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Generosity in Canada and the United States: The 2017 Generosity Index

Summary

  • Manitoba had the highest percentage of tax filers that donated to charity among the provinces (24.6%) during the 2015 tax year while New Brunswick and Quebec had the lowest (19.3%). Manitoba also donated the highest percentage of its aggregate income to charity among the provinces (0.83%) while Quebec donated the lowest (0.26%).
  • The general trend in recent years is that a declining percentage of Canadian tax filers are donating to charity and they are donating less as a percentage of income.
  • Nationwide, a lower percentage of tax filers donated to charity in Canada (20.9%) than in the United States (24.5%). Similarly, Canadians (at 0.56%) gave a lower percentage of their aggregate income to charity than did Americans (at 1.43%).
  • The percentage of tax filers donating to charity varies significantly among US states and Canadian provinces and territories. On this indicator, Manitoba is the only Canadian jurisdiction that ranks among the top 20 (ranked 19th out of 64).
  • The percentage of aggregate income donated was generally less in the Canadian provinces and territories than in the US states. There were only three US states (Alaska, Maine, and West Virginia) where the percentage of aggregate income donated was less than the percentage donated in Manitoba (0.83%), Canada’s highest ranked province.
  • US jurisdictions top the overall Generosity Index rankings. Utah places first (scoring 8.7 out of 10.0), followed by Maryland (7.7) and District of Columbia (7.1). Manitoba is the highest-scoring Canadian province (3.8) but ranks only 37th overall out of 64 North American jurisdictions.
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Report Card on Ontario's Elementary Schools 2017

The Report Card on Ontario’s Elementary Schools collects a variety of relevant, objective indicators of school performance into one, easily accessible public document so that anyone can analyze and compare the performance of individual schools. By doing so, the Report Card assists parents when they choose a school for their children and encourages and assists all those seeking to improve their schools.

The Report Card helps parents choose
Where parents can choose among several schools for their children, the Report Card provides a valuable tool for making a decision. Because it makes comparisons easy, it alerts parents to those nearby schools that appear to have more effective academic programs. Parents can also determine whether schools of interest are improving over time. By first studying the Report Card, parents will be better prepared to ask relevant questions when they visit schools under consideration and speak with the staff.

Of course, the choice of a school should not be made solely on the basis of a single source of information. Web sites maintained by Ontario’s Education Quality and Accountability Office (EQAO), the provincial ministry of education, and local school boards may also provide useful information. Parents who already have a child enrolled at the school provide another point of view.

Naturally, a sound academic program should be complemented by effective programs in areas of school activity not measured by the Report Card. Nevertheless, the Report Card provides a detailed picture of each school that is not easily available elsewhere.

The Report Card facilitates school improvement
The act of publicly rating and ranking schools attracts attention and this can provide motivation. Schools that perform well or show consistent improvement are applauded. Poorly performing schools generate concern, as do those whose performance is deteriorating. This inevitable attention provides an incentive for all those connected with a school to focus on student results.

However, the Report Card offers more than just incentive. It includes a variety of indicators, each of which reports results for an aspect of school performance that may be improved. School administrators who are dedicated to their students’ academic success accept the Report Card as another source of opportunities for improvement.

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Waiting Your Turn: Wait Times for Health Care in Canada, 2017 Report

Waiting for treatment has become a defining characteristic of Canadian health care. In order to document the lengthy queues for visits to specialists and for diagnostic and surgical procedures in the country, the Fraser Institute has—for over two decades—surveyed specialist physicians across 12 specialties and 10 provinces.

This edition of Waiting Your Turn indicates that, overall, waiting times for medically necessary treatment have in-creased since last year. Specialist physicians surveyed report a median waiting time of 21.2 weeks between referral from a general practitioner and receipt of treatment—longer than the wait of 20.0 weeks reported in 2016. This year’s wait time—the longest ever recorded in this survey’s history—is 128% longer than in 1993, when it was just 9.3 weeks.

There is a great deal of variation in the total waiting time faced by patients across the provinces. Ontario reports the shortest total wait (15.4 weeks), while New Brunswick reports the longest (41.7 weeks). There is also a great deal of variation among specialties. Patients wait longest between a GP referral and orthopaedic surgery (41.7 weeks), while those waiting for medical oncology begin treatment in 3.2 weeks.

The total wait time that patients face can be examined in two consecutive segments.

  • From referral by a general practitioner to consultation with a specialist. The waiting time in this segment increased from 9.4 weeks in 2016 to 10.2 weeks this year. This wait time is 177% longer than in 1993, when it was 3.7 weeks. The shortest waits for specialist consultations are in Ontario (6.7 weeks) while the longest occur in New Brunswick (26.6 weeks).
  • From the consultation with a specialist to the point at which the patient receives treatment. The waiting time in this segment increased from 10.6 weeks in 2016 to 10.9 weeks this year. This wait time is 95% longer than in 1993 when it was 5.6 weeks, and more than three weeks longer than what physicians consider to be clinically “reasonable” (7.2 weeks). The shortest specialist-to-treatment waits are found in Ontario (8.6 weeks), while the longest are in Manitoba (16.3 weeks).

It is estimated that, across the 10 provinces, the total number of procedures for which people are waiting in 2017 is 1,040,791. This means that, assuming that each person waits for only one procedure, 2.9% of Canadians are waiting for treatment in 2017. The proportion of the population waiting for treatment varies from a low of 1.7% in Quebec to a high of 5.7% in Nova Scotia. It is important to note that physicians report that only about 11.5% of their patients are on a waiting list because they requested a delay or postponement.

Patients also experience significant waiting times for various diagnostic technologies across the provinces. This year, Canadians could expect to wait 4.1 weeks for a computed tomography (CT) scan, 10.8 weeks for a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan, and 3.9 weeks for an ultrasound.

Research has repeatedly indicated that wait times for medically necessary treatment are not benign inconveniences. Wait times can, and do, have serious consequences such as increased pain, suffering, and mental anguish. In certain instances, they can also result in poorer medical outcomes—transforming potentially reversible illnesses or injuries into chronic, irreversible conditions, or even permanent disabilities. In many instances, patients may also have to forgo their wages while they wait for treatment, resulting in an economic cost to the individuals themselves and the economy in general.

The results of this year’s survey indicate that despite provincial strategies to reduce wait times and high levels of health expenditure, it is clear that patients in Canada continue to wait too long to receive medically necessary treatment.

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Measuring the Distribution of Taxes in Canada

There is a common and mistaken impression in Canada that the country’s top earners are getting away with paying relatively little tax. This misperception has been fuelled by governments, especially the current federal government, which has invoked “tax fairness” to justify recent tax changes such as the creation of a new and higher top personal income tax rate of 33 percent—an increase from the previous top federal rate of 29 percent.

The fact is that Canada’s top income-earners pay a disproportionate—and growing—share of all taxes collected by government.

Measuring the Distribution of Taxes in Canada: Do the Rich Pay Their “Fair Share”? finds that this year, the top 20 per cent of income earners in Canada—families with an annual income greater than $186,875—will earn 49.1 per cent of all income in Canada but pay 55.9 per cent of all taxes including not just income taxes, but payroll taxes, sales taxes and property taxes, among others.

The discrepancy is even more pronounced for the top one per cent of earners. While this group will pay 14.7 per cent of all taxes in 2017 (up from 11.3 per cent in 1997), it will earn a smaller percentage (10.7 per cent) of all income.

By comparison, the bottom 50 per cent of income-earning families in Canada earn 20 per cent of all income, but pay just 14.6 per cent of all taxes.

When looking at income taxes alone, the top one per cent will pay 17.9 per cent of all federal and provincial income taxes, while the bottom 50 per cent will pay nine per cent of all income taxes this year.

Taxing top income earners may appear to be a simple solution to inequality, but doing so comes with considerable costs. Further increases to marginal tax rates on upper earners would have deleterious consequences on the economy and the general prosperity of Canadians. Those who want to see taxes raised further on top earners must recognize that there are considerable economic costs to such policies.

This is the final chapter in a new book on income inequality published by the Fraser Institute.

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Towards a Better Understanding of Income Inequality in Canada

In recent years, income inequality has become one of the most animating—and unfortunately most misunderstood—economic and social issues of our time. Sparked by the 2008-09 recession, the well-deserved backlash against corporate bailouts, the Occupy Wall Street movement, and a deluge of reports pointing to a growing problem, income inequality has vaulted to the forefront of the public’s concerns.

Several analyses conclude that income inequality is rising with increasingly larger shares of income being concentrated among the highest earners. Such conclusions depend on the data and assumptions being used to measure inequality. Indeed, many prominent international and Canadian researchers continue to use flawed and incomplete data and research methods to fuel concerns of a growing “income gap” and stagnating standards of living.

This is why we need a better understanding of the true nature of inequality and income growth, including whether inequality is necessarily harmful, how sensitive the inequality measures are to the underlying definitions, whether or not there really is a rapidly growing gap, and the state of income mobility, which is the ability of Canadians to rise out of their respec­tive income group over time. The chapters in Towards a Better Understanding of Income Inequality in Canada tackle these issues and offer a comprehensive analysis of income inequality.

The book begins by pointing out that individuals earn income and accumulate wealth in dramatically different ways. It is essential this fact be taken into consideration in any understanding of the nature of income and wealth inequality. Chapter 1 explains that when measuring inequality, we can’t simply compare countries such as Canada, where typically businesses and entrepreneurs only prosper by benefiting society, to countries where cronyism and government-granted privileges are widespread and rig the system to the benefit of elites. Before determining how much any society should worry about inequality, citizens should first understand that the way income and wealth are earned is critical.

Chapter 2 comes to the conclusion that, when measured properly, income inequality has not been growing rapidly in Canada. When income inequality in Canada is measured improperly, discussions about it are misleading. For example, earnings (wages and salaries) represent a narrow definition of income, yet many researchers use only earnings to measure income inequality, which ignores a number of critical factors including government transfers (welfare, Old Age Security, etc.) to low-income families. This chapter also addresses the question of who should be measured—individuals or families and concludes that the most accurate measurement for income inequality is after-tax income (which includes government transfers) adjusted for family size.

Chapter 3 finds that inequality in the standard of living of Canadians (consumption inequality, or the difference in spending by different households) has barely changed in 40 years. Consumption—compared to income—better reflects Canadians’ actual economic well-being by measuring what people do buy to support a certain standard of living, and not what people could buy, based on their income.

Chapter 4 points out that wealth inequality in Canada is largely the result of people’s age differences. Wealth accumulation is a process. It happens slowly and steadily over a long period. Canadians usually acquire the most wealth when they hit their peak earning years—between 55 and 69—just before retirement. When they retire, they start to draw down savings and, in effect, become less wealthy again. What’s more, wealth inequality in Canada has actually declined over the past four decades.

Just as wealth is accumulated over the course of decades, so too is the level of income that Canadians earn each year. Chapter 5 explains that Canada’s high level of income mobility means that very few Canadians remain stuck in low income. The vast majority of those in the lowest income group move up the income ladder over time, which is the mark of a dynamic economy.

A repeated claim in the inequality debate is that the middle class in Canada is stagnating. But this is untrue. Chapter 6 demonstrates that middle-class incomes are up dramatically in Canada since the 1970s. Not only have middle-class incomes risen dramatically, the purchasing power of those incomes goes a lot further today than back in the 1970s. Canadians have to work fewer hours today in order to afford similar and often higher quality household goods.

So much of the debate around income inequality revolves around perceptions of fairness. The book’s final chapter discusses the proposition that inequality could be solved if governments increased taxes on upper income earners. This “solution” is based, in part, on a mistaken impression that the country’s top earners are paying relatively little tax. Governments have fuelled this misperception by invoking “tax fairness” to justify higher taxes on upper earners. Canada’s top income earners currently pay a disproportionate share of taxes relative to the share of income that they earn and that tax ratio gap has been increasing over time. The imbalance is primarily due to the progressivity of Canada’s personal income tax system, which taxes higher levels of income at higher marginal tax rates. Those who advocate higher taxes on top income earners are, in effect, arguing that those earners should be paying an even more disproportionate share of taxes.

Taxes cannot be continually raised on top income earners without economic consequences. Higher tax rates would further erode Canada’s tax competitiveness, discourage economically productive activity, hinder the country’s ability to attract and retain top talent, and dampen the incentives for income mobility. Once that happens, everyone is hurt, particularly those, ironically enough, whom the misguided policies are intended to help.

Income inequality is a complex issue. The good news is that the problem of inequality isn’t nearly as bad as people are sometimes led to believe. Canadians have less inequality than they might think, and are more able, thanks to opportunities of mobility, to get out of a low-income situation than they might fear. Middle-class incomes in this country are not stagnating, and most people can and do build wealth over the course of their lives. The bad news is that policies designed to address inequality might be doing more harm than good—exacerbating the situation and making it worse, not better.

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Global Petroleum Survey 2017

This report presents the results of the Fraser Institute’s 11th annual survey of petroleum industry executives and managers regarding barriers to investment in oil and gas exploration and production facilities in various jurisdictions around the globe. The survey responses have been tallied to rank provinces, states, other geographical regions (e.g., offshore areas), and countries according to the extent of such barriers. Those barriers, as assessed by the survey respondents, include high tax rates, costly regulatory obligations, uncertainty over environmental regulations and the interpretation and administration of regulations governing the “upstream” petroleum industry, and concerns over political stability and security of personnel and equipment.

A total of 333 respondents participated in the survey this year, providing sufficient data to evaluate 97 jurisdictions that hold 52 percent of proved global oil and gas reserves and account for 66 percent of global oil and gas production.

The jurisdictions that are evaluated are assigned scores on each of 16 questions pertaining to factors known to affect investment decisions. These scores are then used to generate a “Policy Perception Index” for each jurisdiction that reflects the perceived extent of the barriers to investment. The jurisdictions are then sorted into clusters based on the size of their proved reserves allowing for an apples-to-apples comparison of policy perception in the context of the resources that are available for commercialization.

Of the 15 jurisdictions with the largest petroleum reserves, the five that rank as most attractive or least likely to deter investment are Texas, United Arab Emirates, Alberta, Kuwait, and Egypt. The five least attractive of the large-reserve jurisdictions for investment on the basis of their Policy Perception Index scores (Venezuela, Libya, Iraq, Indonesia, and Nigeria) account for 41 percent of the proved oil and gas reserves of all the jurisdictions included in the survey. Alberta is the only Canadian jurisdiction in the group of jurisdictions with large reserve holdings.

In the group of 39 jurisdictions with medium-sized reserves, the 10 most attractive for investment are Oklahoma, North Dakota, Newfoundland & Labrador, West Virginia, Norway – Other, Wyoming, Norway – North Sea, United Kingdom – North Sea Offshore, Arkansas, and the Netherlands. The only Canadian jurisdictions in this group are Newfoundland & Labrador (3rd of 39), and British Columbia (31st of 39). British Columbia’s score dropped significantly this year and investors now view this province as Canada’s least attractive jurisdiction for investment.

Of the 39 jurisdictions with relatively small proved oil and gas reserves, the top 10 performers are Kansas, Saskatchewan, South Australia, Manitoba, New Zealand, Mississippi, Montana, Namibia, United Kingdom – Other, and Alabama. Nova Scotia also ranks near the top of the small reserve holder group.

When the attractiveness for investment is considered independently from the reserve size of jurisdictions (historically the primary focus of this survey), we find that the jurisdictions with Policy Perception Index scores in the first quintile (suggesting that obstacles to investment are lower than in all other jurisdictions assessed by the survey) are almost all located in Canada, the United States, and Europe. According to this year’s survey, the 10 most attractive jurisdictions for investment worldwide are Texas, Oklahoma, North Dakota, Newfoundland & Labrador, West Virginia, Kansas, Saskatchewan, Norway – Offshore (except North Sea), Wyoming and South Australia. Four of the jurisdictions—Oklahoma, Texas, Saskatchewan, and North Dakota—consistently rank in the top 10, having been there in the last six iterations of the survey.

The 10 least attractive jurisdictions for investment, starting with the worst, are Venezuela, Bolivia, Libya, Iraq, Ecuador, Indonesia, California, Cambodia, France, and Yemen.

Our analysis of the 2017 petroleum survey results indicates that the extent of negative sentiment regarding key factors driving petroleum investment decisions has increased in many of the world’s regions. The United States continues to remain as the most attractive region for investment, followed by Europe. Canada’s score improved slightly this year, allowing this jurisdiction to maintain its spot as the third most attractive region in the world for investment.

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The Age of Eligibility for Public Retirement Programs in the OECD

Summary

  • All industrialized countries, particularly those in the OECD and including Canada, are experiencing an aging of their populations.
  • Of the 22 high-income OECD countries apart from Canada, 18 of them (over 80 percent) (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are enacting increases in the age of eligibility for public retirement programs.
  • Thirteen countries, or almost 60 percent (Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are increasing their age of eligibility for public retirement programs to 67 years old or older; 2 of these (Ireland and the United Kingdom) are moving to 68 years, and Iceland is moving to 70 years.
  • Five countries are indexing their age of eligibility with life expectancy, meaning that the age of eligibility will be automatically adjusted as life expectancy changes.
  • Four countries in addition to Canada are retaining the status quo with no reforms: Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
  • In 2015, Canada’s federal government reversed a 2012 reform that would have increased the age of eligibility for Old Age Security and the Guaranteed Income Supplement to 67 by 2029. The federal government estimates that this policy reversal will cost $10.4 billion in 2030.
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Bending the Curve: Recent Developments in Government Spending on First Nations

How much money are governments spending on Indigenous peoples? How have these amounts been changing over time? How effective is the spending? This is the third in a series of Fraser Institute studies of these questions. This paper extends the previous work on government spending in support of First Nations, including federal transfers from Indigenous Affairs and Northern Development (INAC), Health Canada spending on First Nations, Aboriginal program spending by provincial governments, and own-source revenue (OSR) generated by First Nation governments. Basically, the same methodology has been used as in the earlier papers: INAC expenses recorded here do not include Northern expenditures or internal administration. Own-source revenue is counted slightly differently from the previous attempt to tabulate it.

Main empirical findings

  • INAC support for First nations as measured in constant dollars continued to increase from 1995/96 to 2015/16, but not as rapidly as in the preceding 40 years. The very large cost of the Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (about $5 billion), which was paid to individuals rather than First Nation governments, has inflated the apparent amount of transfers.
  • INAC spending per Registered Indian has declined in this 20-year period because legal changes have led to a rapid increase in the number of Registered Indians. INAC spending per Registered Indian living on reserve has experienced ups and downs but is now about the same as it was 20 years ago.
  • After growing rapidly from 1995/96 to 2005/06, provincial spending on First Nations grew less rapidly in the last ten years. It is a significant total but remains small compared to overall federal spending.
  • Own-source revenue declined slightly in constant dollars from 2013/14 to 2015/16; the reasons for this decrease are not certain, though it was obviously a time of low natural resource commodity prices.

In its first two budgets, the Liberal government of Canada promised a substantial increase in federal spending on First Nations, but figures from the Public Accounts are not yet available to determine how great an increase has actually been implemented. The announced spending hikes will have to contend against an already large deficit, increasing interest rates, and other claims on the budget, such as higher defence spending.

Increased expenditure is not a panacea because some problems faced by First Nations have deeper causes than shortage of money. Clean water, for example, may be difficult to supply in remote locations subject to flooding. Educational deficits may arise more from family disorganization and lack of community support than from budgetary shortfalls. Thus, increased spending should be accomplished by rigorous program evaluation to ensure the increases actually achieve results and are not merely transferred to organized rent seekers.

Own-source revenue, which is already equal to over 50% of federal spending, is a way for many First Nations to improve their well-being. Natural resource development is promising for some First Nations in remote locations but, unfortunately, the contemporary environmental movement and the federal government are making resource development more difficult even as it promises to increase fiscal transfers to First Nations.

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Canada’s Climate Action Plans: Are They Cost-effective?

Four provinces in Canada (Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec) have promulgated “action plans” to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. These plans have several broad components. There is a carbon pricing component; there are assortments of energy efficiency programs; there is a “renewable energy” component; and most of the plans have vehicle electrification components (or such programs have been enacted separately from the climate action plans).

For example, Alberta’s Climate Leadership Plan consists of five key elements: a coal-power phase-out by 2030, a tripling of renewable energy generation to reach 30 percent of generation by 2030, reducing emissions from the oil and gas sector, creating Energy Efficiency Alberta to deliver cost-saving programs, and implementing an economy-wide price on carbon.

Ontario’s climate action plan contains similar efforts, including a “Green Bank” to fund efficiency programs, increasing vehicle electrification, running education programs for homeowners seeking more efficient buildings, and, of course, supporting their “carbon market” which unlike Alberta is a cap-and-trade carbon emission trading system.

Quebec and British Columbia have similar programs. But a review of literature as well as an examination of how carbon pricing is being implemented in Canada suggests that the money of Canadians will not be well spent on these carbon action plans.

An examination of Canada’s various carbon pricing programs reveals a history of flawed implementation that undermines the utility and efficiency of carbon pricing. Rather than obeying fundamental economic principles of true revenue neutrality, regulatory displacement, and allowing markets to find lower cost ways to reduce carbon, Canada’s carbon taxes are piled on top of regulations, are not revenue neutral, and subvert the functioning of energy markets by mandating particular technologies such as wind and solar power, and electric vehicles.

With regard to efficiency programs, studies from the US and abroad suggest that home efficiency programs often underperform, proving less effective than predicted at reducing energy use, and coming in at a cost far in excess of what was originally planned. In some cases, this inverts the cost-benefit analyses used to justify the programs.

Vehicle electrification is the newest intervention into energy markets and consumer behavior. Ontario, for example, offers up to $14,000 worth of subsidies for buying an electric car, waives HST on the purchase, and throws in “free energy” for overnight charging. BC is a bit less generous, with only $6,000 subsidies for the electric cars, but is another with more lucre on tap if you install a charging station. But the laboratory of electrification has to be California, which has pushed vehicle electrification for more than 20 years. California’s experience is telling. As Los Angeles Times reporter Russ Mitchell points out, “[o]ver seven years, the state of California has spent $449 million on consumer rebates to boost sales of zero-emission vehicles. So far, the subsidies haven’t moved the needle much. In 2016, of the just over 2 million cars sold in the state, only 75,000 were pure-electric and plug-in hybrid cars. To date, out of 26 million cars and light trucks registered in California, just 315,000 are electric or plug-in hybrids.” And the cost of GHG reductions for this program? Researchers have estimated that Ontario’s spending on electric cars reduces greenhouse gases at a cost of $523/tonne, while Quebec’s price of avoided emissions comes in at $288/tonne.

Finally, all of Canada’s climate action plans feature the expansion of renewable energy. But Canada’s own experience with that in Ontario has been nothing short of disastrous. Ontario’s renewable expansion has come at a stunningly high cost, with electricity prices in Ontario having risen by 71 percent from 2008 to 2016, over twice the average growth in electricity prices elsewhere in Canada. From 2008 to 2015, electricity prices also increased two-and-a-half times faster than household disposable income in Ontario. The growth in electricity prices was almost four times greater than inflation and over four-and-a-half times the growth of Ontario’s economy (real GDP).

Canada’s climate action plans include carbon pricing, but also rely heavily on regulatory interventions that undermine its efficiency properties, such as expanding renewable sources, energy efficiency measures, and vehicle electrification. There is little reason to believe that money will be well spent on these efforts. Every jurisdiction in Canada with a carbon pricing program has violated the fundamental economics of such programs in ways that will greatly inflate their costs and impair their effectiveness. Evidence from the economic literature suggests that the energy efficiency programs proposed by the various provincial climate plans are likely to cost more than projected and deliver fewer savings than promised. Electric vehicle subsidies are likely to hit Canadians in the pocketbooks, producing at best small quantities of greenhouse gas emission reductions at exorbitant costs.

Canadian governments have aggressively, and with little up-front analysis, rolled out climate action plans that are going to cost a great deal of money, but, most likely, will yield very little return in terms of environmental benefits. Governments would be well advised to slow or temporarily halt their climate action program implementation, and give the public solid analysis of their proposed programs’ economic costs and benefits.

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The Impact of Interprovincial Migration of Seniors on Provincial Health Care Spending

Summary

  • The dominant role played by government financing in Canada’s single-payer health care system has led to an oversight related to demographics: senior migration.
  • Health care spending is skewed towards the first year of life and after retirement. The average amount spent on health care by governments in a person’s first year of life is $10,800. For those between the ages of 65 to 69, that amount is $6,424, but it rises to $13,797 for those over 70.
  • Taxes, on the other hand, start out quite low and then climb steadily to one’s prime earning years (56-63), before beginning to decline as one nears and then enters retirement.
  • When a senior migrates from one province to another, they are likely to have paid the bulk of their lifetime taxes in one province but will consume the majority of their health care in another.
  • Six provinces experienced a net inflow of seniors between 1980 and 2016: BC, AB, ON, NB, NS, and PEI. The remaining four provinces (SK, MB, QC, and NL) experienced a net outflow of seniors. British Columbia recorded the greatest inflow (40,512), while Quebec experienced the greatest outflow (37,305).
  • Based on average annual health care costs by age, British Columbia had the largest cost at $7.2 billion (in 2017 dollars) while Quebec had the largest savings at $6.0 billion.
  • A partial analysis of potential tax revenues provided by migrating seniors suggests that BC’s costs could have been mitigated by as much as 36.3 percent while Quebec’s savings could have been reduced by as much as 19.2 percent.
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