Canada’s Military Posture
An Analysis of Recent Civilian Reports

by Barry Cooper,
Mercedes Stephenson,
and Ray Szeto
Critical Issues Bulletins

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The principal foundations, which all states have, new ones as well as old or mixed, are good laws and good arms. And because there cannot be good laws where there are not good arms, and where there are good arms there must be good laws, I shall leave out the reasoning on laws and speak of arms.

Machiavelli, The Prince, chapter 12
Executive Summary

The current state of Canadian Forces (CF) is the result of political, not military, decisions undertaken over the past couple of decades. The decline in capability can be measured in terms of a decline in funding, of delayed replacement of obsolete and obsolescent equipment, of a high operational tempo, of declining numbers of personnel, of consequent low retention rates, and of many other indices. Moreover, this decline in capability has taken place in a context of a rapid advance in military technology and war-fighting doctrine, the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA). All of the nine civilian reports analyzed in this paper agree that the Canadian Forces have not adapted to the new strategic context in which they are required to operate, that the doctrines and commitments according to which the Canadian Forces are supposed to operate, which stem from the last White Paper on Defence written over a decade ago, are accordingly remote from the realities of contemporary war-fighting. Worse, the reports discussed in this Critical Issues Bulletin note that neither the civilian leadership nor the high military leadership of the CF have dealt with the disconnect between commitment and capability, of which increasing numbers of Canadian citizens as well as specialists are increasingly aware.

This Critical Issues Bulletin discusses first the new strategic realities, then the old and increasingly irrelevant military and foreign-policy assumptions that define CF commitments. The overarching issue, however, is that by allowing the CF to deteriorate so badly, the Government of Canada has increased the dependency of the country on the United States and the robust American military, even while maintaining the position that the absence of a strong Canadian military has somehow enhanced Canadian independence and sovereignty.

The report then summarizes the multi-dimensional decline in the CF, in terms of budget, equipment and, worst of all, in terms of personnel, training, and rotation. Some of this decay is evident in such spectacular problems as the CH-124 Sea King maritime helicopter or the ILTIS Jeep but other, equally significant problems – such as an absence of time for training and recuperation – are expressed only in terms of an increasing unwillingness of the military personnel, particularly trained technical personnel, to extend their limited-term service contracts when they expire and come up for renewal. Moreover, the degree to which CF personnel are rapidly deployed has had a harmful effect on the structure of the Canadian military, changing it from a time-tested hierarchy based on battalion and brigade formations into what one report called a “manpower pool.”

Central to the readiness of the CF to do its job is an ability to fight alongside American units and to help the United States in defending common strategic interests and concerns. In the past, Canada’s geography was a central element in developing a common strategy. More recently, however, Canada’s geostrategic importance has declined, largely as a consequence of technology, a major component of the RMA. On the one hand, the United States can defend North America on its own, without considering the interests of Canada or Canadian geographical proximity; on the other, political factors have come to surpass the brute realities of geography. This is a novel strategic situation for both countries.

Given the enormous importance of cross-border trade to Canada, some serious re-thinking of Canada’s strategic relations with the United States is needed and the importance of Canadian-American political cooperation has to be reconsidered as well. Finally, the report considers future configurations of the CF suggested by the several studies analyzed and the costs associated with restoring the Forces to credibility and to being a source of pride for all Canadians.
Introduction

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, several well-informed and serious civilian reports on the state of the Canadian Forces (CF) have been published, along with a much larger collection of documents written by the military outlining their present problems and proposing future solutions to them. The focus of this Critical Issues Bulletin is on common themes the civilians have raised concerning the current condition of the CF and their recommendations for change. The reason for this approach is not simply the historical and constitutional provision for civilian oversight and audit of the military in Western democracies stretching back to antiquity but also the peculiar problems associated with the CF today and the historical contingencies of their genesis in long-standing government policies. That is, there is near unanimity that the problems analyzed in these reports are political in origin and in solution. They are not, therefore, strictly military.

Perhaps the simplest way to indicate the significance of those historical contingencies is to contrast the Canadian way of implementing civilian control of the military with the way it is done by the United States. By law, the US Congress mandates levels of military force: so many infantry divisions or carriers or strategic bombers or missiles must be available by law to defend America and American interests. Senior military officers are called before legislative committees in the Senate and House of Representatives to account for their execution of the law, their expenditures, their strategies, and so on. Where differences between the uniformed services and the civilian executive exist, they are frankly and candidly discussed in front of legislators in ways that the administration may prefer to have avoided. Congressional, which is to say, legislative oversight of the executive—in this case, the military arm of the executive branch—is a celebrated aspect of the “checks and balances” that are formalized in the US Constitution.

As is well known, the formalities of the American Constitution were developed from British Parliamentary practices. As is also well known, in a parliamentary government, which lacks the formal (and physical) separation of executive and legislature, there are different emphases and a different way of striking a balance between the executive and the legislature. Some analysts have argued compellingly that in Canada today the government is too strongly centralized in the executive (Savoie, 1999; Gibson, 2003). Notwithstanding the recent practice of centralized administrative rule in Canada, however, there still remain important checks on executive discretion.

Most dramatically there is Question Period in the House of Commons and provisions for extensive debates in both the House and Senate. In addition, there are standing committees in both houses that from time to time produce reports on public-policy issues. Two of the most important, the House Standing Committee on Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) and the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD), deal with the military. Opposition parties are usually in a position to propose alternative policies and on occasion issue their own “White Paper” reports, as do interested groups, citizens, and academic specialists.

Generally speaking these latter categories of documents draw attention to aspects of Government policy that neither the Government nor the uniformed and civilian officials in the defence community are keen to discuss. In this respect, they serve in an informal and unofficial way the purposes fulfilled in the US by formal and official Congressional hearings. It was an official report, however, from the Senate committee (SCONSAD, 2002c) that drew attention to the specific problem of a civilian audit of the Canadian military today. Toward the end of the third report produced and issued by this committee within a single calendar year,

1. See Appendix, page 31, for a listing and synopsis of the documents analyzed here.
2. We use the common government and military abbreviations and acronyms (DND, CF, etc.) freely in the text after an initial identification. For a discussion of all the reports and abbreviations used, see the Appendix, page 31. Other reports we typically identify fully, either by title or by sponsoring group or author.
the report noted a lack of frankness on the part of “our military leaders, including senior DND [Department of National Defence] bureaucrats.” The government, which is to say, the executive, had discouraged these senior officials from “the offering of genuine professional opinions.” Parliamentary committees, the Senate Committee said, “can deliver blunt messages to politicians and the public, but unless Canada’s military leaders are more open about the state of the institution that is one of the primary instruments in maintaining Canadian security and prosperity, bad situations are unlikely to get better.” As a result of extensive discussions with ordinary enlisted personnel, the Senate Committee took official notice of the malign effects of having senior military leaders attempt “to defend the indefensible.” Consequently, “the Committee was not always convinced that senior officers and bureaucrats appearing before it were being perfectly frank.” Indeed, they averred “misguided loyalty” had led many senior uniformed military leaders to embrace “timidity with the truth,” which, the Committee observed, “is not the kind of virtue our politicians should be encouraging among its senior military personnel.” The unreliability of statements of the executive and the willingness of “DND bureaucrats” both in and out of uniform to be “timid with the truth” is, therefore, the regrettable but necessary contingent reason for focusing on civilian analyses (SCONSAD, 2002c: 25–6).

Likewise the Conference of Defence Associations’ report, Caught in the Middle (CDA 2001), drew attention to the series of articles and interviews by senior officials at DND that presented a view of the CF based on official Departmental documents. On the one hand, these officials indicated correctly that the context within which military force is used had changed significantly from what it had been a decade earlier. At that time, the Cold War had recently been concluded, the Canadian economy was performing poorly, and the CF, as other Government departments, had to reduce expenditures. Thus, personnel levels could be, and had to be, reduced. In a similar observation, the authors of The People’s Defence Review noted in 2002 that the earlier rationale, namely a poorly performing economy, no longer obtained: “defence is once more affordable, or at least it should be … The nation’s finances are in their best shape in decades … Since the nation’s finances are now healthy, it is time to restore health to the nation’s military forces and defences as well” (CCS21, 2002: 10, 23). In other words, whatever the validity of the “guns versus butter” argument, which in our view both over-simplifies and over-states the problem, such a rationale for starving the military was utterly untenable by the turn of the century.

Defence officials also argued over the decade of the 1990s that technology would substitute for military personnel. As a result, it was claimed that the CF were “more operationally capable and lethal than they were a decade ago.” It was the view of the authors of Caught in the Middle that “this assessment is open to question” (CDA, 2001: 12–13). Among the most questionable aspects of the DND’s self-assessment had nothing to do with training, size, or equipment, the usual measures of operational capability and lethality in any military organization. Rather, the authors of the CDA’s report argued that the belief that, for the foreseeable future, the CF would be employed chiefly in low-risk, non-combat operations, was unrealistic. The basic mission of the CF, the Conference of Defence Associations said, was misconstrued: their first job was not to be a lightly armed constabulary sporting the blue berets of the United Nations but to fight and win wars.

There is no universal consensus among civilian analysts of the CF. What is remarkable, however, is how much these several independent groups agree on the main problems needing redress. All agree that three major elements have combined to constitute the most important comprehensive challenge facing the CF: (1) a new strategic context; (2) the continued adherence to policies that are increasingly remote from contemporary realities; (3) a refusal to rethink obsolete policies. From these three general elements, such specific problems as under-funding or recruitment and retention can be intelligibly linked. We begin, therefore, with a consideration of a decade or so of changes in the military world.
The New Strategic Context

Changes in the military forces of Canada, as of other countries, have taken place in both a political and a technological context. We will consider changes in the technological context below. The political context, at least in principle, has been given definitive, indeed aphoristic, expression by Carl von Clausewitz: “war is the continuation of political operations (Verkehr) with the intermixing of other means.” Leaving aside the domestic use of the CF, which is conventionally called “aid to the civil power,” the existence of a military force has often been likened to an insurance policy (SCONSAD, 2002c: 9). Without paying for security, we can have no prosperity, rule of law, or the pursuit of culturally and humanly distinct objectives and desiderata. Indeed, without military security any country is inviting instability, turmoil, foreign domination, and poverty. The existence of a credible military, in other words, is the basis of national sovereignty: without guns, no butter.

A second implication of Clausewitz’s famous remark, which also indicates the political context within which military policy exists, is that foreign policy strongly influences – even determines – military policy, at least in states that, in principle, claim to be constitutional democracies. So far as Canada is concerned, both military and foreign policy are strongly and directly conditioned by relations with the United States. “The Canada-US defence and security relationship,” write the authors of To Secure a Nation, “has evolved into a strategic partnership. Unfortunately, the Canadian government continues to underplay the realities of that strategic partnership, preferring instead to overplay Canada’s distinctiveness and autonomy with respect to security and defence priorities” (CCS21, 2001: 4). As an instance of “overplaying Canadian distinctiveness,” Canadian soldiers have been prohibited (at least officially) from undertaking “any activity connected with antipersonnel land mines,” which has limited their ability to train with the American army, thus reducing their operational readiness and capabilities (CDA, 2001: 38).

The chief manifestation of overplaying Canadian distinctiveness and autonomy, however, has been in the drastic reduction of the size of the CF and of its ability to act even as a very junior member of a strategic partnership. The result, as we shall see in considerable detail, is that Canada has become more, not less, dependent on the United States. That is, we shall have to consider the apparent paradox that Canadian dependency has increased because the Canadian government has exaggerated Canadian independence. Likewise there is an apparently paradoxical remedy: Canada must become politically closer to the United States in order to protect, not degrade, its sovereignty. Several of the reports we consider have sensed that the ground has shifted, that the assumptions in the twenty-first century governing Canadian-American relations have radically changed. This is why so many of these reports call for a parliamentary review of Canadian military policy in conjunction with a review of Canadian foreign policy. The theory is that of Clausewitz; the hard facts indicate that Canada has but one ally that really counts, America.

The end of the Soviet Union, symbolized by the breaching of the Berlin Wall, marked the victorious conclusion to the Cold War. As with World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and many other modern conflicts, it was not formally ended by treaty. Yet, there was no doubt that the West had won. With victory came complacency. Frank Fukuyama’s celebrated “end of history” promised a world moving gradually towards secular and liberal democracy, a comfortable mediocrity where men and women were more concerned with quiet prosperity and tranquility than with saving their souls or defending their honour in battle (Fukuyama, 1992; see also Cooper, 1994). Canada, even more than the United States, proceeded to cash in its “peace dividend.” Indeed, Canada did so “long before the end of the Cold War” (SCONDVA, 2002). Increasingly Canadians and especially their government took comfort in being highly ranked by the United Nations as a nice place to live. In one sense, there was nothing new in this: western democracies, including Canada, have typically mustered armies for a season, a campaign, or a war. Of course, there were small conflicts elsewhere in the world. In the spring of 2001, for example, at least 30 intra-state conflicts were under way (RCMI, 2001: 3) but they were geographically remote and posed no threat to what soon would be called “homeland security.” During the decade of the 1990s, not domestic
security and defence but peacekeeping was for the DND the chief military challenge and the principles of “human security” (including the prohibition of land mines) and “soft power” were far more important than any concern to maintain a serious fighting force or to train and prepare for extended periods of combat. Even the violent, bloody, and protracted “stabilization” of the former Yugoslavia could be understood, at least publicly, within a peacekeeping context (Cooper, 2002a).

“Terrorism,” wrote the authors of The People’s Defence Review, “is no longer someone else’s problem” (CCS21, 2002: 5). The reason is obvious: “September 11th changed all that” (SCONDVA, 2001). Instead of optimism at the conclusion of the Cold War and a quiet pride in being able to help the inhabitants of failed states and other unfortunates, Canadians suddenly saw they were vulnerable: the attack on the United States was quickly understood to be an attack by aggrieved but perverse religious fanatics on pluralist, secular, liberal democracies, which included Canada. America, The Senate Committee wrote a year after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, remained “the bull’s eye in the sights of most extremists,” but “Canada is clearly positioned as one of the inner rings on the target” (SCONSAD, 2002b: 23; SCONSAD, 2002c: 12).

The method of the attack, namely large-scale and spectacular terrorism, was novel, and initially at least the terrorists and their motives were shrouded in mystery. Several things, however, were clear to all: these new adversaries could act “asymmetrically,” that is, they could use stealth and technology as massive force multipliers to attack and damage a much larger and stronger adversary at home; they were international, non-governmental organizations operating outside the state system; they relied on modern technologies, from satellite phones to air liners; and they targeted the most vulnerable aspects of modern, open, Western societies with spectacular and lethal effect. The sense of vulnerability soon led to considerable speculation on future attacks using even more destructive weapons—chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN). Perhaps more to the point, it was not clear how a conventional military force, even a robust one, would deter a terrorist armed with CBRN weapons. Nor was it clear how a conventional military hierarchy could engage and extinguish a terrorist network (Cooper, 2002b). The first element in the new strategic context, therefore, was not the emergence of the United States as an overwhelming military power but the fact of its vulnerability to asymmetric terrorist attacks — with or without weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

For the first time since the end of World War II, security, including military security, became a focus of government attention in Canada. Security, moreover, was understood as being broader than military power for the perfectly obvious reason that the attacks of September 11, 2001 were asymmetric. Security policy involved such previously “domestic” issues as immigration or harbour police, to say nothing of international airline traffic or questions of supply-chain integrity (see Grubel and McMahon 2002). The shift from military policy in the strict sense of coordinating the roles, missions, and tasks of the CF with Canada’s allies to the broader issue of security policy emphasizes again the novel context within which Canadian foreign policy will be developed in the new century.

Despite the hesitation, confusion, and inability to establish priorities, the first significant response to the terrorist attacks by the Government of Canada and by Canadians was as typical as their earlier disarmament. When attacked, Westerners have typically responded by relentless war. As the second House of Commons report noted: “Afghanistan is not about peacekeeping, nor about peace-making. It is war” (SCONDVA, 2002). The 2002 Afghan operation was certainly war. Indeed, it was chiefly a ground war but it was fought in a new way, not by tanks and artillery using the techniques and procedures for which the Cold War planners had prepared the Western military alliance. Rather, it was fought for the most part by highly mobile light infantry, strongly supported by high-tech air power and intelligence, “an environment in which special forces personnel would prove most effective” (SCONDVA, 2002).

By all reports, Canadian infantry and special forces fought well and were able to integrate themselves capably into American formations. Their ability to do so touches a second structural change in the new strategic context: the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) (Sloan, 2002; Berkowitz, 2003). There are many competing definitions of what is essential and what is peripheral in the RMA. All agree on three things: it is expensive; it relies on the technology of the information age; it requires new organizational doctrines for effective force projection and fighting. Advocates argue that the RMA will dispel the Clausewitzian “fog of war” because it will create “information dominance” prior to establishing conventional military dominance. The term often used to describe this aspect of the RMA is net-centric warfare or even net-war because the priority seems to adhere to networked information systems. In addition, RMA advocates argue that it will reduce Clausewitzian “friction” to near zero; critics reply that the RMA may delude plan-
ners into conceiving of war as “a kind of algebra,” which is just what Clausewitz argued and warned against. The 1991 Gulf War was the first to be conducted with elements of the RMA being pressed into service. Included here were: remote sensing, robust information systems, precision guided munitions, command-and-control systems with a comparatively short time lag, and stealthy “platforms,” which meant everything from huge strategic bombers to robots, small units of special forces, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These elements achieved even greater cohesion in the Kosovo operations, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq. As late as the 2002 Afghanistan campaign, it was clear Canada could participate in an RMA-influenced conflict. To use the language of military planners, Canadian forces were “interoperable” with their senior coalition partner. It is less clear whether Canadian troops could operate “seamlessly” with American and British forces in Iraq. In the event, Canadian capabilities in the latest demonstration of the RMA were never proof-tested because the Government of Canada decided not to participate. Whatever the reasons for the decision, it was undertaken as a matter of foreign, or perhaps domestic, but in any event not military, policy.
Old Assumptions

The connection between the two most prominent strategic novelties, a war on a terrorist network and the RMA, remains largely theoretical. Some of the theoretical elements might have been more extensively tested during the Iraq campaign had the Government of Turkey permitted the US Fourth Infantry Division, the most technically advanced and electronically networked unit in the world, to transit Turkish territory and attack from the north. Even without a comparison between the American Fourth Infantry Division and the more conventional, but still highly networked, troops of the Third Infantry Division, the Marines, and the British, all of whom attacked Iraq from the south, the superiority of “information age” formations to “industrial age” formations such as were mounted by the Iraqis, is beyond serious debate. Of course, the ability of an “RMA participating” force to defeat a “non-RMA participating” force does not settle the issue of how military hierarchies, even when leavened by RMA innovations in procedure, can come to grips with, and defeat, asymmetric terrorist networks (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001).

These strategic novelties, no doubt, will be dealt with in practice by practical men and women in military organizations around the world, including Canada. The problem, however, is that, whatever Canadian military planners may do in practice, as a matter of official government policy, Canadian military doctrine is rooted firmly in the last century when the significance of neither the RMA nor the threat of asymmetric terrorist attacks was obvious. As a practical matter, of course, members of the Canadian military do think about new things and CF units have served in the war against terrorists. The point raised by several of the civilian reports under consideration here, however, is a different one: the central document defining Canadian military policy and war-fighting doctrine, the White Paper on Defence (Canada, 1994), is of chiefly historical interest and, even if it is not entirely irrelevant to contemporary strategic realities, the recommendations it contains have never been implemented or operationalized.

In defence as in other areas of public policy, a White Paper is a pivotal document in the policy-making process as that activity is conducted in Ottawa. With major, complex policy initiatives, the Cabinet on occasion issues a White Paper in order to provide “a clear indication of its intentions” (Dyck, 1993: 390–91). The very premise of one of the reports, To Secure a Nation (CCS21, 2001), is that a new White Paper is necessary, which is to say that the “intentions” set forth in the 1994 document, and the means contemplated to realize them, namely adequate force structure, personnel levels, equipment, training, and logistics, have been utterly overtaken by events. The May 2002 SCONDVA report, for example, declared that the 1994 “White Paper is an anachronism waiting for its epitaph.” Nearly every expert who appeared before that committee agreed “that the CF could no longer meet the commitments of the White Paper.” It is also questionable whether the “commitments” of 1994, except in the most general terms, are relevant to the post-9/11 world. “The mismatch between requirements and capabilities,” said the authors of The People’s Defence Review, “has never been so large” (CCS21, 2002: 11).

Consider, for example, the detailed analysis by the Senate Committee (SCONSAD, 2002c) of the promises not kept in the 1994 policy document. Their argument was straightforward: “the state of disrepair in which the Canadian military finds itself today would not have evolved over the past decade if the Government of Canada had followed the recommendations of the 1994 White Paper on Defence.” The 1994 White Paper was considered by SCONSAD to be “intelligent” and “not . . . extravagant.” Among other things it promised that Canada would be able “to deploy on UN operations contingency forces of up to a maritime task group, a brigade group plus an infantry battalion group, a wing of fighter aircraft, and a squadron of tactical transport aircraft” (Canada, 1994: ch. 6, “Contributing to International Security”). If those forces were all deployed at the same time, some 10,000 soldiers, sailors, and air personnel would be involved. The White Paper also stated: “Canada will increase its commitment of stand-by forces to the UN of two ships, one battle group, one infantry battalion group, one squadron of fighter aircraft, a flight of tactical transport aircraft, a communications element and a headquarters element” (Canada 1994: ch. 6). This second commitment meant that Canada would be capable of deploy-
ing and sustaining indefinitely on UN overseas missions about 4,000 personnel. The SCONSAD report commented:

That never happened. Canada has never maintained 4,000 personnel overseas in the intervening years, because the personnel and resources were never developed to meet that commitment. Twice—in Bosnia and Afghanistan—Canada set out on ambitious field efforts, only to be forced to withdraw because of lack of capacity to sustain those efforts. (SCONSAD, 2002c: 13)

The White Paper also declared that Canada would be able to deploy a joint task force headquarters comprised of one or more of the following:

- a naval task group comprising up to four combatants (destroyers, frigates, or submarines) and a support ship with appropriate maritime air support;
- three separate battle groups, or a brigade group (comprising three infantry battalions, an armored regiment, and an artillery regiment, with appropriate combat support and combat service support);
- a wing of fighter aircraft with appropriate support;
- one squadron of tactical transport aircraft;
- single elements or the vanguard component of this force—within three weeks—and be able to sustain them indefinitely in a low-threat environment and, within three months, the remaining elements of the full contingency force.

Even though the foreign policy context for much of the 1994 White Paper involved the UN and Peacekeeping, the point of the SCONSAD report was that none of the military commitments could be met, whatever the foreign policy assumptions, which, of course, had also changed.

- Afghanistan 2002 indicated that Canada can deploy a naval task group for one rotation.
- Bosnia and Afghanistan indicated that Canada can barely support one and a half battle groups, not three, and certainly not a much larger and complex brigade group.
- The last time an augmented squadron of 28 aircraft was deployed was during the 1990/1991 Gulf War. This is well below an aircraft wing, which consists of 36 planes. A few years later Canada could hardly sustain a small, 8-to-10 plane squadron during the Kosovo campaign.
- Canada has never deployed a squadron of tactical support aircraft. In Afghanistan in 2002, two support planes were in theatre.
- Without strategic air and sea lift, Canada will never be able to come close to meeting the projected deployment time-lines. Moreover, Canada cannot sustain a so-called Vanguard Force beyond six months, as was also evident from Afghanistan.

The White Paper also declared Canada’s military policy to be:

- to earmark an infantry battalion group as either a standby force for the UN or to serve with NATO’s Immediate Reaction Force;
- to have plans ready to institute other measures to increase the capabilities of the Canadian forces to sustain existing commitments or to respond to a major crisis.

To the first commitment the SCONSAD report dryly commented: it is one thing to “earmark” an infantry battalion for deployment and quite another actually to deploy one, which under present conditions is simply not possible. Second, the “major crisis” is already at hand, namely the inability “of the Canadian forces to sustain existing commitments” and there are “no apparent measures to meet it.” Under present circumstances, therefore, having plans ready to increase the capabilities of the CF is little more than a notional, perhaps even utopian, exercise.

The first conclusion to be drawn from the SCONSAD report, as well as from the CCS21 and the RCMI reports, is that the old strategic assumptions do not reflect the new realities conditioned by the Revolution in Military Affairs and the growth of asymmetric and terrorist threats. Even such traditional Canadian commitments to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons have to be reconsidered. In a bipolar world, international agreements such as were embodied in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty or the START series of treaties made a great deal of sense in terms of international stability. When North Korea and Iran developed ballistic missile capability and when they advanced down the road to developing nuclear warheads for them as well, continued adherence to the ABM treaty did not make much
sense. The length of time it has taken for Canada to clarify its position on ballistic missile defence (BMD) indicates that policy-makers were still living in the world of 1994. As late as 2003, the Canadian options were still being “studied.” The first US contracts for BMD were let in 1994.

It also seems clear that not only are the policy assumptions of DND remote from the new realities, the plans and commitments set forth in the 1994 document were remote even from the old realities. That is, the White Paper on Defence established policy guidelines that the Canadian Government did not, or could not, follow. In July, 2001, Daniel Bon, the Director General, Policy Planning and Assistant Deputy Minister at DND, told the Senate Committee that, “with some exceptions the Canadian Forces are much more combat-capable than they were as little as 10 years ago” (SCONSAD, 2002c: 15). Bon’s remarks were received with considerable skepticism. As the authors of the CCS21 2001 report noted, “there is a deep divide between the rhetoric of a grandiose foreign and defence policy and a decline in resources that threatens to discredit Canada’s commitment to common security” (CCS21, 2001: 18). The next matter to consider, therefore, is the extent of this decline in resources.
A “State of Disrepair”

In reports issued during the early and mid-1990s, which are outside our present consideration, SCONDVA argued for the need to have an expeditionary capability consisting of well-trained troops that are fully interoperable with our allies. We have called for more resources, new equipment, adequate troop levels and an effort to realize the potential of the Reserves. While we cannot claim omniscience, as a Committee, we feel that our past reports and recommendations were very constructive contributions to our defence capabilities. The post-September 11th security environment has added a level of unimagined urgency to some of our previous comments (SCONDVA, 2001).

Notwithstanding nearly a decade of advocacy and the “unimagined urgency” of the post-9/11 world, there is widespread agreement that the Canadian Forces cannot do its job.

- After more than a decade of significant cuts in size and funding, the Canadian Forces are losing the ability to make meaningful and sustained contributions to domestic, continental, and global security. (CCS21, 2001: 1)

- The Canadian Forces are stretched to the breaking point … the Canadian Forces is unequivocally short of personnel (SCONSAD, 2002a: 88).

- The Testimony that we have heard, in conjunction with the analysis of the international military situation that we have done, compels the Committee to state flatly that Canadian Forces are under strength, overworked, underfunded, and in precarious health. (SCONSAD, 2002c: 23)

- The CF currently inhabit the worst of two worlds: conventional capabilities are in decline; and, new capabilities are unaffordable. (CDA, 2001: 4)

- Canada’s past procurement practices have largely amounted to a policy of mortgaging the future by not acknowledging its existence. (CCS21, 2002: 23)

There is also widespread agreement regarding the details and extent of the decline in operational readiness of the CF and the reasons for it.

Operational readiness depends, almost by definition, on a clear understanding of the mission a military force is expected to fulfill. Furthermore, as we noted above, in Canada military policy is tributary to foreign policy and is a constituent element of security policy more generally. In principle, however, the CF must be able to make a meaningful contribution, however modest, to military operations across the whole spectrum of combat intensity. As has already been indicated, budget cuts are usually cited as the central cause of the decline of the CF, which is, no doubt, true enough. There is, however, a preliminary issue to be considered. It has, indeed, already arisen indirectly in the observation of SCONSAD that many DND bureaucrats, both civilian and military, exhibited “timidity with the truth.”

The transformation of Canadian Forces Headquarters, with divided responsibilities between the deputy minister and civilian staff (who controlled the money) and the military (who controlled operations) into the integrated National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) of the present has resulted in the “civilianization of the department—the dominance of managers over the military, and of military bureaucrats over operational commanders” (Granatstein, 2002: 373). The implications for operational readiness, in the minimal sense given above, namely being capable of making a military difference to the success of an operation, were emphasized by the report from the Royal Canadian Military Institute:

In long periods of peace, “desk” warriors” tend to replace “combat warriors.” It is so long since Canadian troops faced a serious enemy that most of our top officers have never experienced combat. Under such circumstances bureaucratic considerations triumph.
over innovation and sometimes even over common sense. “Careers” take precedence over what is ultimately right for the CF and Canada as a whole. (RCMI, 2001: 14)

The first CCS21 report raised the same issue and pointed out that civilianization of NDHQ left the Minister of National Defence without an independent source of military advice to verify and report independently on developments in the CF, including operational readiness (CCS21, 2001: 28). Likewise the Conference of Defence Associations report noted a “trend towards ‘demilitarization’ of DND” that treats the military as “merely another government department,” with the result, a ‘watering-down’ of the military ethos” (CDA, 2001: 9). The problem, in short, is that Canada has nothing like the American National Security Council to advise on defence issues and, with civilianized desk warriors atop the chain-of-command, politically palatable rather than militarily rational decisions have too often been made. Moreover, NDHQ has been called upon to provide operational command and control over offshore operations, “a task it was not designed to perform. It is now time to review and analyze thoroughly NDHQ operations with a view to their improvement” (CCS21, 2002: 24).

One of the most obvious consequences of budgetary reductions, which we next discuss, is that their arbitrary nature has forced the CF “into a process of irrational change” resulting in greatly diminished capabilities with no obvious way to begin restoration (CDA, 2001: 41). The remainder of this section will discuss the details of the decline of the CF first in terms of budgets, then in terms of what the military call “kit,” and third in terms of personnel.

**Budget Shortfalls**

“The reduction in the size of the Canadian Forces,” say the authors of the first CCS21 report, “has been budget driven” (CCS21, 2001: 18). Figure 1, reproduced from the Senate report of February 2002 (SCONSAD 2002a), illustrates the budget trend in constant dollars.

Another way of looking at public expenditures on equipment and personnel is to look at per-capita expenditures. There are, of course, bargains to be had in the area of military hardware as in other areas of life but, generally speaking, you get what you pay for. There are also, invariably, differences in priorities and responsibilities so that large states with global commitments are bound to spend more defending their overseas interests, even though economies of scale may reduce unit costs of bullets or tanks. Whatever ingenuity is devoted to explaining—or explaining away—the comparative data, however, it amounts only to a marginal qualification of some obvious and order-of-magnitude differences between Canada and its allies.

As the authors of the November 2002 Senate report, *For an Extra $130 Bucks ...* put it:

... consider these facts:

- Canada spends approximately $395 per capita on defence.
- The United Kingdom spends approximately $1,425 per capita on defence.
- The United States spends approximately $2,000 per capita on defence.
- Although Canada, in the current context of international terrorism, is clearly much more of a military

![Figure 1: Historical Trend of Defence Expenditures (Constant 2000$), 1988–2000](image)
target than most of the world’s smaller countries, it ranks 153rd in defence spending out of 192 countries based on percentage of GDP.

- Canada ranked 13th out of 18 NATO nations in per-capita defence spending—ahead of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Turkey, and Spain.
- At approximately 31 million people, Canada has the world’s 34th largest population. It has the 56th largest regular military forces; the 77th largest military reserves.
- As of August 31, 2002, Canada ranked 34th in the world in its contribution to world peacekeeping missions, supplying less than 1 percent of international peacekeepers in action. (SCONSAD, 2002c: 10–11. Each of these numbers is referenced to a national, NATO, or UN source.)

The conclusion drawn by the Senate committee was obvious: “Any way you cut it, Canada’s level of military spending would be more appropriate to a nation hidden away from the fray of global finance, global politics, and global influence (SCONSAD, 2002c: 12). Moreover, a precipitous 30% decline in defence spending over five years (1993–1998) cannot be restored by a tiny up-tick starting in 2001—an issue especially relevant to training and to which we shall return. As nearly every commentator from the Auditor General to editorial writers has noted, of the projected $5 billion increase in spending between 1999 and 2006, only $750 million is devoted to an increase in the budget base. Thus, it simply does not address capital or operations and maintenance (O&M) shortfalls, all of which constitute the basis for operational readiness and capability. Indeed, of the approximately $12 billion in the DND budget, somewhere between 17% and 25% is “flow through” money, committed beforehand to programs such as provincial disaster relief, transfer payments, and employment insurance. These programs are, perhaps, worthy in their own way but in no way do they contribute to military capabilities. And, as the House Committee pointed out, the announced increase is deceptive because it “overstates what is in fact a very limited budget” (SCONDVVA, 2002). Once again, “timidity with the truth” makes a bad problem—the inability of each branch of the CF to deliver on its mandated level of defence capability—worse by hiding the real problem from public and political scrutiny or pretending it does not exist.

This financial situation means that the Navy will have to reduce fleet operations, delay development and modernization of ships, and be unable to meet and sustain commitments to which it is notionally obligated; the Air Force will have to delay or sacrifice modernization programs; the Army, which has even less flexibility than the other services because 71% of the operations and maintenance budget is tied up in personnel and infrastructure costs, will have to forget about its planned sustain-and-change agendas, forcing soldiers to accept long-term risk in the way of equipment rust-out and further force reduction. In short, all three branches face unprecedented pressure on their O&M budgets and very little flexibility.

Because resources are not sufficient to meet demands, each service is forced to delay anything that is not immediately necessary and essential, which results in long-term damage. So long as costs exceed commitments—and there is no indication that matters are about to change—the military effectiveness of the CF will continue to decline.

**Kit**

In the CF, the term “kit,” which was borrowed from British military usage, refers to materials and equipment, everything from a canteen or an arctic sleeping bag to a weapons platform such as a LAV III, a CF-18, or HMCS Edmonton.

In his testimony before the Senate Committee, Assistant Deputy Minister Daniel Bon reminded his audience that the White Paper on Defence (Canada 1994) said that the CF were to be “appropriately equipped, but no more,” and indicated that, largely because of commitments to defence expenditures made in the 1980s and early 1990s, most of the army and navy equipment is acceptable (SCONSAD, 2002a: 31). The time lag of 15 to 20 years, however, indicates the chief problem with current CF equipment. Just as a demographic bulge can accurately predict future pension requirements, so too can future replacement needs be seen with considerable clarity. Senior military staff have for at least a decade and a half drawn the attention of civilian auditors (including the Auditor General) to the growing problem of “rust out.” That is, equipment, even robust military equipment, that has been upgraded to contemporary state-of-the-art standards, wears out. And, much of the CF kit has become far from the state of the art in any event. This has led military planners and those who watch their work to speak ominously of a “mass extinction scenario,” much as befell the dinosaurs.

In a talk to The Fraser Institute in May 2003, Major-General Cameron Ross (since retired) graphically represented the two dimensions of the equipment problem facing the CF (figure 2). In the upper left-hand quadrant can be found the operationally effective kit. Included here are such major platforms as the dozen Halifax class frigates acquired between 1992 and 1996 and the even newer Kingston class...
Canada’s Military Posture

Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs). The army has two excellent vehicles, the Coyote, a wheeled, armoured reconnaissance vehicle, and the LAV-III, a wheeled, armoured troop carrier, both acquired after 1996. Also included here are modern radio equipment (TCCCS), a track-mounted air defence system (ADATS) and two anti-tank weapons, one short-range (ERYX) and the other long-range (TOW). The four Iroquois class command-and-control destroyers have undergone extensive refits and so are fully capable of sailing in concert with the Americans and British but the hulls are old and the vessels are fast approaching the end of their operational life, as are the two Protecteur class supply ships, which have not been refitted. The various categories of trucks and “life extended” (LE) light-armoured vehicles are also somewhat long in the tooth. Finally, the Airbus 310, called Polaris by the Air Force, “is restricted to well prepared and maintained runways” and is “not a true strategic airlift” (SCONSAD, 2002a: 33), and the light Griffin helicopter is inadequate for many tasks performed by the medium Chinook helicopters before they were sold to the Dutch.

The main problem, even with the modern, state-of-the-art, equipment available to the CF, is that there is not enough of it. The number of available destroyers has been effectively, though not officially, reduced from four to three; the number of available MCDVs is six, not 12. The available helicopter fleet is 85, not 99, and the pride of the Army, the Coyotes and LAVs, are in short supply, which has

**Figure 2: The Two Dimensions of the Equipment Problem in the Canadian Forces**

created a culture of “robbing Peter to pay Paul,” stripping one unit of equipment to supply another unit deploying (CDA, 2001: 24–28).

The real problems, however, are indicated by the major pieces of equipment located in the lower right-hand quadrant. Here the kit is both reaching obsolescence and simply wearing out. The unarmoured ILTIS jeep was obtained in the mid-1980s and looks more liked a World War II jeep than a contemporary (and armoured) Humvee; both the Leopard tank and the M109 self-propelled howitzer are remnants from the Cold War, as is the M113 armoured personnel carrier (APC). A replacement program for direct fire-support vehicles, however, was announced in the fall of 2003, although it will take at least a couple of years before the new Stryker vehicles will be operational.

The Air Force, however, which is inherently high-tech, has suffered the most from the refusal of the government to maintain equipment at acceptable levels. Replacement of the CH-113 Labrador search-and-rescue helicopter is currently underway but the CH-124 Sea King is still several years away from being replaced. The chief problem with the Sea King (apart from the unfavourable ratio of maintenance to flying time) is that it was designed for anti-submarine warfare during the Cold War and is used today primarily for surface surveillance and support for boarding operations at sea. As the authors of the second CCS21 report noted,

there are simply no words available to describe adequately, or to otherwise account for, the failure of the Government of Canada to follow through on the 1994 White Paper Declaration that “there is an urgent need for robust and capable new ship-borne helicopters. The Sea Kings are rapidly approaching the end of their operational life.” Eight years, many crashes, and several thousands of hours of lost flying time later, it is still true. (CCS21, 2002: 26; see also Cooper and Bercuson, 2003)

The CP-140 Auroras are long-range surveillance aircraft, about half the age of the Sea Kings and can be upgraded with modern equipment to extend their service life. Their numbers have been reduced from 21 to 18 planes and their hours on station actually doing their job have likewise been reduced.

The remaining two aircraft, the C-130 Hercules and the CF-18 fighters, each have their own sets of problems. Nearly two-thirds of the C-130s are nearly 40 years old, which, as with the Sea King, increases their maintenance hours and decreases their availability. This has proven to be a major problem because so many of Canada’s post-Cold War deployments have been to far away places—Kosovo, Eritrea, East Timor, Afghanistan—“extremely long ranges on extremely short notice,” as the authors of the 2002 CCS21 report put it (CCS21, 2002: 18). There are other problems as well. The Hercules, for example, can transport a Coyote reconnaissance vehicle only after the turret has been removed, thus reducing its effectiveness in rapid deployment. The LAV-III is too heavy for the Hercules. A little over half the CF-18 fleet is gradually undergoing a mid-life refit to enable them to fly with those currently in service in the US Navy and Marine Corps. The rest of these fighter-bombers, however, will continue to use the radios and computers that were installed over 20 years ago or they will be sealed away in their hangars. Without modern communications, the CF-18 fleet is unable to operate with Canada’s allies so it may as well be grounded, which would save gas. In short, the refusal to undertake any serious thinking about future equipment requirements is reflected equally in official adherence to the obsolete and irrelevant policy articulated in the 1994 White Paper on Defence and in the downward drift in operational readiness tracked faithfully by declining budgets.

It is as obvious as such things can be that postponing replacement of the ILTIS jeep and the CH-124 Sea King fleets has harmed the CF’s operational effectiveness. But, there are other long-term equipment problems as well. Readiness invariably suffers when equipment is kept in service after it has become obsolete or past the point of economical operation. This was as true of Canada’s loss of strategic air-to-air refueling and its current recovery as of acquiring new submarine capability after the old boats were withdrawn from service. In principle, when funds are spent on maintaining old kit, they cannot be spent on buying new. “The problem facing Canada” the House of Commons Committee observed, “is that major pieces of equipment will have to be replaced in 10 to 15 years and considerable expenditures will have to be made for this, as well as for the upgrading of other equipment” (SCONDVA, 2002). Even worse: if Canadians in 2015 or 2020 are faced, for example, with replacing a dozen frigates and a dozen coastal patrol vessels at enormous expense—the “mass extinction scenario”—they may view the prospect as hopeless. That is, without current investment in refitting and constructing modern warships (to take one expensive example) Canada could quickly go from being the only navy in the world that is fully interoperable with the best navy in the world to being a country with a brown-water navy, little more than fisheries patrol vessels and ice breakers useful for extending the shipping season in the St. Lawrence river.
For many years, the House Committee has made the case that Canada needs to have an expeditionary capability that consists of well-trained troops, fully interoperable with Canada’s allies—which, in effect, means the United States. Good equipment is needed to reach that objective. As many reports have noted, the extent to which Canada can meet its obligations today is largely a result of decisions taken a decade or more ago. In the new strategic environment discussed above, and leaving aside the purely technical aspects of the revolution in military affairs, it would seem that rapid response and rapid deployment of light strike forces has become essential. This means that so far as equipment is concerned the focus should logically be on strengthening the bridge between the army and the other two services, namely on air and sealift capacity. This is an important element in what the military call “jointness,” and is an issue to which we return below.

Given the age of the C-130 fleet and the two supply ships, if they are to be replaced, they will have to be replaced soon. Indeed, if the supply vessels are not replaced in the near future Canada will be without a blue-water navy because it will be unable to replenish its fighting ships at sea. Thus, the Senate Committee recommended purchasing eight strategic heavy-lift aircraft to permit the rapid deployment of “outsized cargo,” such as a LAV-III or a Coyote, and four logistics and sealift roll-on/roll-off ships (SCONSAD, 2002a: 100).

**Personnel**

Along with modern and effective kit, the “skills, courage, and dedication” of CF personnel are indispensable to carrying out missions successfully (SCONDVA, 2002). Even more basic, there must also be a sufficient number of such individuals. The 1994 *White Paper on Defence* targets reduced the size of the Regular Force from 87,000 to 60,000 and the Reserves to 20,000. As the 2002 report of the House Committee went on, “the reduction to 60,000 was bad enough given the increased tempo of operations which occurred during the 1990s. The Forces and especially the Army became overstretched, but the decline below 60,000 exacerbated the problems. The suspension of recruitment for a few years during the 1990s did not help either because the flow of new recruits into the Forces was interrupted” (SCONDVA, 2002). The current CF muster is around 55,000.

This would not, by itself, mean that the CF were in a crisis had there been an extensive (and expensive) restructuring of the forces to meet the new realities of the RMA and the current strategic context. In fact, however, there has been no change in the force structure: “The CF have simply become smaller” (CCS21, 2001: 19).

Indeed, “it is almost as difficult to retain CF members as it is to recruit new ones” (CCS21, 2001: 23). The basic problem, on which nearly all the reports agree, is that the CF are faced with an increased need for technically capable and well-trained personnel to meet the demands of the RMA but possess a decreased ability to meet those needs, which further adds to the decline in operational readiness. The Senate Committee, for example, reported that there are 105 military occupations in the CF and that they can be rated in terms of how close their “trained effective strength” comes to the “preferred manning level.” A job is classed as “critical” if it is under 90% of the preferred level and cannot reach the preferred level within two years; “caution” if it is 91% to 95% and the shortfall can be made up within one to two years. Forty-three of the 105 occupations are “critical” and another 23 are “caution,” which is to say some 63% of all jobs in the CF are under some kind of stress. Moreover, they are concentrated in highly specialized occupations such as fire control and weapons technicians, which require considerable training time for practitioners to achieve competence, as well as in electronics and engineering specialties. The Air Force, for example, has a “critical” shortage of 222 pilots and 40 aerospace engineers. Moreover, the most highly trained personnel are needed to teach their replacements, which adds to the burden of maintaining operational effectiveness (SCONSAD, 2002a: 22–23).

The explanation that is usually given for this problem is that the CF have been unable to meet “quality of life” considerations. “Quality of life” in the conventional sense of pay has been an issue during the 1990s, especially on the west coast because of high housing costs, as have been physical and psychological injuries sustained as a result of dangerous activity—post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the effects of depleted uranium ordinance, “Gulf War Syndrome,” being the most prominent examples. In a military context, however, “quality of life” has another, more complex, meaning. As the authors of the Royal Canadian Military Institute report noted, young people do not volunteer because they want to take advantage of the splendid health-care system available in the CF. They join up because

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3. The term “tempo” refers to “the total number of missions undertaken by the Canadian Forces at any one time” SCONSAD, 2002a: 25.
they want to fight (RCMI, 2001: 22). That is, quality of life also means excitement, challenge, opportunity, and even just training for combat and all of those depend upon having a sufficiently large muster that the deployment tempo does not have an adverse impact on personal “safety mechanisms,” namely leave, rotation, and training. Conversely, a high deployment tempo erodes the “safeguards designed to preserve the marriages, health, sanity and professional performance of Canadian troops” (SCONSAD, 2002c: 23). According to the House Committee, a high operational tempo “has pushed many of the remaining members of the Forces to the point of exhaustion” (SCONDVA, 2002). In common-sense language, a high tempo is simply unsustainable. The CF have, however, pursued a high tempo for nearly a decade and the results are obvious: a loss of experienced personnel.

Funding reductions have had a direct and catastrophic impact on training. Consider first the simple matter of the size of units that can be brought together for military exercises. Several of the service personnel interviewed by the House Committee in 2001 argued that Canada could not muster a brigade. As a matter of historical record, for nearly a decade no brigade-level military exercises had been held. The absence of such relatively large maneuvers has serious implications for combat effectiveness and for leadership.

Our commanders need the experience of leading troops at this basic level of military organization. For our troops to be effective in the field, they must know one another, train together and be able to build the requisite levels of trust and familiarity that are essential for battlefield survival.

If our forces are to be interoperable with our allies we need to be able to train with them on a regular basis. The brigade is the critical mass required for effective joint training. It is also important to note that while our forces need to be interoperable, they must also be able to operate under independent Canadian command. The brigade offers the minimum force necessary to ensure such independence of command (SCONDVA, 2001).

We will return again to the issue of interoperability in the following section. One of the less obvious consequences of avoiding training exercises with large formations is a lack of command experience for senior officers at the “basic level of military organization” or the “critical mass required for effective joint training.” In the military, as in other walks of life, it is easy to ignore what you never experience. Never having experienced brigade command has contributed in a fundamental way to the eclipse of “combat warriors” by “desk warriors” (RCMI, 2001: 14).

A military organization is a highly articulated hierarchy. Training starts with individuals and moves up (to use the army as an example) through sections, companies, battalions, and brigades. Combat army brigades, for instance, comprise three infantry battalions along with armoured, artillery, engineering, signals, medical, and logistics units. Usually one of the battalions is “light infantry,” a sub-unit of which has parachute capability; a helicopter squadron from the air force is also usually attached. This basic force structure is a complex but stable organization that must practice and train if it is to be effective. Moreover, it has the organizational shape it does because of previous experience fighting wars: it is not an arbitrary model plucked from the air by an arm-chair general or civilian equivalent. Even marginal changes to this basic organizational model come gradually, after extensive computer simulation and on-the-ground war games. That is, the structure in the term “force structure” is at least as important as numbers, equipment, and training.

We noted above that the response to budget cuts was a smaller, but not restructured, military. On the one hand, it certainly made good sense not to try to invent an entirely new force structure in response to less money. On the other hand, these same budget cuts have necessarily undermined the existing force structure because they have been translated into “arbitrary restrictions and deletions of components, including entire sub-units” of the basic organizational model described above (CDA, 2001: 28). When the various sub-units of the basic organizational model, which constitutes any force structure, are removed, the result is a disarticulation of the entire organization. A fundamental vulnerability or instability is introduced so that, “rather than a well–organized structure of proven components, the army has slipped into a mode that could be described as a ‘manpower pool’” (CDA, 2001: 28). “Robbing Peter to pay Paul” thus does not end with moving familiar equipment around but extends to personnel. It should be evident that a manpower pool in uniform, toting guns, and riding around in an LAV is not, properly speaking, an army with a proven, articulated, well-organized force structure built up from sections to companies to battalions and brigades.

Specific additional consequences of the absence of money for training that have reduced the operational readiness of the CF include:

- delays in getting potential recruits processed and into the Canadian Forces;
• recruits left with very little to do while they wait for training opportunities to open up;

• personnel waiting seven to 12 months for basic qualification courses;

• the augmentation of training units from operational formations;

• a shortage of spare parts that has reached such a level where it affects technicians’ attitudes towards job satisfaction and their subsequent retention in the CF;

• the cannibalization of operational units in order to staff training units during peak training periods (SCONSAD, 2002c: 40).

Moreover, the causal sequence can all be traced to lower funding. The mandated downsizing of the 1990s meant that fewer recruits entered the CF because reductions were achieved chiefly by attrition. Initially, this reduction contributed to increased operational tempo, as noted above, because fewer people were available for deployment. The effects on training over the longer term, however, were both more significant and more insidious. With fewer recruits needing to be trained, “it was easy to argue that training personnel and material could be drastically reduced” (SCONSAD, 2002c: 41). And they were. The result was that fewer recruits were instructed and highly skilled instructors were moved into operational tasks. This meant that, throughout the CF, skills, including combat skills, were degraded or lost. With a lowered level of professionalism and reduced training, the most highly trained and highly motivated—the best—personnel in the CF voted with their feet and left. The loss was compounded by the fact that those who remained were less concerned about the decline of professionalism and so easily acquiesced in the decline in combat capability and fighting effectiveness.

The several consequences of the funding crisis in the CF have had cumulative effects. Here are two (of many) examples. A highly trained C-130 Hercules pilot does not re-enlist because he seldom gets to fly. He cannot fly because aircraft are unavailable. Aircraft are unavailable because mechanics have to wait an inordinate time for spare parts or they lack the equipment to carry out maintenance in a timely manner. In addition, morale is low because the parts or the equipment is available and could be purchased locally.

The Electronic Warfare Squadron at CFB Kingston acquired an Intelligence Gathering System several years ago. The firm that manufactured the equipment went out of business shortly after producing four prototypes. There are no spare parts so one unit is being cannibalized to keep the others operating. This common problem is exacerbated by two additional and wholly unnecessary complications: first, many of the coding and decoding functions of the system are obsolete. They do not, for example, “frequency-hop,” which adds another level of security and so serves to enhance code-breaking skills through more realistic training. However, “even if they got modern equipment, the Canadian Radio Television and Telecommunications Commission restricts the military to assigned bandwidths,” which effectively prohibits frequency-hopping. Second, the Intelligence Gathering System could be made to work if the Electronic Warfare Squadron “were allowed to bypass the procurement system and buy off-the-shelf parts, some of which were readily available at the local Radio Shack,” which were both less expensive and more reliable (SCONSAD, 2002c: 61). As with the locally available aircraft parts noted above, CF personnel are compelled to purchase parts through military channels.

Both of these examples deal with conventional military issues. There has been much less attention devoted to newer asymmetric threats, noted above, including Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) or Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) attacks. Nor has there been much training in mobilizing the existing NBC Response Team, which is, in any case inadequate because it is too small (SCONDVA, 2001; SCONDVA, 2002). The Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) is intended chiefly for external deployment into insecure areas; its chief drawback is that it takes 26 flights of C-130s to move it (as distinct from four flights of a C-5 Galaxy or seven of a C-17 Globemaster) (SCONSAD, 2002c: 67). Nor has much attention been devoted to another asymmetrical threat, a cyberwar attack (RCMI, 2001: ch. 8).

For many of the personnel and training problems discussed in these reports there are obvious and clear solutions—and the first of these is money. Even massive increases in funding, however, cannot provide a short-term fix. There is no short-term fix. It takes years rather than months to train people, to recover lost or forgotten skills, or to acquire new ones. All the money in the world cannot easily or quickly overcome the effects of a decade of neglect.
Half a century ago, prior to the age of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), military and strategic planners in Canada and the United States knew that American homeland security was necessarily continental. To a considerable extent, it still is. Given the importance of continental trade, Canada is bound to play a significant role in American homeland security policy. We will see, however, that in terms of military policy strictly considered, Canada’s geographic proximity to the United States is increasingly less important than it has been historically. However that may be, in the decade prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001 the geostrategic importance of Canada for America’s homeland security—a broader concept than military security—was all but ignored: the context for relations between Canada and the United States had been framed almost entirely by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The economic benefits accruing to the signatories are evident in nearly a decade of economic growth reflected in rising trade figures. Moreover, the connection between democratic political institutions and free trade has been well documented by numerous international bodies, university scholars, NGOs, and think-tanks (Gwartney et al., 2003). Arguably, there is no greater threat to the liberal democratic institutions and prosperity of North America than an attack on the American homeland. It is clear, not simply from the emergency response to the attack in the days that followed September 11, 2001 that Canada is vulnerable to the same kind of physical attack, that Canada felt immediately the economic consequences of the attack, that Canada was part of a North American response to it, and that Canada is bound to be as much a part of future defence against terrorism as it was part of the military offensive of 2002 in Afghanistan (SCONSAD, 2002a: 62ff).

Notwithstanding the common problem of continental security, the United States and Canada have both common and divergent interests. It has often been said of relations between the United States and Canada that, when Americans look north, they think chiefly of their own security but, when Canadians look south, they are both noticed by American markets and concerned over the erosion of Canadian sovereignty. In short, for the United States, security in the North America simply means security; for Canada, security is also influenced by concern for trade and sovereignty. Indeed, in the Canadian literature on relations between Canada and the United States, the issue has often been overstated and certainly starkly framed as security versus sovereignty. These ongoing aspects of the Canadian-American relationship have reappeared since September 11, 2001 but in a new form. Nearly all the reports examined for this analysis discussed or alluded to the foregoing problem.

Thirty years ago, Nils Orvik developed the concept “defence against help” as a general security strategy for small states (Orvik, 1973). Under conditions of geostrategic interdependence (Orvik initially had Finland and the Soviet Union in mind), the larger power, however friendly, posed a threat to the smaller because it was in a position to protect its own interests by “helping” its smaller neighbour defend itself, whether the smaller state agreed or not. To avoid such “help” smaller countries had to have military credibility. For Orvik, this meant persuading the large neighbour that the smaller one could defend itself against any of the enemies of the large neighbour, though obviously not against the large neighbour itself, because that was unnecessary.

The application of Orvik’s doctrine to Canada is this: because American security is—or rather, has been—strongly dependent on Canadian territory and airspace and because the two countries have many common interests, Canada can defend itself against American help by concluding bilateral defence agreements. Defence questions have thus centered not on resisting the United States’ security needs but on establishing the terms and conditions, the ground rules, governing American military activities on or over Canadian territory. This, Orvik said, is “the basic issue in Canadian national security” (Orvik, 1981).

Historically speaking—at least for the past 80 years—“defence against help” has been a useful way of thinking about Canada’s defence relations with the United States.
States. In the late 1930s, secret talks between senior military officials laid the groundwork for President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s pledge of 1938 to assist Canada should it be attacked. Prime Minister Mackenzie King promised, reciprocally, that Canada would resist any attempt to use Canadian territory as a means of attacking the United States. In 1940, the defence relations between the two countries were formalized by the Ogdensburg Agreement. During the Second World War the United States built the Alaska Highway as well as extensive infrastructure to support an air-staging route to Alaska and on to the Soviet Union. Using the new Permanent Joint Board of Defence, the Canadian government created joint defence plans that provided for “bilateral force command cooperation” (that is, on-going consultation between Canadian and American chain-of-command structures) rather than a unified Canadian, American, or blended chain-of-command structure, for the military aspect of northern defence, and increased the numbers of Canadians on the ground in the north (Bercuson, 1990).

The coming of the Cold War increased the geostrategic importance of the Canadian north: a transpolar attack by Soviet bombers posed the most likely threat to North America. At the same time, because tactical decisions for the comparatively high-tech air force had to be made very quickly, the option of cooperation and consultation between separate and distinct military hierarchies was less appealing and less workable than it was with land and maritime forces. As a result, the two air forces worked out an innovative solution to the problem of balancing the demands of national sovereignty with the military imperatives of unified command and control.

It is important to bear in mind that Canada did not simply acknowledge America’s strategic security concerns, it shared them. In this regard, Canadian and American foreign policies were in agreement: Canadian airspace would be the next battlespace and Canadian territory would be where the radioactive detritus of battle would likely end up. Canadian exposure was enhanced by one of the strategic lessons learned in World War II: an intelligent and effective bomber defence must be based upon early detection and interception of the bomber stream as far as possible from its intended targets, a doctrine called “forward engagement.” It was operationalized first by pre-positioning Canadian troops and aircraft in Germany on the “central front” described in NATO planning; by 1954, the North American variant was in place. This was the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line, a complex of arctic radar sites positioned to track incoming bombers and send interceptors as far north as possible to kill them, initially using air-burst tactical nuclear weapons and then heat-seeking and radar-guide missiles. The first echelon engagement was undertaken by the RCAF; the second by the USAF. Later the DEW line was used to warn North American targets of incoming ICBMs, should they have been launched by the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, that is, Canada participated actively in European and continental defence. Of equal importance to our present concerns, Canada was compelled to contribute to the defence of North America because of its geographic position between the two superpowers, given the technology and the strategies of the day. Changing technologies and changing strategies would present Canada with a different array of options or a different set of problems. The contemporary version of forward engagement or of pre-positioning, for example, is greater mobility, both by air and by sea. In any event, even in the 1950s and early 1960s when Canada supported the doctrine of forward engagement with real assets, the Canadian contribution to continental defence was hardly equal to the American but it was credible and responsible, thus fulfilling the requirements of Orvik’s theory of “defence against help.”

The first formal and conscious institutionalization of what both Canadian and American defence planners saw as a geostrategic necessity was the North American Air (later Aerospace) Command, NORAD. In 1955, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to a proposal from the two air forces for their operational integration. The objective was to rationalize continental air defence by providing authoritative direction from a single location by a single command rather than by multiple, decentralized commands making independent decisions that may well have resulted in conflicting action messages. At the same time, the Combatant Commander (an American) and Deputy Commander (a Canadian) would report to their respective governments, which would both ensure civilian control and safeguard Canadian concerns about national sovereignty. On May 12, 1958, the North American Air Defence Command Agreement was signed by President Eisenhower and Prime Min-

4. We shall ignore “Defence Scheme No. 1” drawn up during the early 1920s by Col. J. Sutherland “Buster” Brown, which contemplated Canadian occupation of Spokane, Seattle, and Portland as well as a rapid assault on Fargo, North Dakota. In 1933, the Chief of the General Staff, Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton, ordered all copies destroyed. (See Eayrs, 1964: 323ff, 70ff; Preston 1974).
ister Diefenbaker. NORAD ensured that planning and air operations would be binational; but since they would be coordinated against an attack across the pole, NORAD also addressed American concerns about security by creating an integrated operational command structure. For the next half century, NORAD provided joint, cooperative, and coherent defence of the entire continent.

This outline of the historical context of defence relations between Canada and the United States indicates that the theoretical problem of “defence against help” was essentially solved by NORAD. Several of the reports under analysis explicitly or implicitly acknowledge the importance of the NORAD model. Accordingly, expanding this model in a world after September 11, 2001, it is argued, would ensure harmonious bilateral relations into the foreseeable future. That is, the argument of many of these reports is that neglect of the CF has impaired Canada’s ability to defend itself against American help. This is true enough but, we will argue, it is not the whole truth.

The report of May 2002 by the House of Commons Standing Committee, for example, emphasized the importance of defence of North America, which “means that we must be willing to bear our fair share of the burden. One suspects our neighbours remain skeptical about our willingness to do so.” Homeland defence, the Committee continued, is “a piece of common sense … Both nations need to protect each other in order to protect themselves. In our case, however, we are also protecting ourselves from potential US intervention in Canadian affairs” (SCONDVA, 2002).

In his testimony before the Senate Committee, Kenneth Calder, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) in DND praised NORAD strongly:

“[I]t seems to us that an arrangement with the United States or any other country that allows us to work together with them but does not in fact force us to work with them in any particular crisis … and which does not inhibit us from acting independently, does not in fact impact on Canadian sovereignty. We would argue that is the case with NORAD. NORAD gives us a mechanism where the two countries, when they agree, can act together. It does not stop either country from acting individually and separately in the same area, the area of aerospace defence. In fact, for NORAD to function, it must have the agreement of both governments. Therefore, we would say that in fact NORAD is not any sort of diminution of our sovereignty. It is actually an exercise of our sovereignty to be involved in that operation. (SCONSAD, 2002: 24–25)"

The Committee endorsed Calder’s view and added that it is a great bargain as well.

Defence against help was a premise of the first CCS21 report, informing particularly its concern that Canada never become a liability to the United States (CCS21, 2001: 4), and also of the Royal Canadian Military Institute’s analysis (RCMI, 2001: 19–20). In this context as well, the House Committee introduced the concept of “capabilities-based planning” as providing an appropriate context within which to discuss operational readiness in a world without traditional and obvious enemies. The Committee quoted General Richard Myers, Chairman of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff: because it is easier to anticipate how an adversary might fight than who that adversary might be, General Myers said, the task of a defence planner is “to identify the capabilities US military forces will need to deter and defeat a wide variety of adversaries.” After summarizing Gen. Myer’s testimony before the US House Armed Services Committee, the House Committee noted: “What is of utmost importance is the ability to deploy quickly, have a high degree of interoperability, and be able to make effective use of technological advances. These principles will have significant bearing, not only on the American military, but also on those of its allies” (SCONDVA, 2002).

In bilateral relations, given the new approach to warfighting emphasized by the American general, Canada has a long way to go. For example, American doctrine calls for the deployment of “light brigade-sized strike forces without heavy armour and artillery in 96 hours” or four days. In contrast, Canada hopes to deploy a “Vanguard Force” in 21 days (SCONDVA, 2001), which makes it a vanguard in name only. Clearly, genuine interoperability with the United States remains remote and capabilities-based planning makes this problem even more apparent than do traditional ways of measuring the ability of Canada to act together with the United States.

Current Implications

As we will discuss in the next section, capabilities-based planning provides useful guidance for recommendations regarding the force structure of the CF. As early as the 1960s, however, there were indications that the NORAD model and the NORAD mandate might not be extended to cover strategic threats other than an over-the-pole bomber attack. Specifically, the development of Soviet ICBMs and the notorious (and largely fictitious) “missile gap” introduced by John Kennedy during the 1960 US presidential election pointed to a real problem: NORAD might warn
against a Soviet missile attack after launch but, given the strategy of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD), there was nothing to be done in terms of defence. Indeed, the strategic response was to launch an even bigger salvo in return; hence, the alleged “gap.” Perhaps more important, the shift of attention from aerospace (and land and sea beneath it) to outer space, based on new technologies, shifted the focus of strategic thinking as well. In 1960, for example, the United States established a single Integrated Operational Plan to coordinate the targeting of US Navy and USAF strategic nuclear missiles. Canada was not a participant in the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS). Indeed, Canada effectively ignored space as a military issue even though space was how ICBMs would reach North America. In June 1992, JSTPS was replaced by Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and, in October 2002, STRATCOM absorbed US Space Command. The Americans pursued a mixture of military and civilian space programs, NASA being the most well known of the civilian programs. In contrast, Canada’s space program was civilian and commercial only (Kirton, 1986, 1995). Canada did not pursue any independent launch capability and refused to consider adopting any military applications of space technology. As a result, Canada became increasingly dependent on American assets for remote earth sensing, ship and aircraft navigation, meteorological data, and so on. In return, Canada provided equipment and research for American space programs. One reason Canada was largely on the receiving end of American policy is that space did not easily fit into received Canadian military planning doctrines, all of which were based on geostrategic factors.

It was also during the 1960s that ballistic missile defence (BMD) arrived on the strategic scene. The US developed and deployed the Sentinel and the Safeguard ABM systems; in 1968, when the NORAD treaty was renewed, Canada explicitly opted out of BMD (Sokolosky, 1995). The argument made at the time was curious: first, in the event of nuclear war, Canadian sovereignty would not matter very much in any case. Second, as Defence in the Seventies: White Paper on Defence pointed out, the United States did not depend on Canadian territory for the ABM system. As noted, the interceptions would take place in outer space and Canada could not claim any jurisdiction; thus the traditional geostrategic argument did not apply. Finally, it was argued, even if it did somehow apply and even if the extinction of Canadian society in a nuclear exchange had something to do with Canadian sovereignty, the Americans were willing to use diplomacy and international treaties to counter the Soviet threat, the 1972 ABM Treaty being a notable landmark. Canada, therefore, really had nothing to do (Canada, 1971). Hence, the neglect of the military importance of space.

In 1981, NORAD became the North American Aerospace Command, giving belated recognition to its chief task, eventual defence and present warning against missiles. Two years later, President Reagan announced the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), “Star Wars,” designed to create an umbrella against a Soviet ICBM attack. Canada did not take part in SDI (though Canadian companies did) and some defence officials worried about being left out of American technological development (Sokolosky, 1995: 179; Crosby, 1996/1997). In the event, Canada did not develop any space-based military assets of its own although in 1985 it did join the United States in constructing the North Warning System, successor to the DEW line. A year later, the Canadian Space Agency was launched as an entirely civilian organization. And, with the end of the Cold War, as we have seen, Canada cashed in its “peace dividend” and reduced its already declining capability even further.

The point of this narrative is not to criticize the government of the day for a road not taken but to make plain the implications of the divergence in strategic policy: Canada and the United States were growing farther apart in terms of space-based strategic capability and necessarily, therefore, Canada’s geostrategic importance was declining in the eyes of the Americans. No warnings were raised, except indirectly by a few hard-nosed academics, that Canada might have to rethink its traditional strategic assumptions based on geography and a half century of cooperative practice.

The direction of future American strategic developments was indicated by the mid-1990s when the United States began investing in ballistic missile defence once again. By the late 1990s, it was not a question of if the United States would deploy a “national missile defence” (NMD) system but when. And the politically important question for Canada was whether NMD would be part of NORAD. A secondary issue was whether any NMD installations would be located in Canada. This was secondary because the United States was able to deploy NMD ground-based radars without using Canadian territory—in Alaska and Greenland. To have NMD installations in Canada would require not only an invitation by the Canadian government but Canada would have to persuade the United States that it was a militarily more effective use of their resources than the Alaska-Greenland option. Clearly, a decision to persuade the United States on this aspect of military policy involved the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) far more centrally than it involved DND.
We are now well into the era of the cone of silence that followed the 1994 White Paper on Defence. By the mid-1990s, it had become abundantly clear that something major had shifted in American defence policy: the United States was aiming to defend itself and North America without Canadian territory being considered one way or another. What replaced a more or less conceptually clear and distinct issue of strategic military policy had become a complex, ambiguous, and interlinked political one. The United States has made it very clear it would like Canada to be part of NMD (Hamre, 2000) and to help the United States sell NMD to a skeptical international community. That is, strategic military relations between Canada and the United States after 2000 have been defined almost entirely in terms of politics. This is one reason that, during the late 1990s and early twenty-first century, traditional formulations of the arguments over “defence against help” theory have been almost entirely absent from the Canadian-American discussions about military cooperation, particularly as concerns strategic cooperation, which today means space-based assets and NMD.

What is new is that the cost of Canadian participation in NMD is not that Canadian sovereignty would be threatened or degraded—the traditional argument. Rather, by not participating in NMD Canada would voluntarily be giving up a significant amount of sovereignty. The argument is straightforward. If Canada did not take part in NMD and the Americans deployed as they said they would, it would not be under the existing command and control of NORAD. There would be no role for the Canadian Deputy Commander at NORAD, at least so far as the aerospace dimension of the command is concerned. NORAD would revert to air defence only (Fergusson, 1999: 13-16; 1998). Canada, thus, is increasingly unable to defend itself against American “help.”

Like it or not (and the Government of Canada appears not to like it), the militarization of space—even if weapons are not deployed there—is inevitable. Indeed, in some respects, such as communications, GPS, and so on, which are essential features of the Revolution in Military Affairs, it has already taken place. The Canadian Air Force, for example, depends on American military satellites for its communications. If the Americans denied service to the Canadian Forces, a CF-18 on a training mission out of Cold Lake, Alberta, might suddenly be deprived of its primary means of communications. Once a secure and integrated military communications structure is operating, and without a means of substituting an independent structure should access be denied, the military capability of the junior partner along with its sovereignty is inevitably degraded.

In other words, space-based American-controlled assets do not in any way depend for their effectiveness, almost by definition, on geostrategic considerations. The fact that Canada shares a border with the United States, that Canadian geography once had strategic significance to the United States because of its proximity both to America and to common adversaries is increasingly a matter of historical, not current, interest. The use of space-based assets means that Canada simply does not matter nearly as much to American continental defence strategy as it once did. This does not, however, mean that Canada need no longer be worried about defence and military relations with the United States. It means that the terms of that relationship have changed fundamentally.

Canada can no longer trade geography for American defence because the value of geography has been drastically discounted. Not only, therefore, have relations between Canada and the United States been politicized in such a way that the military component of Canada’s contribution, namely geographic proximity, has been devalued, Canada is now in the position of having to pursue a defence policy not against American help but for and with help: in order to defend itself, it must rely on genuine American help. This is Canada’s contemporary strategic position. That Canada’s strategic importance to the United States has become entirely political, like that of Poland or Australia, is one of the unanticipated consequences of the Revolution in Military Affairs. There has been some academic discussion of the implications of this new strategic relationship but it seems hardly to have penetrated official thinking (Kirton, 1986; MacDonald, 1989; Lackenbauer, 2000). This is not to say that the Revolution in Military Affairs has made geography irrelevant to American military planning, only that it has drastically altered the importance of Canadian geography. Geography counts for the American-led war on terrorists, which has given Bulgaria and Romania as well as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Djibouti and Kenya, a new strategic importance because of their geographic location (Donnelly and Serchuk, 2003). “Forward engagement” in the war on terrorists does not include Canadian real estate. Accordingly, Canada’s importance to the American-led conduct of this particular war will depend much more on politics than on proximity.

This erosion of the traditional geostrategic relation between Canada and the United States contains an obvious danger to Canadian sovereignty, whether that means territorial control and jurisdiction or, in a looser sense, its ability to make independent decisions. If, for example, Canada is denied access to information because the United States sees no military usefulness in sharing it or, for political
reasons in the narrow sense, wishes to show disapproval of a position Canada has taken with respect to American foreign policy, then Canada’s independence and well being are threatened. If Canada is unable or unwilling to work with the United States because it cannot keep up with American technology—even if Canadian foreign policy supports the United States—then Canadian independence is degraded. Indeed, the inability of pilots aboard Canadian CF-18s to talk to their American counterparts during the Kosovo campaign damaged Canadian interests because it indicated Canada was not entirely reliable as a military ally. When Canada is dependent upon American space-based assets for surveillance of Canadian territory, it is up to the CF to show they can make a credible contribution in other ways to continental defence, not up to the US to ask. They have no need to ask.

Even though none of the reports under scrutiny have paid sufficient attention to the implications of the new strategic relationship that exists between Canada and the US, many of them have proceeded on the assumption that something has changed drastically. The fact is, Canada is now in a position where it has to show the Americans that the CF are worthy of their attention. In this respect, as well, Canada is in the same position as Poland or Australia. Of course the United States would like Canadian diplomatic, which is to say, political support, as has been made clear by any number of official statements. But where vital American interests are concerned—such as BMD or expeditionary warfare—diplomacy is ancillary, not essential. This was made as clear as possible during the diplomatic gavotte undertaken at the United Nations during the fall of 2002 prior to the invasion of Iraq. Moreover, it was equally clear that Canada’s decision not to deploy troops in Iraq alongside those of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia was a foreign policy, not a military, decision. It is for this reason that several of the reports analyzed drew attention to the need for a review of Canadian foreign policy in conjunction with a review of military policy—for well-known Clausewitzian reasons outlined above in the Introduction. However, as will be clear from the civilian recommendations for a new CF structure, discussed in the following section, the assumption is that Canadian and American foreign policy will be far more harmonious than it has been in the past few years. It is not at all clear that this is a realistic assumption. Nor is it clear that the implications for the Canadian military if Canada does not draw
In the previous section, we argued that the traditional doctrine of defence against help had to be rethought in the new strategic context conditioned by the Revolution in Military Affairs. In pre-RMA days, Canada needed a credible and competent military to ensure that the United States would not defend Canada on American terms. Today, Canada needs to have a credible and competent military in order to defend itself with American help. Network-centric communications, which are an essential component of the Revolution in Military Affairs, mean that Canada necessarily is integrated with American systems or it does without. Moreover, even the most sophisticated “platform,” whether a frigate, a CF-18 or a section of JTF-2 soldiers, is next to worthless if it is not also fully networked, which is to say, fully in communications with other allied fighting units. The implications for the broader areas of security policy are just as significant. Because, for example, Canada has limited capability in the area of satellite surveillance, if Canada is to know who is sailing off the west coast, perhaps a boat filled with illegal immigrants, or to learn who may be sailing through the Arctic Ocean, it needs access to American communications satellites and networks.

Notwithstanding their adherence to an obsolescent doctrine based on geography, many of the reports under review made useful common-sensical observations and recommendations that were fully compatible with the new RMA-conditioned strategic environment. We will first consider these comments and then indicate a few additional ramifications.

To put it as simply as possible: many of the recommendations proffered for a twenty-first century Canadian military seek to fix what is obviously broken. Money is an issue. Estimates on the amount needed range from $4 billion to $12 billion (SCONSAD, 2002a: 97–99; RCMI, 2001: 23). SCONSAD calculated that an increase from 1.2% of GDP to 1.69% would place Canada twelfth among 19 NATO countries, up from seventeenth.

Other recommendations carried quite different implications. In their report of late 2002, the Senate Committee recommended a “strategic retreat” from current operational levels, recommending that CF be withdrawn from overseas duty when their then current (2002) tours were completed and that, for the following two years, no overseas deployments be undertaken (SCONSAD, 2002c: 20ff). A thirty-month moratorium, the Senate Committee said, was needed to begin a decade-long project of recovery. This initial period would be devoted to training, family time for frequently deployed personnel, equipment maintenance and upgrades, and so on.

Prior to reaching these gloomy conclusions, which were based on extensive conversations with personnel deployed around the country, the Senate Committee, in its report issued earlier in 2002, provided an extensive list of near-term requirements:

- proceed expeditiously with the purchase of 28 modern helicopters under the Maritime Helicopter Project;
- purchase a national strategic lift capability including eight strategic heavy-lift aircraft and four afloat logistics and sea-lift “roll-on/roll-off” ships;
- muster an additional mechanized brigade group (equivalent to the first brigade based in Edmonton) and fully man the current three brigades to provide a total of four fully manned brigades;
- improve military information technology required to connect with other security and defence agencies and coalition partners by funding the Canadian Military Satellite Communications project;
- replace the army’s medium trucks;
- conduct a comprehensive frigate mid-life refit and upgrade to extend the ships’ operational life;
- purchase smart weapons for the CF-18 and Aurora aircraft;
- enhance Canadian Forces’ intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance capabilities;
- improve the Canadian Forces’ capability to react to Chemical, Radiological, Biological, and/or Nuclear (CRBN) incidents;
• provide the army with indirect fire support by upgrading the current M109 system with an integrated and automated fire-control system;

• provide funding for the Canadian Forces joint space project to ensure ongoing civilian and military communications and surveillance capabilities of and from space, such as the RADARSAT II satellite, which assisted authorities in responding to the Manitoba floods of 1997;

• provide, as appropriate, all Canadian Forces members with operationally effective and comfortable clothing suitable for all geographic sites where Canadian Forces might operate; and

• set up a “strategic analysis team” comprising representatives from academic institutions, strategic planners, and experts from the research and development community to think “outside the box” in looking forward to future technologies and likely changes in equipment, tactics, and strategies.

( SCONSAD 2002a )

Looking a bit farther into the future, the second CCS21 report (2002) added that Canada needed to increase its participation in the replacement for the CF-18, called the Joint Strike Fighter, and follow up on its letter of intent to take part in a second American development program, the DD-X, a stealthy surface vessel project.

The Senate report and several others emphasized the need to expand the size as well as enhance the RMA capability of the CF. The numbers varied but an expansion into the range of 75,000 to 100,000 personnel—a considerable increase from the current muster but certainly comparable to the 120,000 or so in the armed forces 50 years ago when there were half as many Canadians as there are today.

The most interesting recommendations were concerned less with repairing the consequences of a decade of damage than with reflection on an appropriate force structure. In the 1950s, L.Gen. Guy Simonds, Chief of the Canadian General Staff, advanced the opinion that the organization of the Canadian Forces “should be very much like that of the United States Marine Corps, which is a mobile force complete with all its ancillaries and able to meet what we commonly call brush-fire situations” (quoted: RCMI, 2001: 16).

The USMC model provides a very specific target for the policy contained in the 1994 White Paper on Defence: a modern, multi-purpose, combat-capable, expeditionary force.

A number of the reports made more detailed recommendations concerning the requirements for such a force. Nearly all were responses—direct or indirect—to the Revolution in Military Affairs. The following is a summary of several recommendations, some provided with elaborate and detailed justification.

• In explicit response to the RMA, the CF should be organized into five regional “joint commands” of 600 to 700 regular force personnel and 300+ reserves.

• Joint commands will be easier to integrate with the US Unified Command Plan, especially with the new (October, 2002) Northern Command (NORTHCOM), but also with NORAD and BMD.

• Each 1000-person battle group would comprise an infantry battalion, a light-armoured squadron, artillery (six 105 mm light howitzers), and engineering, communication, medical, and logistical support elements.

• Because of the importance of special forces in counter-terrorist conflict and because they are a central component of RMA battle doctrine, the number of personnel in Joint Task Force 2 should be increased significantly and its capacity enhanced.

• Heavy armour artillery is not likely to be useful in an environment where light, rapidly deployed, infantry and special forces are used. The army will thus have to review its rationale for maintaining a heavy artillery and main battle tank capability.

• Two amphibious task forces (Esquimault and Halifax) would be established to transport a battle group and equipment overseas.

• Dedicated amphibious ships should be purchased with a stern submersible “dock,” a large landing craft, and capacity to carry and land troops and vehicles over a beach as well as provide a landing deck for helicopters.

• A fleet of replenishment ships to fuel and resupply the recommended amphibious task force also needs to be acquired.

• The Navy will thus need to review its acquisition of submarines and frigates in favour of increased numbers of Marine Coastal Defence Vessels and amphibious support ships.

• Two air-portable battle groups deployable on short notice from the three interior commands (West, Ontario, Quebec) should be established.

• A fleet of 10 new C–130s would also be needed to deploy the recommended air-portable battle group
in a timely manner. Consideration should also be given to purchasing a smaller fleet of C-17s.

- The Air Force will thus need to consider a major restructuring of its forces; in particular, the trade-off between modernizing the CF-18 fleet and acquiring new C-130s will have to be examined. In addition, the mix between aerial fighters, attack helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and coastal patrol and surveillance needs to be considered.

- An ethos favouring a combat-oriented force of regular and reserve battle groups needs to be fostered.

- Because of the importance of secure communications for the RMA, it may be necessary to establish a dedicated “cyber force.”

Many of the recommendations included in this list are bound to be controversial, not because they imply additional expenditures—for a dedicated “cyber force,” for example—but because they require a new way of conceptualizing the mission and, thus, the capabilities and structure of the CF. In addition, of course, defence policy as a whole must be integrated with foreign policy.

Simply within the area of force structure, the recommendation for regional joint commands, which looks sensible enough to civilians, is, in practice, very difficult to achieve. “Jointness,” as military planners use the term, means more than interoperability, the integration of the Canadian with the US Navy, the integration of Third Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (3PPCLI) with the 82nd Airborne, and so on. It means far more than just operating side by side and being able to listen to one another’s radios, use one another’s ammunition, or identify accurately respective national aircraft on a cluttered radar screen, although all these things [are] important. Jointness, whether of the horizontal or vertical variety, means, in short, the effective integration of service capabilities—or the “blending” of their particular strengths as required—plus the gradual erosion of the service-specific mind-set that, at one level, is closely associated with the concept of inter-service rivalry. As Colin Powell has put it with respect to the American armed forces, “We train as a team, fight as a team, and win as a team” (CCS21, 2002: 25).

A generation after the formal “unification” of the CF, it may seem odd that the authors of a Canadian report on the Canadian Forces would quote an American general, however eminent, on what jointness would mean for the CF. The fact is, however, that interservice rivalry is flourishing in the CF, not least of all because competition for disappearing dollars and personnel has been so intense (Pugliese, 2003).

Whatever the threat to service identities and traditions, an effective CF that approaches the model of the USMC, which is certainly one in which all Canadians could take pride, requires a joint command and force structure. “Jointness,” say the authors of the second CCS21 report, will not only produce the greatest economies and efficiencies for military organizations; it will also increase the effectiveness of military forces in actual operations. The CF’s land, maritime, and air commands must prepare for joint operations with each other but also for the much bolder step of joint operations with the land, sea, and air forces of their allies. Canadian infantry battalions, for example, should eventually be able to deploy from and be supported by American amphibious assault ships and the helicopters they carry. Canada’s aircraft should be fully integrated electronically with the surveillance, communications, and target acquisition systems of allied aircraft, warships, and ground controllers, and pilots should be briefed fully on the operational doctrine, command procedures, and organizational and technical weaknesses of those units with which they will work. Canadian warships sailing with American carrier battle groups should be capable of receiving real-time tactical data from other friendly surveillance platforms and of incorporating this data immediately and seamlessly into their own tactical planning environment. The Revolution in Military Affairs is upon us, it will increasingly shape the battlefields of the future, and if Canada is to play any role in the world and its own defence, the CF must be prepared to operate in an RMA world (CCS21, 2002: 25).

Complementing these recommendations related to organization and the RMA was a separate concern for intelligence. Included here were recommendations for expanding “signals intelligence,” which is currently conducted by the Communications Security Establishment, so as to create a useful interpretation and assessment capability. “Why,” the House Committee wondered, “is Canada the only G-8 country without a foreign intelligence agency?” (SCOND-VA, 2002). Such an agency, it was clear, would engage in “human intelligence,” gathering and assessing information collected on the ground in foreign parts. This innovation would serve to balance, complement, and enhance the domestic work undertaken by the RCMP and CSIS.
Conclusions and Implications

“Canadians are, in the main, not a bellicose people and for many Canadians one of Canada’s greatest attributes is that it has traditionally served as a haven from the tumult and troubles of the outside world.” At the same time, however, this “great blessing is also a great danger” (SCONSAD, 2002b: 23). Canadians historically have not been bellicose in the sense that, as a country, they have not sought confrontation, especially military confrontation. On the other hand, Canadians have on occasion been eager and competent warriors. Moreover, when a “great blessing” is itself in danger, Canadians as other citizens in Western democracies have, again historically, done their duty.

The first conclusion we would draw from the analysis in this study is that the aggregate significance of the reports is that there exists in Canada a growing awareness that some major decisions are going to be made about the Canadian Forces in the next few years.

A second conclusion is that there is a general and widespread awareness of the stark alternatives to be faced because of the decline in Canada’s military capability. As the first CCS21 report noted: “the CF stands on a precipice between truly viable combat capable forces and a constabulary force” (CCS21, 2001: 16).

Third, there is a direct connection between Canadian prosperity and a credible military as well as an awareness that Canadians have been living on borrowed time, enjoying the one without paying for the other. When he was foreign minister, John Manley summarized this new awareness with surprising frankness for a Minister of the Crown: “you can’t just sit at the G8 table,” he said, “and, then, when the bill comes, go to the washroom. If you want to play a role in the world, even as a small member of the G8, there’s a cost to doing that” (quoted in SCONSAD, 2002c: 13). What Manley did not mention is that for a generation Canada had been in the washroom when the bill came.

Fourth, as John Manley’s words also indicate, foreign policy guides defence policy, not the other way around. Or, as the House Committee report noted, “the CF cannot provide its own justification” (SCONDVA, 2002). Even a cursory reflection on “readiness” or “capability-based planning” indicates immediately that capabilities and standards of readiness need to be assessed in terms of roles and missions that, in turn, are tributary to a clear grasp of Canadian foreign-policy interests. Because, as many observers have noted over the past few years, it is not clear what Canadian foreign policy is, calls for a Parliamentary review of defence policy have almost invariably been linked to a call for a review of foreign policy. Moreover, because of the habit of “timidity with the truth” that has insinuated itself in the upper reaches of DND (to say nothing of DFAIT), “this is not the time for ‘in-house’ reviews” but for broadly based public consultations (SCONDVA, 2001).

Fifth, notwithstanding the common sense of conducting a review of foreign policy prior to a defence review, it seems clear that the implications of the RMA as well as the long-term interests of all Canadians in maintaining their liberty, their security, and their prosperity require that Canada defend itself by cooperating more closely with the United States and not by maintaining an exaggerated and narcissistic sense of its own distinctiveness.
Canada’s Military Posture

Appendix: Documents Analyzed


This report provides an independent analysis outside government departments and parliamentary committees. The organization's members consist of former military personnel and about 2000 members from the private sector who are interested in current defence issues.

The framework of the report follows a basic pattern: (1) describing the international system; (2) examining the Canadian current policies in place to deal with it; and (3) analyzing the particular contribution played by the Canadian military. The RCMI's report contains a harsh criticism of Canada's seeming inability to adapt to a volatile and dangerous world. Reduction of Canadian commitments to NATO and to the military in general was viewed as evidence of "prevaricating" and "hoping pious platitudes and small scale intervention will save the day." RCMI's view of Canada's foreign policy is equally negative. The report also contains a classic "defence-against-help" argument and drew attention to the gap between commitment and capability: what Canadians may want to do in the world far surpasses the military resources available to do it. Canada's current military structure was seen as being restrictive, current defence white-paper commitments unattainable, preparation for mobilization minimal, and the Navy and Air Force unable to meet obligations and support the deployment of the Army abroad.

Bearing in mind the significance of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the report proposed a bold and innovative force restructuring: the redistribution of units across the country in five joint commands along with sufficient equipment and international intelligence capability to provide a credible military contribution to Canadian and allied security.


The purpose of *Caught in the Middle* is to determine the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces in light of the commitments and goals set out in the 1994 White Paper (Canada 1994). The CDA is a non-profit NGO made up of individuals and corporations with an interest in security and military affairs.

The CDA sought to assess the operational readiness of the CF in the summer of 2001, prior to the terrorist attacks of September. They found the CF were far less than optimal levels of readiness. These results are attributed to a lack of funding for DND, which has left the CF without sufficient resources to achieve policy goals and thus has reduced the CF’s operational readiness.

The CDA report begins with the assumption that the “essential role of the military is the controlled application of the maximum force, under the authority of the State, and under unlimited liability.” Reciprocally, the unlimited liability of service personnel must “be matched by an unlimited responsibility on the part of the government to ensure that members of the CF, if placed in harm’s way, can achieve their mission at as low a risk as possible.” The government is thus under the obligation to provide modern equipment and high levels of training to enable the CF to carry out successfully missions assigned by the government. The problem, as described by the title of the CDA report is that the CF are “caught in the middle” of declining conventional capabilities and unaffordable future ones. Had this report been written after 9/11, no doubt the prognosis would have been even more bleak.

The CDA report is not only concerned with the ability to fulfill defence policy commitments and goals but also how those policies are made. The Department of National Defence has a set policy-planning framework that determines how policy is made. A multitude of documents form a policy framework for the military that is designed to implement and improve policy. While in theory the policy framework creates a “rational and systematic application of defence policy,” in reality the shortage of resources has undermined the framework’s structure. The system builds all defence planning documents on the White Paper but the
White Paper could never have been fully implemented because of inadequate funding and piecemeal and “irrational” cuts to defence spending. As a consequence, the entire policy framework has been rendered ineffective because the central document’s goals could never be achieved. Finally, the CDA draws attention to the uncomfortable fact that Canada’s allies, especially the United States, have noticed, and publicly commented on, the insufficient resources of Canada’s military. This does not bode well for Canadian influence or trade. If the Canadian Forces do not receive an injection of funding, they will be incapable of addressing situations that affect Canada’s economic as well as security interests.


To Secure a Nation presents the expertise of a number of notable Canadian academics and private-sector and civic leaders interested in issues of national security and defence in Canada. This report, produced for CCS21 by the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, received national attention for its primary recommendation, which called for a review of security and defence policy, a theme that recurs throughout the report.

To Secure a Nation maintains that the 1994 government White Paper on defence does not reflect many global changes and the heightened involvement of Canadian Forces in the world. Many recommendations deal with topics to be included in any future security and defence review, including domestic security, emerging new threats to sovereignty, and security within the country and on the littorals. Other concerns cover a full range of issues, from asymmetric threats and terrorism to ballistic missile defence (BMD) and an appropriate force structure for the future, from the place of the reserves in the CF to the public accountability of consultations in the defence review process. A long and thorough list of considerations for a defence review would imply a thorough and complete white paper on defence.

Further to these recommendations are those addressing current Canadian foreign and defence policies, Canada’s relations with international organizations, allies—especially Canadian-American relations—and Canadian treaty obligations. To Secure a Nation also argues that NATO may regain its primacy in Canadian defence and security policy given its re-emergence as the central security organization in Europe, even though it is marred by conflict and instability in some areas. As for the United Nations and, specifically international peace support operations, this first CCS21 report argued that Canada should under-take a re-evaluation of costs and benefits to participating in such operations because of Canada’s limited capacity to contribute in a militarily effective way.

One recommendation that merits further exploration concerns opportunities to build a stronger relationship with Russia in the light of Canada’s long-standing positions on non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament. The report argues that Canada could assist the Russians in diminishing their nuclear stockpiles.

Although military capabilities of the Canadian Forces were not discussed at length, it was noted that future acquisitions of equipment had to serve the needs of mobility, rapid deployment, heavy firepower, integrated operations, and effective command, control, and communications to ensure Canada’s combat capabilities. Command structures of the operational deployments of the CF required examination to ensure both integrated operational command effectiveness and efficiency and Canadian independence.

The quality of life of CF personnel were not addressed at length but the recommendation was made that pay, base housing, other fixed costs to CF members, family benefits, educational opportunities, pension allowances, and family support services should be monitored by the Minister of National Defence, with recommendations made directly to the Treasury Board. Such a measure would ensure that the quality of life of CF personnel would not “slip” and become problem areas that deter recruitment and retention.

(4) House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs [SCONDVA] (2001). State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces. <http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/37/1/NDVA/Studies/Reports/ndva01-e.htm> (November). In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a short report was submitted by the House Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs that briefly addressed the current state of the Canadian Armed Forces in light of the possibility they might be deployed in response to the attacks. This report was not an assessment of the Canadian Forces but simply looked broadly at what had to be done in terms of national defence and emergency preparedness to respond to these and future terrorist attacks.

In the event, the Navy was able to deploy five ships, and the Air Force mobilized transport and surveillance aircraft. Had the Army been called upon, the Committee judged it would not have been able to respond quickly or in force. They concluded that maintaining interoperability with the Americans will require more attention to the new strategic environment of rapid response and, thus, of strategic lift. New structures and new realities will there-
fore require a re-examination of equipment and funding. SCONDVA recommended increased funding, increased personnel levels, refocusing on counter-terrorism, especially against WMDs, including Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) weapons. The Committee again drew attention to inadequacies in sea and airlift and recommended an increase in the strength of Canadian special forces in Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2).


This report is the compilation of testimony from witnesses and the views of the Senate committee based on these findings, on issues of national defence and security of Canada. It is the result of a year of fact-finding missions and testimony from government officials, military personnel, intelligence personnel, law enforcement officials, and academics. The attacks of September 11, 2001 gave additional urgency to the deliberations of the committee. In addition to its consideration of the state of the CF, the report also addressed the issues of port, airport, and border security as well as intelligence and law enforcement in the context of security.

The four recommendations made by the Senate committee report are: (1) that the Canadian Forces needs to be at least 75,000 personnel in order to sustain the level of tasking given them over the last eight years; (2) that the Department of National Defence be given an immediate increase of $4 billion to the baseline budget; (3) that there be future annual budget increases which are “realistic, purpose-driven, and adjusted for inflation”; and (4) that defence policy flow from foreign policy so that a foreign policy review precedes a defence review.


Five months after issuing their initial report following September 11, 2001, the House Committee issued an in-depth report on the Canadian Forces. The report, drafted after a year of hearings, was seen as a means to help a beleaguered CF by addressing its problems. From its first pages, the Committee’s views were not optimistic about the current state of the military and made the initial assertion that “the status quo is not acceptable.” Although the report addresses present-day concerns, the main focus of the Committee was how to make the CF capable, prepared, and ready for the future.

Again a major focus was on funding problems and the resulting shortfalls in equipment, personnel, training, and so on. The Committee gave some attention to Canada’s current intelligence-gathering capabilities, specifically those of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). These agencies are mainly geared towards signals intelligence, electronic information relevant to threats to the security of Canada, as opposed to an involvement in foreign intelligence gathering, information concerning the activities of other states, organizations, people, and non-state actors. Furthermore, the CSE and CSIS get most of their intelligence from open sources and not through clandestine intelligence work. The Committee recommended a review of the Canadian intelligence organization to determine whether an independent agency to gather foreign intelligence should be established. The Committee noted that “operational readiness” was difficult to measure in the absence of a clear understanding of what the military is for, but nevertheless suggested establishing a comprehensive system to determine readiness using clear and standardized measurements, inspections without notice to test readiness, and annual evaluations to be reported to SCONDVA.

The report also examines the Canadian Forces branch by branch, the defence of Canada in the context of relations with the United States, and soldiers’ quality of life. This report by SCONDVA on the state of readiness of the Canadian Forces makes it clear that Canada has an obligation to maintain a higher level of military preparedness than it is doing at present, which translates into new equipment and additional funding.


Although this report deals primarily with Canada’s participation in the collective defence of North America with the United States, certain comments and observations expanded observations made in the previous report of February 2002. The bulk of the matters discussed here concerns continental security. There was some discussion of the Canadian Forces’ role in this mission, particularly in NORAD. Canada’s territorial waters have been cited as a potential avenue of access for threats coming into North America. Although the Canadian Forces do patrol Canadian waterways, they do so irregularly and cooperation with other departments and agencies such as the Coast Guard is in-
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termittent and uncoordinated. Accordingly, the Committee recommended better coordination of Canadian resources and greater cooperation and coordination with American counterparts (specifically, the Canadian-American joint planning group for maritime protection), coordination of Canadian monitoring resources from involved agencies and multi-departmental operations centres at each coast to collect and analyze shipping intelligence.

The Committee noted the obvious: that the CF could not defend the second-largest land mass in the world and recommended more combined training with US forces in the context of Northern Command along with regular large formation training. A combined and joint Canada-US land force planning unit should also be established to coordinate the armies of both countries to respond to natural and man-made disasters.


Following their report of February 2002, the Senate Committee tabled this report re-emphasizing many of their previous recommendations. Many of their comments and opinions were based on developments that had taken place since the first report and also on a series of interviews conducted at 15 military bases and installations across the country.

The primary concern raised was again about the funding of National Defence and the CF, this time in comparison with Canada’s allies. The Committee argued that Canada is both active in the world and a large target. Canada thus requires a greater amount of security than the government is willing to provide. The $4 billion minimum recommendation for funding increase was calculated as $130 for each Canadian—an increase that would amount to payment of an “insurance policy” premium.

A dramatic recommendation by the Committee suggested that the Canadian Forces follow the “rope-a-dope” boxing tactic, a withdrawal to regain one’s energy only to swirl back and win. For the Canadian Forces, the report makes the recommendation of imposing a 30-month moratorium on deploying Canadian Forces abroad so that they can be restructured, rearmed, and revitalized. In this recommendation, Canadian troops currently serving abroad would be pulled back as missions expired, followed by a minimum of 24 months to resolve the major problems. The Committee concluded that it is now impossible simply to inject the Canadian armed forces with cash and resources and expect that it will quickly create a force capable of performing all the tasks expected of it.

The Committee stated flatly that the Canadian Forces are under strength, overworked, underfunded, and in precarious health. Although Canadian personnel have a “can-do” mentality, certain safety mechanisms have eroded to the point where the ability to perform professionally has been hindered. Because such mechanisms as proper leave time, reasonable rotations, and regular training have degraded, the CF has suffered unusual losses of trained personnel that reduce their overall operational capabilities. Furthermore, the main complaint heard by the Committee was that Canadian Forces personnel were not being allowed to perform their jobs because of constraints in personnel and the lack of funding for maintenance and equipment. The Senate Committee underlined once again that the Canadian military is in such a state of disrepair that it is unable to meet the requirements of the last Defence White Paper.


This is the second report by the CCS21, published approximately a year after To Secure a Nation. As with so many other reports, this one begins by noting that the 1994 Defence White Paper is sorely out of date, especially considering the dramatic shifts in the international environment since September 11, 2001. The People’s Defence Review charged that, in light of its neglect of the Canadian Forces, the Canadian government’s actions “can only be characterized as dereliction of duty.” Indeed, this was why CCS21 produced The People’s Defence Review. The document is structured as a White Paper and outlines “a reasonable, sound defence policy for Canada” in view of the major assumptions of Canadian defence policy and the minimum requirements the Canadian Forces must have. The report argues that new attitudes, more money, more personnel, and more and better equipment are all needed. CCS21 again urged the Canadian
References


