass immigration of Chinese should come to a halt, the Chinese gangster may disappear in a blaze of assimilation after a couple of decades.” This solution to the problems associated with Chinese isolation can be applied to other ethnic groups as well.

In Krikorian’s view, the same solution applies to immigrant-related terrorist activity. As long as immigrant communities are continuously buttressed with newcomers, the problems that some of them bring with them from their homeland, such as crime and terrorism, are likely to persist for much longer than they would otherwise. In this regard, Krikorian refers to the very rapid expansion of Muslim communities in the United States through immigration, and the effect that this could have on the creation of fertile soil for the recruitment of terrorists and sympathizers. He cites a disturbing example from Lackawanna, New York, where six Yemeni Americans—five of whom were born in the United States to immigrant parents and were raised in an immigrant community—were arrested in 2002 for operating an al-Qaeda terrorist sleeper cell. He points out that, between 1996 and 2005, more than 18,000 Yemenis immigrated legally to the United States. In Lackawanna alone, the Arab population ballooned by 175% during the 1990s. Yet the median household income in the Yemeni neighbourhood is 20% lower than in Lackawanna as a whole.

A rapid increase in the Muslim population is also taking place in Canada, mainly due to immigration rather than natural growth on the part of those who are already here. According to Statistics Canada, in 1981 the Muslim population was 98,165. By 2006, the population had increased to 783,700 and, based on mid-range projections, will reach 1,421,400 by 2017 (Statistics Canada, 2005). Thus, the Muslim population in Canada has grown six-fold in a period of 25 years, and over 36 years is projected to reach more than 14 times its 1981 size. As an illustration of the significance of this increase, the Muslim community will change from being one-third the size of the Jewish community, for example, to being four times the size. A further comparison of these two religious groups shows that in 2001, 69% of Jews in Canada were born in this country, while only 21% of Muslims were born here (Statistics Canada, 2001). The

implications of these trends for Canadian foreign and domestic policies could be very important.

The continuing severity of the terrorist threat

Many of the chapters in this book clearly demonstrate that the ongoing terrorist threat to Canada remains serious. Christopher Rudolph notes that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has confirmed the presence of some 50 active terrorist organizations operating in Canada. From an American point of view, this represents a potential threat to United States security as terrorists could exploit Canada's lax immigration policy and then use their Canadian base as a potential staging ground for terrorist attacks.

In addition to the threat that terrorists in Canada may pose to the United States, they may also plan to attack targets in this country. Stoffman points to the example of Ahmed Ressam, who was captured while trying to enter the United States for the purpose of bombing the Los Angeles Airport, admitted at his trial that he and an associate had also considered detonating a bomb in a Montreal area with a large Jewish population. As well, Stoffman notes that an al-Qaeda training manual published in 2004 states, "We must target and kill the Jews and the Christians The grades of importance are as follows: Americans, British, Spaniards, Australians, Canadians, Italians" (Bell, 2004, Mar. 31).

Even without considering the threat of attacks by terrorists from overseas, as was the case in the 9/11 attacks, neither Canadians nor Americans can be complacent about possible threats from within their countries. Jan C. Ting points out that, according to a poll released in May 2007, 47% of Muslim Americans think of themselves as Muslim first, rather than American, 8% think suicide bombing can often or sometimes be justified, and 5% have a favourable view of al-Qaeda. Among Muslim Americans between 18 and 29 years of age, 60% think of themselves as Muslim first, rather than American, 15% think suicide bombing is often or sometimes justified, and 7% have a favourable view of al-Qaeda.

The situation in Canada is not any more encouraging. Following the arrest of 18 Muslims in Ontario who allegedly were planning to carry

out mass killings in the Toronto area, it was revealed that the RCMP had quietly broken up at least a dozen other terrorist groups in the previous two years (Sallot and Laghi, 2006, June 7). David B. Harris and Stoffman both point out that, in a poll released in February 2007, 12% of Canadian Muslims surveyed (almost 100,000 Muslims) believed that the plot was justified. A 2008 report regarding a Muslim university student from the Toronto area who called for the killing of Canadian troops in Afghanistan, as well as Jews, demonstrates a continuing cause for concern about such issues (Bell, 2008, Jan. 30).

While most of the focus in this volume has been on threats from Islamist extremists because they are the most likely to target Canadians and Americans, they are by no means the only terrorists within our borders. Sikh separatists were responsible for the Air India bombings in 1985—the largest single act of terrorism launched from Canadian soil. Since then, they have desisted from attempting large-scale operations in Canada. James Bissett and Stoffman both note the ongoing activities of Sikh and Tamil terrorist supporters in Canada, and express concern over the failure of our authorities to put a stop to their operations or to successfully prosecute those who have been apprehended. In recent months, there have been indications that extremists in both of these communities have become increasingly open in their efforts to build ties with political parties and to trade electoral support for more lenient treatment of their terrorist-related activities. For example, these activities include reported attempts at the Liberal Party leadership convention in December 2006 to offer delegate support to leadership candidates in exchange for a promise to remove the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam from the list of designated terrorist groups in Canada. Meanwhile, Muslim delegates at the convention were advised by the Canadian Arab Federation not to support leadership candidate Bob Rae because his wife was a senior official with the Canadian Jewish Congress (Fatah, 2006, Dec. 6).

In spring 2007, a number of federal and provincial politicians attended a parade in Surrey, a suburb of Vancouver, where Talwinder Singh Parmar, the suspected mastermind of the Air India bombing, was held up as a “martyr” to the cause of an independent Sikh homeland (Brown, 2007, Nov. 22). Later that year, a three-day memorial service was held to commemorate

Parmar as a martyr at a Sikh temple in Surrey (Bolan, 2007, Oct. 31). In November, a number of federal Liberal Members of Parliament attended a memorial service held in Toronto for a senior leader of the Tamil Tiger terrorist group (Leong, 2007, Nov. 6).

Renewed doubts over whether Canada is able to deal effectively with terrorists and suspected terrorists on its own soil have also been raised in connection with the difficulty Canada had applying what appeared to be tough anti-terrorism legislation after 9/11. In recent months, opposition parties in Parliament have successfully prevented the extension of two important provisions of the *Anti-terrorism Act*, while, as Bissett notes, judicial decisions have placed in jeopardy the one remaining useful instrument for detaining and removing foreign terrorists: the immigration security certificate. Moreover, Canadian authorities have yet to lay a charge under legislation that was passed to curb terrorist fundraising, even though the agency that tracks such activities has reported transactions of \$200 million annually under the category of suspected terrorist activity financing and other threats to the security of Canada (FINTRAC, 2007).

Despite the partial dismantling of the anti-terrorism law, the government has persisted in its efforts, begun in 2004, to bring to trial Mohammed Momin Khawaja, the first case under the remaining provisions. However, Khawaja's lawyers have been sufficiently successful at raising various legal and constitutional objections so that in January 2008 the presiding judge opined that the case may be nearly impossible to bring to trial. In the meantime, five of his alleged co-conspirators in the United Kingdom bomb plot in which he is accused of participating, were tried, convicted, and sentenced by a British court months ago (MacLeod, 2008, Jan. 25).

Assessing the economic and demographic benefits of immigration against the security risks

While issues concerning the benefits and costs of immigration in general were not addressed in any detail in this volume (but will be at a conference in Montreal in June 2008 which is being organized by the Fraser Institute), a few words have to be said about whether the security risks entailed by

Canada's current large-scale immigration policies must be accepted simply because of the major gains we realize through immigration. Stoffman, in particular, challenges the assumptions on which such claims are based. He points out that neither economic nor demographic justifications exist for accepting any negative consequences resulting from the Canadian immigration program. Stoffman points to major studies by the Economic Council of Canada and the US National Academy of Sciences which have found that, as a fraction of gross domestic product, the economic gains from immigration are minuscule. He also rejects claims that Canada will benefit economically from having a larger population, or that immigration can have a significant effect on mitigating the challenges associated with Canada's aging population.

Another issue that needs to be examined in relation to the benefits of large-scale immigration is whether it is necessary to fill labour shortages. The Economic Council of Canada report cited above, along with other more recent studies, concluded that immigration is not an effective way to fill gaps in the labour force and that cases where immigration had been successfully used to fill such gaps were rare.

One of Canada's most eminent experts on the economic and demographic impacts of immigration, Professor (Emeritus) Alan G. Green of Queen's University, points out that, in addition to the absence of any general economic gains from immigration, as well as the fact that immigration will not solve problems related to an aging population or to regional inequality, immigration is not the best way to address labour shortages. According to Green, Canada has the educational facilities to meet our domestic needs for skilled workers in all but extreme circumstances (Green, 2003). Whether Canada makes full use of this capacity and, if not, why does it not do so are questions that require further examination.

Security implications of the Canadian refugee system

In addition to security issues raised in relation to Canada's large-scale immigration intake, many of the chapters in the volume cited Canada's refugee determination system as a source of major problems. In particular, Stephen Gallagher, Bissett, and Stoffman examine, in considerable detail,

the shortcomings of the system, including the extent to which it has been used by terrorists and their supporters. Harris also expresses concern over the system's laxity from a security point of view, while Noble identifies areas in which improvements are needed. Rudolph notes that, from an American perspective, Canada's refugee and asylum policies have resulted in trends that are disconcerting to some security-minded American policy makers, while Glynn Custred makes reference to the ease with which the "millennium bomber," Ahmed Ressam, had been able to make use of the Canadian refugee system.

In addition to the various points made in each chapter, it should be noted that the very large numbers of refugee claimants (or "asylum seekers," as they are called in most countries) that Canada has accepted—four times the per capita average of other countries—and its generous rates of approval—three times the average of other countries—have contributed substantially to the formation of large communities of ethnic minorities, many members of which are below the poverty line (Collacott, 2006).

Moreover, a number of developments since these chapters were written have cast serious doubts regarding Canada's ability to deal with the shortcomings of the system. A significant case in point is the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) between Canada and the United States, under which asylum seekers in the United States must make their claims in that country, rather than coming to Canada to do so. Similar restrictions under the STCA apply to those in Canada. A number of the chapters in this volume voiced support for the STCA in principle, but argued that it needs to be strengthened by eliminating some of the exceptions under which, as Gallagher points out, the vast majority of asylum seekers in the United States who have come to the Canadian border since the agreement went into effect have been able to qualify. However, instead of closing the loopholes, a Canadian Federal Court judge, following representations from refugee advocacy groups, recently ruled that the entire STCA was invalid, essentially because no other country provided the same level of protection for refugee claimants as Canada did. The government, however, was not about to give up on the STCA and obtained a Court of Appeal decision in January 2008, allowing the agreement to remain in effect until a full review could be carried out.

Another recent development of concern in the area of refugee policy is the current initiative put forth by opposition parties in Parliament to create a body that would provide a further opportunity for appeal (the Refugee Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board) for failed refugee claimants who are seeking to avoid removal from the country. The current Conservative government, as well as its Liberal predecessors, has resisted pressure to create this additional level, given the already existing range of appeals and reviews which some failed claimants have been able to use to stay in Canada for years and even decades. If the opposition parties successfully establish this new level of appeal, they will make an already highly dysfunctional system even worse.

Obstacles to policy reform

While outlining the shortcomings of Canadian immigration and security policies from a security point of view, a number of chapters also examined the factors that make reforms difficult. Harris notes that “an extremely powerful lobby of politicians, immigration lawyers, government funded settlement organizations, NGOs and others” plays a role in impeding reform. Reform is also slowed by an absence of political debate regarding the abuse of the refugee system, as well as immigration policy in general. Gallagher points out that well-funded and well-organized advocacy and special interest groups connected to the immigration file work tirelessly to ensure that the government lives up to all of its pro-immigration rhetoric.

One of the chief obstacles to reform, according to Bissett, is the extent to which political parties solicit support from ethnic or religious groups and offer rewards in return for votes: “Block voting by new immigrant groups is an old phenomenon—these groups tend to vote for the party that promises them the most benefits.” As Bissett writes, the government ended its former policy of adjusting the number of immigrants based on the ups and downs of the labour force, and decided that Canada should aim for an annual intake equivalent to 1% of the country’s population. No convincing explanation was provided for establishing such levels, leading Bissett to suspect that the real reason behind this decision was the

assumption that larger numbers of newcomers would mean more potential voters for the party in power.

In 1977, the *Citizenship Act* was passed, reducing the waiting time for citizenship eligibility from five to three years. Voting patterns show that new immigrants often vote for the party in power at the time the immigrant was admitted to the country. Bissett notes that, in return for the immigrants' votes, the party in power usually becomes a powerful advocate for large scale immigration.

Stoffman points to the influence that ethno-politics can have, not only on immigration, but on security issues as well. A steady stream of supporters of the Tamil Tigers, one of the world's most murderous terrorist organizations, have found a haven in Canada, largely because we accept a far higher percentage of asylum seekers claiming to be Sri Lankan Tamils than any other country in the world. Yet, as Stoffman argues, federal Liberal governments were so eager to cultivate support among the fast-growing Tamil community that they refused to ban the Tigers as a terrorist organization, even though the United States and the United Kingdom had already done so. When Paul Martin, who would later become Prime Minister, was criticized for attending a dinner sponsored by a group associated with the Tamil Tigers, he was unapologetic. Such criticism was "un-Canadian," Martin was reported as saying. In Stoffman's view, this is how a dysfunctional immigration and refugee system, in combination with the notion that minority cultural groups are immune from criticism, makes it all but impossible to control unwanted immigration.

Other actors with a vested interest in opening Canada's borders even wider and with little interest in impeding such a process by introducing more effective security measures include the immigration lawyers and immigrant settlement organizations mentioned by Harris. Many of them are government-supported organizations that lobby for diversity, human rights, and related causes.

In addition to vested interest groups lobbying for increased immigration, several of the chapters identify additional factors that impede reforms to our immigration and refugee policies. One of the most important of these is Canada's multiculturalism policy. Bissett argues that this policy is often used by political parties to shore up electoral support among

immigrant groups. He points out that, in the 1970s, political parties discovered that they could gain and maintain the allegiance of ethnic voters by formalizing the concept of multiculturalism. Thus, it was no longer necessary to use party funds to entice ethnic voters. Once in power, a party was able to expend large sums of the taxpayers' money in support of ethnic organizations, including newspapers and media outlets, and ethnic or religious celebrations and related events. All of this was done in the name of multiculturalism—and with the expectation of block voting from ethnic groups.

Mansur examines how Western countries have made themselves vulnerable to penetration and exploitation by extremist groups through the adoption of multiculturalism policies. He argues that these groups have made use of opportunities to claim that they are being treated unfairly and, therefore, should receive concessions in compensation. This assessment has been born out by recent initiatives on the part of Islamic organizations to use Canadian human rights tribunals to shut down media coverage of issues that they consider unsympathetic to their cause (Steyn, 2008, Jan. 14).

In a similar vein, Harris documents how organizations such as the Council for American Islamic Relations of Canada (CAIR-CAN), whose parent organization in the United States has been associated with Islamist extremist activities, have been able to promote the notion that Muslims have been victimized by Canadian efforts to strengthen counterterrorism measures. Such groups have made a careful study of Canadian law, including human rights provisions, and make maximum use of this knowledge to advance their agendas.

Balancing freedom and security

A question that is frequently raised when new security measures are proposed is whether they will infringe unduly on the rights and freedoms of individuals. Ting examines in detail various factors that must be considered when one tries to answer this question. While citing the declaration of the US Supreme Court that “distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality,” he notes that, in

certain circumstances, even the Court recognizes that security measures that focus on certain groups are justified. However, such measures should be restricted to situations where they are particularly warranted because of serious security risks. Ting argues that, for example, stopping and questioning drivers of a certain ethnicity on the New Jersey Turnpike with the hope of identifying a threat to national security ought not to be permitted. However, subjecting passengers boarding an airplane to closer inspection because of their ethnicity, if officially authorized, ought not to be rejected automatically as a violation of civil liberties. Ting challenges the claim that any compromises in relation to civil liberties carry a serious risk of being the beginning of a slide down a slippery slope towards the erosion of basic freedoms in general. In this regard, he points to the example of the restrictions placed on people of Japanese origin in the United States during World War II, and the fact that these restrictions were completely removed when the war was over.

Harris looks at the debate on these issues in Canada. He argues that most academics and lawyers who have taken a position on the subject have been ardent supporters of the primacy of human rights and have limited knowledge of the nature of the terrorist threat or the challenges associated with effectively dealing with it. In effect, they take the position that if there are any compromises in relation to civil liberties, then the terrorists will have “won.”

Securing our borders

A number of chapters focused on the importance of border security and the possibility of establishing a common security perimeter around North America, or at least around Canada and the United States. Such a perimeter would enhance security and facilitate the movement of people and goods across our common borders.

Considering the issue from an American perspective, Custred raises concerns in relation to the potential threats to American security that may come from the Canadian side of the border. He notes that this danger does not come from a hostile country to the north, but rather from immigration and refugee policies that make it easier for aliens who are hostile to the

United States to enter Canada, disappear into the general population, and connect with networks submerged in its large immigrant communities.

Custred's strongest criticism, however, is reserved for the situation along the southern border of the United States. Noting the mass influx of illegal migrants, the level of lawlessness and violence (particularly on the Mexican side), and the large-scale smuggling of narcotics into the United States, Custred is highly critical of the Mexican authorities for allowing it to happen and of Washington for its lack of resolve in terms of controlling the situation. Given this lack of border security, Custred remains skeptical of North American attempts to facilitate trade and border flows.

Bissett, on the other hand, is in favour of the establishment of a common security perimeter by the United States and Canada, given the benefits to our country. He doubts that the increasingly robust measures being taken by the Americans to strengthen their side of the border will prevent determined terrorists from crossing it. However, he recognizes that to establish a common perimeter, our two countries would have to harmonize policies in a number of areas. For example, Canada and the United States would need to create a common list of countries for which visas are waived, and establish common policies regarding the detention of people arriving without travel documents, the acceptance of asylum claims, and the removal of foreign criminals and terrorists.

Bissett is not optimistic, however, that Canadian political parties would be prepared to make the changes to our immigration and refugee policies that would be necessary for any harmonization to take place and for the Americans to be interested in a common security perimeter. Similarly, Noble is not overly sanguine about the prospect of establishing a common security perimeter, even though it might be in both countries' interests to do so. Before a common perimeter could be established, Canada and the United States would first need to make some fundamental decisions with respect to the nature of our future economic integration, and a number of areas, including our porous refugee system, would need to be dealt with before the Americans would be interested in such a perimeter. As well, Noble does not think that the relatively unfettered movement of people and goods between our two countries would be entirely a blessing for Canada if, for example, it allowed greater freedom for more illegal firearms

or more of the illegal immigrants presently flooding into the United States to enter our territory.

Noble also reviews the two countries' progress in terms of their increased cooperation to date in such areas as the implementation of the Smart Border Declaration and Action Plan and the Safe Third Country Agreement (with respect to asylum seekers). In doing so, he questions the value of some of the United States' attempts to strengthen security along our common border, particularly when the United States is clearly doing such an inadequate job of controlling its border with Mexico.

In Noble's view, Canadian interests would be best served by continuing to work with the Americans to find ways to make our border both smarter and more secure, while at the same time correcting some of our policies and programs. For example, one area that needs improvement is our refugee determination system, which is highly dysfunctional from a Canadian perspective. Such policies and programs undermine the United States' confidence in our ability and resolve to exercise effective control over our borders.

Rudolph also examines, in considerable detail, our prospects for greater progress in terms of Canadian and American efforts to create a "smart borders" regime. He argues that such a regime would require a fundamental reorganization of existing structures and procedures. Similar to some of the other authors, he has concerns about the Canadian refugee system and expresses doubts regarding the extent to which harmonization could be achieved with the United States in the area of asylum policy as envisioned under the 30-point smart border plan.

As well, Rudolph identifies features of the Canadian system that make it disproportionately open in comparison to those of other advanced industrial states. These features include high rates of approvals, a generous social welfare system, infrequent prosecutions, and lax deportation procedures. He notes that strong domestic lobbies in Canada have been instrumental in shaping both immigration and asylum policies, as human rights and immigration law lobbies have successfully institutionalized protections for migrants within the judiciary (as well as the Immigration and Refugee Board) that constrain policy makers from enacting restrictive policies.

To realize further progress in terms of border security cooperation, Rudolph argues that improvements in intelligence sharing must be made. What makes this facet of an integrated border management regime so complicated, according to Rudolph, is that the need for better intelligence creates interests for a regime within a regime. Pooling raw anti-terrorism data requires a high degree of cooperation in scale and scope, both within states (interagency sharing) and among them (interstate). In the United States, major initiatives were taken to ensure better integration among intelligence gathering agencies to eliminate the kind of coordination failures that may have prevented the events of 9/11. However, there is still much to be done in this area. In Canada, steps have been taken to achieve greater integration in the handling of intelligence, and the intelligence community has been given additional powers and resources. Yet, according to Rudolph, little has been accomplished in terms of altering the bureaucratic structure and its processes, within or among members of the intelligence community. These impediments notwithstanding, Rudolph believes that the need for both openness and security on our borders would seem to demonstrate that the creation of a cooperative regime is a necessity. He advises, however, that we should not underestimate just how complicated the process will be as we move toward such a regime.

Conclusion

In the preceding chapters, each contributor outlined their concerns with respect to the shortcomings in Canadian immigration and refugee policy system as they relate to security issues and, in particular, the threat of terrorism. The authors point out that these problems not only involve risks to the security of Canadians, but they also undermine American confidence in the ability and resolve of Canada to exercise adequate control over who is allowed to enter and remain in its territory. As such, the United States will likely continue to impose tighter controls over the movement of people and goods across its common border with Canada. This could have serious implications for the Canadian economy since it is heavily dependent on trade with the United States.

One of the major problems with Canadian immigration policy identified by the authors is the unrelentingly high level of intake that is resulting in an increase in both the number and size of separate immigrant communities. The formation of such communities tends to slow down the integration of newcomers and provides an environment in which extremists can operate relatively unnoticed and have increased opportunities to recruit supporters. Questions were raised as to why Canada maintains such high immigration levels, since they do not result in economic benefits of any significance and are not the most effective means of meeting most labour shortages. While Canada does have an aging population, it is clear that immigration will do little to mitigate the challenges associated with this phenomenon.

The authors who pursued this issue concluded that the most important factor contributing to the continuation of high immigrant intake levels was the influence of organizations and individuals who have a vested interest in seeing it continue. Prominent among them are political parties, which count on newcomers who arrive while they are in office to provide them with electoral support once they become eligible to vote. Other players include immigration lawyers, immigrant settlement organizations, and others such as groups that lobby for diversity or human rights, for example. While some chapters concluded that, at least in Canada's case, human rights and civil liberties had often been given undue priority over security concerns, it was also clearly accepted that the former were of fundamental importance and that a reasonable balance had to be established between liberty and security.

Related to Canada's high intake levels is the issue of the lack of resources available for the adequate security screening of individuals who are accepted as immigrants. To ensure reasonable standards of security, the resources available for screening must be increased or the number of immigrants admitted must be decreased.

Canada's refugee determination system was also cited as a source of major concern from a security point of view because it has been used as a means for terrorists and their supporters to enter Canada and to delay their removal from the country. American contributors noted that the weaknesses of the system are among the major reasons why the United

States continues to have serious concerns about Canada's ability to deal with security issues. With respect to Canada's refugee system, the authors identified the need to ensure that the system does not continue to be clogged with large numbers of asylum seekers who would be rejected or prohibited from applying for protection in other countries. To a great extent, this could be achieved through the application of "safe third country" and "safe country of origin" rules, as other countries have done.

Action also needs to be taken in other areas of our refugee system. For example, there is a need for more frequent use of detention in the case of claimants whose identity is in doubt and who may pose a security threat to Canada, as well as claimants whose applications have been rejected and who have been ordered removed but frequently fail to show up for their departure unless kept in custody. Another area that requires correction is the appeal process. Currently, refused claimants have the ability to delay their removal almost indefinitely through various appeals and reviews.

While not specifically proposed in any of the chapters, one of the obvious conclusions to be drawn from this volume is that a thorough and comprehensive review of both immigration and refugee policy is long overdue in Canada. Such a review must determine what the objectives of Canada's immigration policy should be, and must look critically at the extent to which current programs are achieving these objectives and the extent to which immigration policy and national security policy can pursue complementary objectives. Moreover, the review should not be done by any of Canada's political parties, which have a strong tendency to treat immigration policy as means of shoring up electoral support, or by organizations that will advocate policies that serve their own interests. While all interested groups should have an opportunity to present their views, it is important that an independent review be organized in such a way that the interests of Canadians in general are paramount.

A final topic discussed by the contributors was the importance of continued cooperation between Canada and the United States. Both countries should look for ways in which they can harmonize standards and procedures, in order to ensure that the measures in place along our common border provide an adequate level of security while facilitating the movement of goods and people. Such harmonization could include

the establishment of common lists of visa-exempt countries, as well as common security screening standards and procedures for visa applicants. The contributors recommended that the two countries work towards a better integration of the work of intelligence gathering agencies from each country.

With a comprehensive and fundamental review of Canadian immigration and refugee policy that takes into account the various issues and recommendations made in the chapters in this volume, Canadians could ensure that the programs in these areas achieve their stated objectives, while contributing to, rather than detracting from, the security, economic, and humanitarian interests of Canadians at large.

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