

Studies in Canada-US Relations



June 2009

Measuring Parliament's Attitude towards Canada-US Cooperation

by Alexander Moens and Nachum Gabler





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Executive summary

Mutual trade and investment as well as numerous shared political, security, and defense interests make Canada's relationship with the United States a uniquely large and important matter in Canadian public policy. While the state of this relationship and the quality of its management are under constant surveillance and commentary by journalists and scholars alike, there are few measurable or "hard" indicators of how Canadian policy makers view this relationship.

This publication offers a completely new contribution to Canadian-American studies. We evaluate how members of Canada's Parliament approach the Canadian-American relationship. Specifically, we measure Parliament's inclination towards seeking cooperative or non-cooperative solutions to Canadian-American issues and problems. Our focus is on the post-9/11 era. By carefully going through the parliamentary Hansard, we found 918 instances of transcribed debate where *relations* and *cooperation* were the focus of the comments. Using objective, reliable, and replicable scoring and data analysis methods from a field of social science called content analysis, we measured whether parliamentarians expressed their support for or opposition to more cooperation and/or better relations with the United States. We employed four outside judges (i.e., individuals outside of the Fraser Institute) to independently score a representative sample of the debates in order to exclude any potential bias and to ensure sufficient inter-judge agreement. The study was peer reviewed by academic experts.

Our goal is to offer Canadians more transparency on how their representatives view national policy vis-à-vis the United States and to hold parliamentarians accountable for how they articulate and pursue Canada's interests.


Our findings contradict many conventional studies which posit that Canadian attitudes towards the United States were negative after 9/11 and only turned positive after the 2006 switch in government from Liberal to Conservative. In fact, in the first year of our findings (2002–2003), the score of Parliament's cooperation towards the United States was 54.5% positive. However, this overall cooperative attitude drops to as low as 14% in 2006 and never recovers above one third of the total. The steepest decline in positive sentiment takes place during the years 2005–2006 when it falls from 45% to 14%. The negative outlook constitutes a majority with 57% of the comments in 2006. The positive score is the largest of the three in the years 2002/03–2005 while the negative score is on top in 2006 and 2007. Clearly, the pivotal

year in our findings in terms of change in overall sentiment, switching from positive to negative, is 2006 (see executive summary figure 1).

Next, we divided the parliamentary comments into three categories: Border and Security, Trade and Economics, and Political Relations. We found that the scores on the first two categories were slightly more negative than the average. Trying to pinpoint this phenomenon, we ran a count of “hot button” topics and found that “softwood lumber” and the “border” were the most frequently mentioned issues in four out of the six years of study and the runner-up in the fifth year. While the overall negative score on the border is highest in 2004, both trade and political affairs only turn negative in 2006.

In our third take on Parliament's attitude towards working with the United States, we examined the scores along political party lines and then compared the category and party scores. Concerning political party scores, we found three significant trends. First, both the New Democratic Party (NDP) and the Bloc Québécois (BQ) consistently score very negative over the entire period and across the three categories. The NDP range is between 87% and 74% negative, while the BQ range is between 75% and 60%. Second, the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) scores most positive of all parties throughout the study. After 2006, the Conservatives increase their neutral score but not their negative score. Third, the Liberal Party scores are generally positive until 2006, following which its score becomes predominantly

Executive summary figure 1: All Parliament, comments on all categories, by ranking and selected years



Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

negative. During 2006, the negative Liberal score suddenly doubles to 50%, and then peaks at 59% in 2007.

To interpret our findings as objectively as possible, we considered whether major changes on the top issues could explain the three trends mentioned above. However, we found little variance in the issues. The border issue remained unresolved and a lightning rod for concern throughout the 2002–2007 period. Also, shortly after the Tories negotiated the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement, new disputes broke out, keeping softwood at the forefront of contentious issues. In the same vein, there was no change on the American side that could have spurred change in Parliament as the Bush administration governed over our entire period. Finally, we considered leadership change, but the only change before 2006 was in 2004 when Paul Martin took over from Jean Chrétien and this date does not coincide with the major shift in Liberal scoring that took place in 2006.

Recognizing that this change coincides exactly with a change in minority government from Liberal to Conservative, our findings lead us to conclude that the Liberals change their attitude in most of the comments as a result of becoming the official Opposition. The Liberal scores show that they are willing to change their overall favorable sentiment in support of close cooperation while in government to a critical attitude of overall Canadian-American cooperation when they are in opposition. A similar switch is not observed for the Conservative Party.

There is no change in the scores of the NDP and the BQ as a result of either a change in government or change in the issues. Their consistent opposition to closer Canadian-American cooperation points to a rigid approach in which a better working relationship with the United States is rejected *a priori*. It must be noted though that neither party carried the responsibilities of government or the official Opposition, and could afford to speak with less restraint.

We offer our conclusions with caution, realizing that the total number of years (i.e., six) and the total number of observations per party per issue are at times small. Also, the conclusions should be seen as hypotheses we derive from this study that need further testing by methods beyond content analysis. Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that Liberal parliamentarians switch their attitude based not on major change in issues or interests but as an expedient change in political strategy.

There is no intent in this study to single out political parties. In fact, the data in this study can serve multiple inferences or conclusions regarding the federal parties. For example, contrary to the charge that the Liberals were uncooperative during the 2002–2005 period, our findings show that Liberal parliamentarians were actually quite positive with cooperation scores above 50% in all three years from 2002/03–2005.

Given the importance of the economic and trade relationship as well as proper management of the border, security, and defense portfolios, our study is based on the premise that a cooperative approach serves Canada's interests best. However, our findings show a large proportion of parliamentarians either decry more and better cooperation or are willing to use this relationship as a tool for political advantage and power. From 2004 onward this antagonistic presence has formed a majority in Parliament. These findings should be a concern for Canadians and should lead to debate on the causes and solutions to this negative sentiment.

At the same time, our findings should be of interest to American analysts and policy makers. The Canadian Parliament does not feature often in discussions about bilateral relations but our findings show that it can pose a challenge to a strong cooperative relationship. While Canadians take note of both congressional and presidential action, it is not clear that Americans are as aware of the different interests and expressions of Canadian political parties on key issues and how that plays a role in Canada's foreign policy formulation. At a minimum, American decision makers who monitor the debate in Canada's Parliament should be concerned about the significant negative attitude toward cooperation, as three of the six years studied were predominantly characterized by negative sentiment.

Introduction

The importance of Canada's relationship with the United States, both in terms of trade and security, can hardly be overstated. In the last eight years, on average 80% of all Canadian exports went to the American market, including in key sectors such as energy, minerals, and manufactured products (FAITC, 2009). In 2007, 67% of Canada's overall trade was with its southern neighbor, constituting 40% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). At the same time, 60% of foreign direct investment in Canada came from the United States. The United States is clearly Canada's most important security partner both in terms of the land and sea border as well as the Arctic. In military affairs the US is again Canada's key ally, and since 2006 the two countries have worked very closely through the NATO alliance to bring peace and stability to the Kandahar region of Afghanistan.

While such close relations cannot eliminate all disagreements or disputes, many observers perceived a decline in the overall quality or management of the Canada-US relationship in the post-9/11 era (Rempel, 2006; Haglund, 2004). Trade disputes were exacerbated by military and political conflicts, the most prominent of which was Canada's decision in 2003 not to support America's efforts in Iraq. The sometimes vitriolic condemnation by Canadian government officials and parliamentarians of American actions only inflamed the tension between the two neighbors (Richter, 2005; Jones, 2003). Much has been written about the trade disputes between our two countries during these years, especially regarding softwood lumber and BSE (i.e., mad cow disease) (Moens, 2006; O'Neill, 2005; Broadway, 2005/2006). Likewise, the Canadian decision in 2005 not to accept the American invitation to join in ballistic missile defense and heightened security measures at the border have led to numerous criticisms of Canada's handling of the bilateral relationship (Rudd, 2005; Jones, 2003).

Most of these accounts are based on qualitative data and normative assessments regarding the management of Canadian-American relations. Given the importance of this relationship to Canada's economy and security, it is of considerable interest to add quantitative indicators to this body of research that are objective in nature. This study attempts to address one area where measurable and quantifiable data can be brought to bear. We evaluate how nationally elected Canadian representatives approach the Canadian-American relationship.

Our purpose is to measure Parliament's inclination towards seeking cooperative or non-cooperative solutions to Canadian-American issues and problems. In so doing, we want to shed light on one important branch

of Canada's decision-making process, namely its national Legislature. Quantifying Parliament's debate on bilateral questions will give Canadians more transparency on how their representatives view national policy vis-à-vis the United States. It should also provide an element of accountability for the members of Parliament to the public, as an assessment of comments provide Canadians with a tool to hold their representatives responsible in how they pursue Canada's interest.

In addition, we intend to show American analysts and policy makers an important dynamic of how Canadians approach Canadian-American relations. While Canadian analysts and decision makers often acquire expertise in how Congress works and how the US administration makes policy, Americans typically do not study the Canadian Parliament and may not be aware of the various motives and attitudes that may become part of Canadian policy towards its southern neighbor. Finally, we hope that this attempt at measurement will produce further efforts to quantify how the two countries manage their important relationship.

The research design of measuring parliamentary debate

We designed a comprehensive study to gauge the extent to which Canadian members of Parliament had either expressed support for or opposition to cooperation with the United States. Our objective was to measure, quantify, and contextualize the attitude and sentiment of parliamentarians towards tangible bilateral cooperation. While there are public opinion surveys that gauge sentiment towards cooperation with the United States, no content analysis of the Canadian Parliament has yet been done.

We explore transcribed debates in the House of Commons to assess the attitudes of parliamentarians when discussing issues that make direct reference to Canada-US cooperation. We realize that there are other indicators available, such as how parliamentarians vote on legislation pertaining to Canadian-American issues. However, two issues make vote counting appear less indicative for our goals. First, party discipline is a large determinant and thus voting records would reveal little nuance in how individual parliamentarians think. Second, few pieces of legislation deal directly with Canadian-US issues, as most laws are national in content and the bilateral aspects are often only indirect results.

We want to measure the extent to which cooperation is being advocated or opposed in Canada's national Legislature. It is important to note that our study focuses on the propensity or attitude towards cooperation. It is not a study about pro- or anti-Americanism, although a certain amount of comments that are critical of Canadian-American cooperation may well derive from such sentiment. Our study extends beyond earlier content analysis work done on media studies such as that by Miljan and Cooper (2005) which measured anti-American sentiment in a selection of Canadian media. To address this query we employ the most useful tools contained in the collection of methods used to analyze recorded communication, commonly referred to as content analysis.

Content analysis has been used extensively as a measurement tool of attitudes. Various types of communications have been scrutinized, including political internet forums, mass media, and blogs written by politicians (Miljan and Cooper, 2003). There are at least two other studies that analyze the debates of national parliaments. Omar (2008) examines the Malaysian Parliament in order to determine the extent to which the opposition parties can cajole the government into adopting resolutions that implement reforms or new statutes in public policy. Another paper by Hix, Noury, and Roland (2006) utilizes an approach that tries to place political parties in the European Parliament on a conventional left-right political spectrum.

According to Berelson (1952), content analysis is a collection of methods used in the study of communication that objectify, systematize, and quantify the content in its relevant context. It was pioneered in the analysis of newsprint and has since aided researchers in such diverse fields as psychology, marketing, and politics (Krippendorff, 1980; Holsti, 1969; Mei, 2008). Content analysis includes several different methodologies that can be combined in various ways depending on the type of data being investigated.

In our thematic investigation of expressed attitude and sentiment by members of Parliament, we utilize features of the so-called “hypothesis-generating” approach to content analysis described by Kolbe and Burnett (1991). The purpose of this type of study is to develop testable hypotheses on themes present in the contents of a discourse. The research has to be designed with careful consideration given to standards of measurement. The methodological design must also place emphasis on the reliability of coding decisions and validity of the inferences culled from the communication being analyzed. More specifically, reliability focuses on controlling for bias in interpretation while validity refers to establishing a logical system of inference that connects intention, content, and effect, thus making the research replicable. Objectivity is predicated on establishing that any inferences made stand up to tests of validity (Carney, 1972).

In the parliamentary Hansard for the period 2002–2008 we found 918 instances of parliamentary debate regarding Canada-US cooperation. Our criteria for including these observations were based entirely on whether the debate focused on relations and/or cooperation between the two countries. Thus, any reference to the United States that was merely in passing or that had no bearing on the bilateral relationship was excluded. We categorized the 918 comments into three primary subject areas: economics and trade, security and borders, and political relations. The development of the categories was informed by the history and experience of the Canadian-American relationship and reflects the depth and width of issues the two countries manage. Together, the categories provide a comprehensive picture of the overall bilateral environment.

Members of Parliament may have a variety of motives or audiences for their comments during debates. However, our study focuses not on their motivation or on the intended audience but instead tries to measure objectively what they said. Still, the research design must be constructed in such a way as to consider and account for the subtleties and sentiment expressed in the data. To ensure effective design, the researcher must simultaneously consider issues of unitizing, recording, sampling, standards of assessment, and inferential procedures (Carney, 1972). Safeguarding objectivity while controlling for subjectivity and bias is of cardinal importance in any content analysis. This is particularly true in analyses of thematic orientation.

The units of analysis are individual words and passages containing statements made in the course of debates within the Canadian Parliament. We began our investigation by searching through the Canadian House of Commons

Hansard and isolating, recording, and compiling all material references to Canadian relations with the United States. To reflect the post-9/11 era, we chose the 37th through 40th parliamentary sessions, spanning from 2002–2008. The Hansard records can be reviewed with an internal search engine that allows the investigator to browse for and filter out relevant words or phrases of interest.^[1] After entering the desired session of Parliament and the dates within which to search, we looked for relevant words such as “America” or “United States” and phrases such as “US administration.” The complete list of words used to identify the 918 comments for inclusion in the population of observations and their frequency of mention are listed in table 1. It is important to note that passages usually made multiple reference to such words as “America” or “United States.” As a result, their frequency (1,472 and 3,170, respectively) far exceeds the 918 excerpts studied in this report.

Any comment or passage that was found to contain a material reference to Canadian-US relations was subsequently recorded into the database

Table 1: Terms of reference included in the selected passages and associated frequencies

Term	Count
1. US	1,029
2. USA	26
3. United States	1,472
4. America	54
5. Bush	222
6. US/American/Bush administration	96
7. Secretary of State	16
Total number of references	3,170
Average number of references per comment	3.45

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

- 1 In 2006, the Hansard search engine was reconfigured to return a more refined output. Prior to 2006, the search engine would return a document containing the complete debate for a given day in Parliament. Following 2006, the search engine's filter was refined to return each individual comment without the remainder of the day's debates and with its own link. This reconfiguration was also the reason why our analysis collected observations from the years 2002 and 2003 together, but not together thereafter. During this period it was only possible to search within a particular parliamentary session and not by individual years.

with all of its relevant details. These details include the session number and date, the speaker's name, the speaker's party affiliation, and the web link leading directly to the particular Hansard record. All immaterial and tangential references to the United States were excluded from the population of observations as these comments were void of any consequential implications for cooperation between Canada and the United States.

Because the database of passages to be analyzed was assembled manually, each material reference that led to the inclusion of an excerpt was highlighted. This is a measure that eases future referencing and data evaluation (Twycross and Shields, 2006). As mentioned above, we developed three categories broad enough to span the entire horizon of issues in our analysis of the 918 instances relating to 1) Trade and Economy, 2) Border and Security, and 3) Political Relations.

The next step was to create coding criteria for thematic interpretation. These criteria would then be used to make a consistent assessment of the attitude and sentiment expressed towards cooperation with the United States by members of the House of Commons. The evaluation utilizes a three-point scale that judges a comment as being positive, neutral, or negative. This is a method of evaluation commonly used for analyzing themes and attitudes in political communications or discourse (Holsti, 1967). Each comment received a score based on which criteria points were most evident or clearly expressed within the passage. For example, positive scores would be given to comments that expressed support for increased or strengthened cooperation with the United States and would convey a desire for reduced friction when dealing with American leaders or institutions. The criteria of assessment for positive scores are given in table 2a. As an illustration of a comment that was scored as positive, in 2005 MP Jim Peterson stated:

Mr. Speaker, Canada and the United States enjoy today the largest trading relationship that this world has ever seen. In spite of very high profile disputes, such as softwood lumber, BSE, live swine, more than 95% of that trading relationship is dispute free and those of us on this side of the House will work to ensure that it is 100% dispute free.

(Hansard, Peterson, 2005)

Table 2a: Coding criteria for positive scores**Any statement that argues for or declares...**

- ⌘ More cooperation or coordination
- ⌘ Improving cooperation or coordination
- ⌘ Better relations
- ⌘ Mutual benefits
- ⌘ Common policies or solutions
- ⌘ More policy convergence
- ⌘ More goodwill
- ⌘ Compromise and policy flexibility

Conversely, any comment that discouraged broadening or deepening cooperation with the United States, criticized cooperative effort, or resorted to mere condemnation without any constructive action was given a negative score. If a comment invoked any of the points listed in table 2b it was evaluated as negative. The following remark attributed to MP Louise Thibault was given a negative score reflecting a non-cooperative attitude towards Canada-US relations:

Mr. Speaker, to the detriment of Quebec and Canadian companies and citizens, the Conservative government keeps accommodating the United States: a sellout agreement on softwood lumber; the implementation of new CFIA standards that penalize our beef producers, while their U.S. competitors will benefit slightly from the situation; and, finally, the U.S. government's announcement that its nationals will only need a simple piece of identification with a small receipt, while our nationals continue to line up at Passport Canada to satisfy U.S. requirements. When will the Conservative government stop agreeing to be a slave to the U.S. government and start defending the interests of the public.

(Hansard, Thibault, 2007)

Lastly, a neutral score is given when a comment is neither positive nor negative or so mixed that no clear conclusion is possible. Such a neutral or marginal score can be demonstrated by MP Jean Crowder's remark made in 2008 during the second session of the 39th Parliament:

Mr. Speaker, the government has said that shipbuilding is of strategic importance to the sovereignty of this nation. We have people like George MacPherson from the Shipyard General Workers' Federation talking about the fact that currently the shipyard industry is only operating at

about a third of its capacity and that over the next 15 years it will be worth about \$9 billion in Canadian jobs. The Shipbuilding Association of Canada and Irving Shipbuilding have called for a carve-out. We know that in the United States, for example, under the Jones Act, the Americans did a carve-out and were able to protect the shipbuilding industry in the U.S. Given all that, why would this minister not consider putting on the table a carve-out for the Canadian shipbuilding industry?

(Hansard, Crowder, 2008)

Note that the above comment is principally concerned with an issue of Canadian policy and not cooperation. American policy is used only as evidence to shore up an argument being made by the member of the House for Canadian action at home. The coding criteria for neutral scores are given in table 2c below.

Table 2b: Coding criteria for negative scores**Any statement that argues for or declares...**

- ❧ Unilateral action
- ❧ Less cooperation or coordination
- ❧ Protest or condemnation of the other party
- ❧ Separate solution or policy
- ❧ Exclusive benefit at the expense of the other party
- ❧ More policy divergence
- ❧ Less goodwill
- ❧ No compromise, policy rigidity

Table 2c: Coding criteria for neutral scores**Any statement that argues for or declares...**

- ❧ Ambiguity about sentiment for cooperation or non-cooperation
- ❧ Overall balance of both negative and positive sentiment towards cooperation
- ❧ Lack of any expression or sentiment towards either cooperation or non-cooperation
- ❧ Some reference to the United States but with predominant concern for domestic affairs

Reliability, objectivity, and validity

In addition to conducting a master scoring of the entire population of N=918, we prepared a random sample drawn from this population. This sample was then distributed to a panel of four independent judges who scored each comment using the same coding criteria and three-point nominal scale that was employed for the evaluation of the total number of parliamentary comments by the authors. The independence of the judges refers to their being completely separate and removed from our research efforts and authorship. The purpose of having four judges was to ensure the objective and reliable interpretation of each passage. Many content analyses make use of only two judges. However, it is advisable to use three or more judges if feasible to improve the reliability and objectivity of the scoring method (Kolbe and Burnett, 1991).

A standard random number generator process without replacement² was used to select from the N=918 total observations those to be included in the sample. A total of n=265 observations, constituting approximately 30% of the whole population, were compiled for grading by the independent judges. The sample of n=265 observations is in the upper part of the range of typical sample size (Neuendorf, 2002). These sample observations were selected in such a way as to reflect the composition of the whole population N. More specifically, we extracted 30% of the comments from every issue category in each year for inclusion in the sample. For example, in our total population we found 29 comments concerning Canada-US political relations in 2006. The sample would then include nine randomly selected observations from 2006 which focus on the political relations between Canada and the United States.

The four judges were selected from the student body at Simon Fraser University based on their strong academic performance. They were completely independent of the authors and the research of the Fraser Institute. It was important to utilize judges that could be depended upon to diligently read and score the sample comments (Kassarjian, 1979). The judges were given the scoring criteria and instructed to apply these to the passages with the objective of evaluating whether members of the House of Commons were expressing support for or opposition to cooperation or good relations with the United States. Note also that the final document containing the sample observations included nothing more than the raw communication. Omitted from the judges' copies were the names of the members of Parliament and their respective party affiliations. The purpose of denying the judges this

2 The random number generator in Excel can be multiplied by a factor of 100 to produce a series of numbers between one and 100. The first nine numbers in the series below a value of 29 indicated which observations should be included in the sample. After repeating this process for every category in a given year and for each year, the n=265 sample observations were amassed.

information was to reduce any potential bias that might result from simultaneously evaluating a comment for attitude while associating it with a specific political party or person in the House.

After the judges returned the evaluated samples we tabulated all of their scores and computed a set of reliability measurements. The first calculation was a simple coefficient of agreement matrix. The elements of this matrix are the individual coefficient of agreements between each respective pair of judges. With the evaluations (i.e., scoring) of the four independent judges and the master score, there were 10 coefficients that needed to be determined. The results of are given in table 3a.

All of the judges were in agreement approximately two thirds of the time. More precisely, the average inter-judge agreement was 0.66 and the resultant composite reliability score was 0.90.[3]

To determine the extent to which the neutral scores—which were the most difficult scores to assess because of their relative ambiguity—were responsible for a disproportionately high number of disagreements, a second round of calculations were undertaken that omitted any observation for which one of the judges had given a score of neutral or zero. After all zeros were removed 115 observations remained. The new coefficient of agreement matrices are given in table 3b. As we can see, there was a significant increase in the average rate of inter-judge agreement of approximately 29%. Of course the composite of reliability score also improved, rising to 0.99. It is apparent that omitting the neutral score led to marked improvement in the rates of agreement between all of the judges. In fact, there were 99 observations for which agreement was unanimous.

The last indicator of reliability left for computation was Scott's π .^[4] This metric eliminates the possibility of chance agreement and measures the likelihood of agreement based on the coding criteria above those agreements that are purely random. In other words, it isolates the likelihood of agreement based solely on application of the coding criterion. We computed an extension of Scott's index that was developed by Craig (1981) which accounts for the use of multiple judges. The modified formula allows for the consideration of various so-called voting rules in scoring such as unanimity or majority rules. Our index is based on a majority rules decision-making mechanism that requires agreement between three out of five judges. For observed inter-coder

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- 3 The composite reliability score was calculated using the following formula which can be found in Holsti (1969): $\text{Composite reliability} = N \cdot (\text{avg. inter-judge agreement}) / 1 + [(N-1) \cdot (\text{avg. inter-judge agreement})]$ where N is equal to the number of judges.
 - 4 Scott's π was developed by Scott (1955). The Generalized version we calculated uses the following formula: $\pi(3/5) = [\text{Po}(3/5) - \text{Pe}(3/5)] / [1 - \text{Pe}(3/5)]$, where Po = observed inter-coder agreement, and Pe = expected proportion of agreement by chance of at least 3 out of 5 coders. See Craig (1981).

agreement we use the average inter-judge agreement figure from table 3a as a proxy and the proportion of final coding decisions falling into each sentiment score was calculated as the average of every judge's respective scoring distribution. The resultant Generalized Scott's Index was 0.53341 with a corresponding 95% confidence interval of 0.491789 to 0.574893.⁵ Our confidence intervals were particularly narrow (and thus good), the spread being a mere 8% because of the relatively large sample size of 265 observations.

Table 3a: Coefficient of agreement matrix

	Master	Judge 1	Judge 2	Judge 3	Judge 4	Average
Master	1	0.66	0.70	0.71	0.61	0.67
Judge 1	0.66	1	0.61	0.67	0.67	0.66
Judge 2	0.70	0.61	1	0.66	0.59	0.64
Judge 3	0.71	0.67	0.66	1	0.66	0.68
Judge 4	0.61	0.67	0.59	0.66	1	0.63
Average	0.67	0.66	0.64	0.68	0.63	0.66

Table 3b: Coefficient of agreement matrix without neutral scores

	Master	Judge 1	Judge 2	Judge 3	Judge 4	Average
Master	1	0.94	0.97	0.94	0.91	0.95
Judge 1	0.94	1	0.95	0.93	0.91	0.94
Judge 2	0.97	0.95	1	0.95	0.92	0.96
Judge 3	0.94	0.93	0.95	1	0.93	0.95
Judge 4	0.91	0.91	0.92	0.93	1	0.93
Average	0.95	0.94	0.96	0.95	0.93	0.95

5 The confidence intervals were calculated using the following formula: 95% CI = $\pi \pm 1.96\sigma$, where $\sigma^2 = [1/(1-Pe)]^2 [Po(1-Po)/n-1]$. In other words, 95 out of 100 times, our generalized Scott's π will fall in the range 0.491789 to 0.574893. See Neuendorf (2002).

Craig (1981) also suggests using a scoring range proposed by Landis and Koch (1977) which gives a standard interpretive meaning to the results. According to this scheme, our inter-judge agreement of 0.66 would fall in the upper moderate part of the range when considering Scott's generalized pi. In sum, we determined that the coding criteria were sufficiently reliable.

Given the level of inter-judge agreement and the reasonable confidence score, we determined that both in terms of objectivity and reliability we could use the outcome of the master score of the entire population. In other words, the other judges and their agreement levels allowed us to confirm and objectify our interpretation of the data.

The data was broken down by year, category, and political party affiliation.^[6] This step was repeated for each individual year of the study. A comprehensive set of 36 tables is given in appendix B. To gain greater insight into what characterized the relationship over the entire horizon of our study, we produced another set of graphs that illustrate the year to year distribution of positive, neutral, and negative comments. A list of the 20 line graphs that were constructed is specified below in table 4.

Table 4: List of figures collectively evaluating each year of study (2002/03–2008)

	All parties	LIB	CPC	NDP	BQ
All issues	Fig. 1a (pg. 15)	Fig. 2a (pg. 18)	Fig. 2b (pg. 19)	Fig. 2c (pg. 20)	Fig. 2d (pg. 20)
Trade and economy	Fig. 1b (pg. 16)	Fig. 3a (pg. 21)	Fig. 4c (pg. 24)	Fig. 5b (pg. 25)	Fig. 6b (pg. 27)
Border and security	Fig. 1c (pg. 17)	Fig. 3c (pg. 23)	Fig. 4a (pg. 23)	Fig. 5a (pg. 25)	Fig. 6a (pg. 26)
Political relations	Fig. 1d (pg. 17)	Fig. 3b (pg. 22)	Fig. 4b (pg. 24)	Fig. 5c (pg. 26)	Fig. 6c (pg. 27)

⁶ The two independent parliamentarians in this time frame were treated as members of their former caucuses. Specifically, Carolyn Parrish who made a total of two comments was grouped with the Liberals and Louise Thibault (three comments) was treated as member of the Bloc Quebecois. Despite being ostracized from their respective parties, their political platforms remained sufficiently close to that of their former caucuses, often espousing similar views and opinions.

Our findings offer both the yearly and year-to-year changes in sentiment towards cooperation with the United States as expressed by members of Parliament. In addition, to highlight the “hot button” issues that drove much of the discussion in Parliament concerning Canada’s relationship with the US, we did a raw frequency count of words and phrases that occurred in the majority of the parliamentary debates. We used Acrobat Reader to search for specific words and phrases that occur frequently throughout the years of study such as softwood, BSE, Iraq, war objectors, weaponization of space, and the Security and Prosperity Partnership. A list of the 20 words for which we searched in every year is given in table 5.

We posit that words and phrases with higher frequency of mention were indicative of their centrality in the landscape of the debates. The frequency counts essentially allowed us to observe and quantify the intensity of debate surrounding any one category. In this way they played a complementary role in our assessment, giving some further context to the evaluation of sentiment expressed by Canada’s Parliament.

Table 5: Frequency count: Words


- ✎ Iraq
- ✎ Afghanistan
- ✎ Terrorism
- ✎ Weaponization of space
- ✎ 9/11
- ✎ SARS
- ✎ Softwood
- ✎ Customs
- ✎ Exports
- ✎ Tariffs
- ✎ Duties
- ✎ Trade
- ✎ BSE or mad cow
- ✎ Drugs
- ✎ Kyoto
- ✎ Relations
- ✎ Oil
- ✎ Gas
- ✎ Energy
- ✎ Conscientious objectors

Summary of findings

In the first year of our findings (2002–2003), the score of Parliament's cooperation towards the United States was 54.5% positive (figure 1a). Only one quarter of the comments indicate no willingness to cooperate, while another fifth of the scores expresses a neutral outlook. However, this overall cooperative attitude turns into a minority of the cases (40%) in 2004, then dropping to as low as 14% in 2006 and never recovering above one third of the total. The steepest decline in positive sentiment takes place during the years 2005–2006 when it falls from 45% to 14%. While the negative outlook on cooperation is the largest score in 2007, it constitutes a majority with 57% of the comments in 2006. The neutral score climbs gradually in our research time frame from 21% in 2002/03 to 46% in 2008. The positive score is the largest of the three in the years 2002/03–2005, while the negative score is on top in 2006 and 2007. The largest score in 2008 is the neutral score. Clearly, the pivotal year in our findings in terms of change in overall sentiment, switching from positive to negative, is 2006.

When we look at the results through the prism of the three subject areas (i.e., border and security; trade and economics; and political relations), we find,

Figure 1a: All Parliament, comments on all categories, by ranking and selected years




Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

apart from the last two years (2007/08), that the negative score is greater than the overall score in both the trade and economics and the border and security categories (figures 1b, 1c). For political relations (figure 1d), the willingness to cooperate with the United States shows its strongest scores between 2002/03 and 2005, reaching some 68%. Then, in 2006, the positive sentiment figure plummets to 10% and the negative score rises into the low 70s. Indeed, the year 2006 is the turning point both in the overall score and in the categories trade and economics, and political relations. For the border and security category, the negative score overtakes the positive and is bigger than the neutral score as early as 2004. However, by 2007, the negative scores decline below 30% and both the positive and neutral scores are higher in the last two years of the study than the negative score. The negative propensity (i.e., no or less Canada-US cooperation) is lowest in the years 2007 and 2008. However, more of the non-negative attitude in 2008 is absorbed by the neutral score (46%) than the positive score (30%), a trend most pronounced in the trade and economics category where the neutral indicator rises as high as 64% in 2008.


When we look at how the four federal political parties scored on cooperation with the United States during this time frame, we see three main

Figure 1b: All Parliament, comments on trade and economy, by ranking and selected years




Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Figure 1c: All Parliament, comments on border and security, by ranking and selected years



Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Figure 1d: All Parliament, comments on political relations, by ranking and selected years




Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

trends.[7] First of all, the Liberal Party mainly scored positive until 2006 (figure 2a). In that year, suddenly the negative Liberal score doubles to half, peaking at 59% in 2007. When broken down by categories, we see that the Liberal score turns negative on border and security issues in 2005. A year later it goes negative for both the trade and economics and the political relations categories.

Second, the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) scored most positive throughout. The lowest point (45%) is reached in 2006 (figure 2b). The Tories' highly positive ratings on border and security issues (84%) in 2002/03 went to a low of 37% in 2006. On trade and economics, the Conservatives gyrate down and then up in the first two years, but then the trend moves upward toward quite positive ground from 2005 onward. The party is positive on political relations except for the year 2007. Over all the years, the Conservatives do not score more than 11% negative on Canada-US cooperation and generally stay well below the 10% mark. The only exception is on trade and economics, when they score 37.5% negative in 2004 and 14% in 2005.

Figure 2a: Liberals, comments on all categories, by ranking and selected years




Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

7 Though the Alliance Party and the Progressive Conservative Party were separate during the first session in our study, their scores were identical on this issue and we have counted them as one even before they amalgamated into the Conservative Party of Canada in 2003.

Considering only the two largest federal parties, the neutral score climbs very gradually from 28% in the first year for the Liberals to 49% in 2008. For the Tories, the neutral score rises from 14% during 2002/03 to 34% in 2008. Between these two major parties, the dominant event in this time frame is the Liberal switch from positive to negative in 2006.


The third trend pertains to the New Democratic Party and the Bloc Québécois (figures 2c, 2d). Their scores are most pronounced of all. Both the NDP and the BQ show overwhelming negative opinion towards more or further cooperation with the United States on all issues from the first year until 2007. The NDP's total negative score ranges between 87% and 74%, except for 2008 when it goes down to 40%. The BQ's negative cooperation score varies between 75% and 60%, with the exception of 2008 when it drops to 15% as its neutral score goes up to 75%. The difference between the NDP and the BQ is absorbed by a slightly higher neutral score on the part of the Bloc. In both

Figure 2b: CPC, comments on all categories, by ranking and selected years




Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Figure 2c: NDP, comments on all categories, by ranking and selected years



Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Figure 2d: BQ, comments on all categories, by ranking and selected years




Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

parties, the positive score never rises above 10%, except for 2008 when it goes to 13% for the NDP and 10% for the BQ.[8]

Given the large number of comments from members of Parliament included in this study (N=918), it is remarkable that in three of the six years of this study both the NDP and the BQ simply have no positive scores at all. In the years 2003 and 2007, neither has positive scores at all out of a total of 62 comments on Canada-US relations (see appendix B). In both parties, the decline in negative scores in 2007 and 2008 is predominantly absorbed by a rise in the neutral score.

When we combine the results of the three categories and the political party scores, we find the following. For both trade and economics and political relations, the Liberal count of negatives rises very strongly, showing an abrupt switch from positive to negative in 2006, confirming the earlier noted trend (figures 3a, 3b). The total number of MP comments for these two categories denoting this switch between 2005 and 2006 is 51 (see appendix B). The switch

Figure 3a: Liberals, comments on trade and economy, by ranking and selected years



Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.


- 8 In 2005, the NDP positive score in the border and security category suddenly rises from 0% to 25%. However, because the total number of NDP comments on this category in 2005 is only 4 (see appendix B) the small population does not allow drawing any conclusions. On the other hand, the positive NDP score on trade and economics in 2008 (3%) is drawn from a total population of 25.

on border and security issues takes place one year earlier and comprises a total of 36 instances (figure 3c). Only on border and security issues does the positive score recover again, ultimately ending up in positive territory.

The Conservative Party's positive attitude toward cooperation in border and security areas as well as in political relations holds consistently until 2006 when the positive score weakens and the neutral score rises (figures 4a, 4b). However, the Trade and Economic category displays more variety (figure 4c). The strong positive score of 60% in 2002/03 falls to 12% in 2004 out of a total of 57 parliamentary comments. Also, only on this issue and in these two years do the Tories register considerable negative scores towards cooperation with the United States. The negative expression rises from 21% in 2002/03 to a peak of 37.5% in 2004. However, most of the other negative scores by the Conservatives are very small, and, in an interesting inverse of the NDP/BQ findings, there are several years for which no negative scores occur at all.


The New Democrats' score is negative for all three categories for all years except 2008, when the neutral score on trade and economics is larger (60%) than the negative score at 33% (figures 5a, 5b, 5c). On trade and economics, the Bloc Québécois also reveals a very strong negative score except for the year 2008, when the neutral score rises to 80% (figures 6a, 6b, 6c). While the number of parliamentary comments on any one of the categories per year for the NDP and BQ is smaller than for the major parties, the overall trend is very pronounced.

Figure 3b: Liberals, comments on political relations, by ranking and selected years




Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Figure 3c: Liberals, comments on border and security, by ranking and selected years




Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.


Figure 4a: CPC, comments on border and security, by ranking and selected years



Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.


Figure 4b: CPC, comments on political relations, by ranking and selected years

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Figure 4c: CPC, comments on trade and economy, by ranking and selected years


Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Figure 5a: NDP, comments on border and security, by ranking and selected years




Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Figure 5b: NDP, comments on trade and economy, by ranking and selected years




Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Figure 5c: NDP, comments on political relations, by ranking and selected years




Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Figure 6a: BQ, comments on border and security, by ranking and selected years




Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Figure 6b: BQ, comments on trade and economy, by ranking and selected years



Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Figure 6c: BQ, comments on political relations, by ranking and selected years



Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Interpretation and analysis of results

How do we explain the major findings in this measurement of parliamentarians' attitudes towards Canadian-American cooperation in the realm of borders, security, trade, economics, and political relations? How do our findings compare to the conventional wisdom that Canadians in general and the Canadian government in particular were quite critical or inept on cooperation with the United States following the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and certainly towards the buildup of the American-British attack on Iraq in 2003? The same wisdom holds that while Canadians at large remained very critical of the presidency of George W. Bush, the new Conservative minority government of early 2006 attempted to mend fences and lay the groundwork for better cooperation, thus changing the political climate on Canadian-American cooperation.

The Pew Global Attitudes Project found that the number of Canadians expressing a positive attitude towards the United States declined from 71% in 1999 to 59% in 2005 (Pew Research Center, 2005). Several Ipsos Reid polls showed that while in 2002 60% of Canadians named the United States "Canada's closest friend," the number dropped to 53% in 2005 (Ipsos Reid, 2006).

Also, some targeted surveys corroborate the conventional argument of a better political climate between the United States and Canada in the post-2006 era. For example, polls conducted by COMPAS Inc. show that only 7% of Canadian business leaders thought the relationship was better than average in March 2005, while by October 2006 61% thought so (COMPAS, 2006).

The key years of our study (2002–2007) benefit from no change in the American administration, eliminating one source of variability. In trying to better understand the significance of our findings, we also ran a "hot button" frequency count for all the comments recorded. Table 6 shows the top five issues that received the highest number of mentions in that year. The frequency count shows that "borders" and "softwood lumber" dominated four of the six years and came in second and third in 2002/03.

The consistent top ranking of the same issues two issues (borders and softwood) gives our study a certain consistency or *ceteris paribus* when examining changes in the positive or negative scoring of the parliamentarians. In other words, if there were an entirely new issue for every year that ranked first or second in the frequency count, it could be argued that the change in positive or negative scores is simply determined by the unique attributes of each new issue. If, however, as our frequency count shows, the same two issues dominate the debates in most of our time frame, then we may conclude that either major changes within these issues or changes in parliamentarians'

attitude towards these issues explain why the negative and positive scores varied as they did.

While our findings indicate that the border and softwood topics ranked as the most frequently discussed issues in four out of the six years, the reader should keep in mind that the frequency of these topics does not correspond to the total population of MP comments as these words may appear more than once in a single comment. Rather, the frequency of the hot button topics is an approximate measure of the intensity with which the topic is debated in Parliament.

The border became an instant issue when American authorities closed all personal and commercial traffic across our land border in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC on September 11, 2001. As more than 80% of Canadian exports go to the United States each year and nearly 70% of our imports came from our southern neighbor during this time frame, this temporary standstill and the subsequent delays at the border made a significant impact on Canada's trade (Industry Canada, 2008). Nearly \$2 billion in trade traverses the border each day, with most manufactured products being transported by truck or rail (KPMG, 2002).

Even before 9/11, a bottleneck had been forming at the busiest border crossings due to insufficient border staff, numerous regulations such as rules of origin on products, and outdated infrastructure (Taylor and Robideaux, 2003). Canada and the United States signed a "Smart Border Accord" in 2001 filled with initiatives and pledges to make the border more efficient (FAITC, 2002). In practice, however, many of the new security measures introduced by the United States as well as several mutually agreed upon

Table 6: Hot button frequency count per year

	Word #1 (frequency)	Word #2 (frequency)	Word #3 (frequency)	Word #4 (frequency)	Word #5 (frequency)
2002/03	Iraq (255)	Border (86)	Softwood (72)	Terror-9/11 (64)	Kyoto (27)
2004	Border (91)	Softwood (85)	Mad cow/BSE (65)	Iraq (50)	Terror-9/11 (39)
2005	Border (67)	Softwood (60)	Terror-9/11 (14)	Energy (14)	Mad cow (12)
2006	Softwood (100)	Border (92)	Energy (22)	Objectors (20)	Iraq (16)
2007	Border (158)	Softwood (98)	Terror-9/11 (27)	SPP (20)	Energy (12)
2008	Energy (39)	Drugs (39)	Iraq (25)	Objectors (18)	Afghanistan (11)

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

measures to facilitate expedited travel and checking measures have slowed down commercial border crossings (Hart, 2006; Goldfarb, 2007).

Numerous studies since 2001 have shown the costs to both commerce and government incurred by these added measures (Transport Canada, 2005; Moens, 2008). Most also conclude that despite innovations such as dedicated secure programs for shippers and travelers, waiting times are generally up and the closely integrated automotive and machinery sector that had built an efficient just-in-time delivery system has suffered from border delays (Conference Board, 2007; Hale, 2009). Most recently, the US-initiated Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, which mandates passports for all land, sea, and air crossings, has generated a lot of debate in Canada. There is no evidence that border problems between our two countries eased during the time period of our study. As such, we cannot identify any date in our study where this issue goes through a decisive change that would prompt parliamentarians to change their overall attitude.

Disputes about Canadian softwood lumber exports to the United States date back for more than a century. As forests have shrunk in the East, the timber disputes have gradually moved their center of gravity towards the West (Reed, 2001). In 1996, Canada and the United States agreed on a five-year softwood lumber deal as they had done two times prior that would preclude the United States from taking any trade action in return for which Canadian exports would be subject to an export fee when they exceeded a certain amount of lumber exports per year. In essence, these agreements allowed Canada open access to about 30% of the American market (FAITC, 1996). When this agreement expired in 2001, it was not renewed. Meanwhile, Canadian lumber exports continued to grow and were valued at \$8.5 billion in 2005 (FAITC, 2005).

Soon after the expiration, the US government announced that Canadian lumber exporters would be subject to countervailing duties. Later, the US government added anti-dumping charges. In total, Canadian lumber exporters paid some \$5 billion in duties between 2001 and 2006. The US argument at heart was that stumpage fees levied by provincial governments for logging publicly owned timber constituted a form of subsidy and dumping. The Canadian government took action at both the NAFTA and WTO level to challenge the American claims as well as in the US Court of International Trade. Repeatedly, NAFTA panels have ruled that Canadian stumpage fees do not injure the US industry. While WTO rulings have been somewhat more nuanced, the Canadian case has generally prevailed. Meanwhile, the American side appeared unwilling to budge and continued to seek one appeal avenue after another. It is this rancor over duties and drawn-out trade rulings that set the context of most softwood comments made by members of Parliament as recorded in the years 2002/03–2005.

The only change in the issue occurred in 2006 when the Conservative minority government negotiated a new agreement with the American government. The 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement erased numerous WTO and NAFTA disputes and rebated 80% of some \$5 billion in Canadian-paid levies since 2002. The deal included a quota of a maximum 34% share of the US market, but with a sliding scale of export tax based on a range of US market prices of lumber. As lumber prices fall, the export tax would increase. The agreement was by no means received warmly by all in the Canadian forestry industry (Alberts, 2006, July 6). Some felt that pursuing litigation in US courts would eventually have led to a Canadian victory. Others feared that such a legal victory could unleash a movement in Congress to scrap NAFTA in its entirety.

The new agreement did not prevent new disputes from breaking out, beginning as early as 2007 and leading to two arbitration cases. Also, as a result of the slump in the housing market followed by a sharp economic downturn in the United States, the price of softwood lumber has steadily fallen since 2007 and the sliding scale in export taxes has hurt Canadian producers very badly, as 15% levies came on top of slumped prices and declining demand. Thus, while the 2006 Lumber IV agreement did offer a significant solution to the dispute, it did not remove Canadian concern or critique about the terms of softwood trade with the United States.

A final factor for consideration in interpreting the results is the composition of seats in Parliament during this time, which changed in the course of several elections. Table 7 shows a gradual rise by the Conservatives from 88 seats in 2002 to 143 in 2008. Similarly, the New Democrats consistently improved their numbers from 13 to 37. Clearly, the major change on the losing side is the decline of the Liberal Party as it fell from a 172-seat majority government under Jean Chrétien in 2002 to a minority government under Paul Martin of 135 seats in 2005. Finally, the Liberals lost their hold on power in January 2006 and continued to decline to 77 seats in 2008.

Table 7: Distribution of parties in Parliament per session of government

	2002–2004	2004–2006	2006–2008	2008–present
CPC	88	99	124	143
LIB	172	135	103	77
BQ	38	54	51	49
NDP	13	19	29	37

Source: Canada, 2009.

If we return to figure 1a—the overall results—we see that the predominant switch from positive to negative scores in parliamentarians' attitude towards Canadian-American cooperation takes place in 2006. Out of a total of 66 Liberal comments we observe a switch from 25% to 50% negative. At the same time, there is no significant change in negative scoring among all the other parties. As this change coincides exactly with a change in minority government from Liberal to Conservative, our findings point to the conclusion that the Liberals changed their scoring on most of the comments as a result of becoming the official Opposition. This conclusion gains credibility if we consider the most likely alternative explanations of the Liberal shift from positive to negative.

First, as argued above, there is not enough change on the border issue to explain a Liberal shift. Also, even when we account for the Liberal critique of the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement as negotiated by the Tories in 2006, we still observe the same pattern of growing Liberal negative scores continuing in 2007 when the Liberal negative score rises to 59%. Similarly, on borders and security as well as on political relations, the Liberal trend is strongly negative in 2006 and 2007. Second, it could be suggested that change in Liberal leadership and the degree to which the leader imposes discipline over his caucus may explain the shift. However, the data does not bear this out. The handover from Jean Chrétien to Paul Martin took place in 2004, while the change in Liberal attitudes does not show up until 2006.

When we compare the overall 2002–2007 trend of declining positives and rising negatives to the trends in each political party's scores, we suggest the following observations.

The Conservatives, when in opposition, tend to critique the Liberal government for not being sufficiently cooperative towards the United States. For example, MP Joy Smith made the following criticism of the Liberals in 2004:

Mr. Speaker, this week we had the great honour of a visit from the President of the United States. The United States has been our greatest ally in times of need and until recently we were viewed in the same light by our neighbours to the south. The dinner held for President Bush on Tuesday night was a polite event, with many restrictions and careful orchestration to avoid any embarrassing situations. Unfortunately, beyond President Bush's acknowledgement that Alberta beef was on the menu, there was little else to chew on. The government has chosen to indulge in petty and juvenile attacks on our greatest ally and trading partner, and ranchers in Manitoba, Quebec, Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchewan and countless other Canadians are now paying the price.

(Hansard, Smith, 2004)

The Liberals defend their record by showing that they are cooperative. For example, in November 2004 Raymond Simard stated:

Mr. Speaker, the visit of the President of the United States of America today gives us an opportunity to recall the vitality of our trade relations with our partners and neighbours to the south. During the 1990s, Canadian exports to the United States more than tripled. They reached \$359 billion in 2000, compared to \$108 billion in 1989. Canada's total exports amount to \$400 billion a year; demand by our American partners accounts for nearly 85% of these exports. Today, one in three jobs in Canada is directly related to exports to the U.S. market. That shows how intimately our economic health is linked to that of our neighbours and friends in the United States. For decades, the mutual friendship between Canadians and Americans has been a guarantee of prosperity. Let us hope that this friendship, based on the democratic values of respect for rights and freedoms, continues for a long time.

(Hansard, Simard, 2004)

However, when the Tories are in government, the Liberals switch their position and attack the Tories for being far too close and too cooperative with the Americans and in effect lackeys of the US administration. For example, in 2006 MP Omar Alghabra had this to say about the Conservatives and their relationship with the Americans:

Mr. Speaker, it is mid-term election time in the United States and a [Republican] television attack ad has outraged many Canadians. The ad says in part, "Let Canada take care of North Korea, they're not busy". Is this what Canadians should be expecting as the outcome of cozying up to Mr. Bush by the Prime Minister and his Conservatives?

(Hansard, Alghabra, 2006)

Another illustrative example is a comment from 2008 made by Liberal parliamentarian Judy Sgro concerning the Tories and the Americans:

Mr. Speaker, the investigation into the NAFTA-gate affair clearly was a whitewash. Key individuals who had access to the diplomatic memo were not interviewed or even contacted. The Republican farm team over there, the Canadian Conservatives, were obviously trying to help their bush league friends. Why was Frank Sensenbrenner, the Republican operative that the government embedded in the Canadian embassy, not even questioned as part of this so-called investigation?

(Hansard, Sgro, 2008)

In fact, the Liberal scores show that they are willing to change their overall favorable attitude for close cooperation to a criticism of overall Canadian-American cooperation. During June 2007, when discussing the agreement resolving the softwood lumber dispute, Brian Wilson and Stephen Harper had the following to say:

Mr. Speaker, the government brags about its softwood lumber sellout, but only seven months into the deal the U.S. has started attacking our programs, increasing the 10.8% duty to a 15% tax. Now we learn it is getting set to impose a new 50% penalty tax, while at the same time starting new lawsuits against us using our very own money which the Conservatives surrendered in the first place. Canadians deserve answers. It is time to tell the truth. When will the government stop caving in to the White House and the U.S. lumber lobby?

(Hansard, Wilson, 2007)

Mr. Speaker, any disputes that are now occurring between Canada and the United States are occurring within the framework of an agreement that gives Canada ongoing and secure access to the United States' market. That is why the industry across the country wants the agreement to remain in effect and why it would be a terrible thing for the industry if the Liberals and NDP got their way, ripped it up and threw us back into litigation.

(Hansard, Harper, 2007)

Thus, it appears that the Liberal MPs subordinate the Canada-US relationship to their short-term political needs.

We do not find a similar switch on the part of the Conservatives. They do not switch their comments from negative while in opposition to positive while in government. Instead, Conservatives criticize the Liberal government even when they are trying to be cooperative for not being even more cooperative. For example, on March 22, 2005 Stephen Harper and Paul Martin exchanged these words:

Mr. Speaker, President Bush has summoned the Prime Minister for a meeting on trade and security matters. We know that this anti-American Liberal government has been moving in the opposite direction to Washington on a range of defence, military and security matters, but the Americans have said that trade and security are linked. How exactly does the Prime Minister intend to move forward our bilateral trade interests with the United States?

(Hansard, Harper, 2005)

Mr. Speaker, I am not quite sure where the Leader of the Opposition got the schedule upon which President Bush and President Fox and I will be meeting, but the fact is that there is an enormous amount of opportunity to discuss a wide range of areas and we intend to do so. The hon. member knows that in fact the border would have been opened if it had not been for the decision of an individual judge in the State of Montana. He also knows that the administration has supported the Canadian position wholeheartedly. That demonstrates the nature of our relations and how important it is that we continue to work together.

(Hansard, Martin, 2005)

Then, as they form the government in 2006 and come under attack from Liberals and other MPs for being too close to the United States, some Tory MPs switch from positive to neutral scores on Canada-US cooperation, but do not increase their negative score. We can see this in the following example from a debate in October 2007:

Mr. Speaker, in 2004 the Prime Minister stirred up doubt about the innocence of Mr. Arar. Yesterday we heard Condoleezza Rice refuse to apologize or recognize the torture endured by Mr. Arar while in Syria. This contradicts Justice O'Connor's report that cleared Mr. Arar of any terrorist activity. Regardless, Mr. Arar is still unable to travel to the United States. When will the government use its allegedly good relations with the United States and have Mr. Arar's name removed from the no fly list?

(Hansard, Ratansi, 2007)

Mr. Speaker, following a review of the transcripts of the secretary of state from the United States, I wrote a letter today to my counterpart in the United States, the secretary of Homeland Security asking, in light of what the secretary of state said, for them to reconsider their designation of Mr. Arar and remove him from those look-out lists.

(Hansard, Day, 2007)

In other words, we found no significant number of instances where Conservative MPs will speak out against working cooperatively with the United States in order to gain or maintain political advantage in the House of Commons.

Both the New Democrats and the Bloc Québécois call consistently for less cooperation with the United States in the 2002–2007 period. Two examples that highlight this tendency are given below. The first comment was made by MP Olivia Chow in 2006 about not extraditing war objectors despite requests to do so by the American authorities; the second comment is attributed to Claude Bachand in 2004 concerning missile defense:

Mr. Speaker, I have two petitions. The first petition is from thousands of Canadians who are asking that Parliament allow the American-Iraq war resisters stay in Canada. The petitioners believe there is a moral choice for Canada, which is to give refuge to those who refuse to be accomplices in a U.S. led war in Iraq. If we were to reject war resisters, they would be returned to the United States, face incarceration, and possibly even the death penalty. Therefore, Canada should not facilitate the persecution of American war objectors by returning them to the United States.

(Hansard, Chow, 2006).

Mr. Speaker, the minister's speech does not surprise me. This is more or less what he has explained this week. I find that his image of neighbours is a good example. We are the Americans' neighbours, and they have the bigger house, much bigger than ours. I want to remind the minister that, the last time, we told our American neighbours we did not support the destruction of our Iraqi neighbour. We said so. We had a policy and we decided not to follow the neighbour that wanted to destroy the Iraqi house. Why today should we tell our American neighbour that we agree that he should install a great big dome on his house, which would cover ours, when other neighbours and the neighbourhood do not agree? This is the problem. We have always been go-betweens, ready to get involved in peace endeavours. Now, because our neighbour has a larger house than ours, we want to combine forces and have a dome installed on our house, so the neighbour can impose its law everywhere. The neighbourhood example is a good one, but there are also the other neighbours. We are turning our other neighbours into bad friends. Of course, we will be good friends with the American neighbour.

(Hansard, Bachand, 2004)

Both the NDP and the BQ do not change their scores as a result of either a change in government or change in the issues. We can thus conclude that their opposition to closer Canadian-American cooperation is neither the result of strategic political behavior in reaction to the government's position nor the result of the specific nature of the issues. The scores of their attitudes point most closely to a rigid approach in which a better working relationship with the United States is rejected *a priori*. Of course, it must also be noted that neither party carried the responsibility of government or the official Opposition, and could thus be expected to speak with less restraint.

Finally, the year 2008 appears as an outlier in this study for all the parties except the Conservatives. The largest category by far in that year is the trade and economy area and the largest switch is from negative towards neutral. It appears that the overall economic malaise dominates the debate and

the predominant solutions sought are not so much in Canadian-American relations but in domestic economic programs.

Our findings show 2006 as the pivotal year in this study. A frequency count of so-called “hot button” items confirmed the predominance of the two main categories from 2002/03–2007 and further showed particular intensity around two issues: the border and softwood lumber trade. These two issues scored first in the top five issue occurrence rate in four of the six key years of our study (2002–2007). Given the constancy of the border issue (more and more border constriction) and the continued concern about softwood lumber trade even after the 2006 agreement, as well as an increase in Liberal negative comments on political relations, we conclude that the most significant factor in explaining the negative trend and the 2006 pivot are the comments of Liberal parliamentarians. While Liberals already score more negatively than positively on border issues during the 2005 government of Paul Martin, they increase their negative scores on all categories dramatically in 2006 when Stephen Harper forms the Conservative minority government.

We offer our conclusions with caution, realizing that the total number of years (i.e., six) and the total number of observations per party per issue are at times small. Also, the conclusions should be seen as hypotheses we derive from this study which require further testing by means beyond content analysis. We conclude that Liberal parliamentarians switch their attitude based not on major change in issues but as a political strategic change in their new role as official Opposition. What is significant about this finding is that none of the other parties switch their scores in a similar manner. The Conservatives use their opposition role to call for more cooperation or to fault the government for not enough favorable policies and attitudes toward cooperation. When in government, and as they are consistently attacked by the other parties for being too cooperative with the United States, the Tories keep their positive score relatively high while also somewhat increasing their neutral score.

Also of interest is our finding that the NDP and BQ score consistently and highly negative. At minimum we must conclude that they do not favor any cooperation on border and softwood trade issues, but when we add all issues and categories it appears that their opposition does not change on any issues or on which major party is in government. It appears that it is a blanket type of opposition to cooperation with the United States which seems to be driven by ideology or values.

Conclusion and recommendations

Our objective in this study was to gauge Parliament's attitude towards cooperation with the United States. We have utilized an indicator which measures positive or negative attitudes towards cooperation in a quantifiable manner that is objective, reliable, and replicable. We have tabulated and cross-tabulated our results by year, issue category, and by political party. The results of our study show significant parallel trends across the three major areas of our relationship: trade, security, and general political issues. In the overall score of all categories from 2002–2007 we have found a consistent trend of decreasing positive attitudes and rising critical attitudes towards Canada's relationship with the United States.

There is no intent in this study to single out political parties. In fact, the data in this study can serve multiple inferences or conclusions regarding political parties. Contrary to the criticism directed at the Jean Chrétien government that the Liberals were uncooperative during the 2002–2005 period, our findings show that Liberal parliamentarians were actually quite positive, with cooperation scores above 50% in all three years from 2002/03–2005. Also, our study offers evidence that both the NDP and BQ are consistent about seeking a different approach to Canadian-American relations. Given the Tories' favorable inclination towards cooperation with the United States, one could argue in a pure Machiavellian framework that the best position for Parliament's cooperative expression toward the United States would be a Liberal government with the Conservatives as official Opposition. The Liberals in government are going to be most positive when spurred on by Conservatives who want them to be even more cooperative. According to the same logic, a Liberal government with the NDP and/or BQ as official Opposition would bode ill for cooperative attitudes.

In this study, we posited that statements made in Parliament are a useful indicator of Canadian discourse and of Canadian policy. As such, our measurable results provide one transparent asset for Canadians to examine how their representatives position themselves on Canada's most important foreign policy portfolio. Because our study measures a parliamentarian's inclination, attitude, or advocacy concerning more or less cooperation with the United States, it provides a tool for the public to hold Parliament accountable and to examine how parliamentarians influence the policy debate in government.

Our study covers a feature in Canadian-American relations (i.e., parliamentary attitude) that has not been measured before. As such, we hope that it may spur research in other areas in which to measure our government's

performance on managing this important relationship. Public statements by government officials as well as voting records may offer further data.

Given that the economic and trade relationship as well as the border and security portfolio with the United States is by far the largest Canadian foreign mandate, our study is based on the premise that a cooperative approach serves Canada's interest best. However, our findings show a large presence in Parliament which either decries more and better cooperation or is willing to use this relationship as a tool for political advantage and power. From 2004 onward this presence has formed a majority in Parliament. These findings should be a concern for Canadians and should lead to debate on the causes and solutions to this negative sentiment.

At the same time, our findings should be of interest to American analysts and policy makers. The Canadian Parliament does not feature much in discussions about bilateral relations but our findings show that it can pose a challenge to strong cooperative relations. While Canadians take note of the intricacies of congressional affairs and executive-legislative relations in Washington, it is not clear that Americans are aware of the different interests and expressions of Canadian political parties on key issues and how that plays a role in Canada's foreign policy. At minimum, American decision makers who monitor the debate in Canada's Parliament should be concerned about the significant negative attitude toward cooperation, as three of the six years studied had predominantly negative scores.

Appendix A: Parliamentary excerpts used in this study

Table A1: Number of parliamentary excerpts used in this study

Categories	2002/03	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
Trade and economy	86	47	45	65	42	82	367
Border and security	65	74	12	35	28	18	232
Political relations	89	62	25	29	25	89	319
Total	240	183	82	129	95	189	918

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Appendix B: Annual breakdown of comments by party, category, and sentiment

Table B1: Total comments on borders and security by party and ranking, 2002/03

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
CPC	16	2	1	19
LIB	11	6	8	25
NDP	0	2	7	9
BQ	0	3	9	12
Total	27	13	25	65

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B2: Total comments on trade and economy by party and ranking, 2002/03

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
CPC	25	7	9	41
LIB	18	10	5	33
NDP	0	0	4	4
BQ	0	3	5	8
Total	43	20	23	86

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B3: Total comments on political relations by party and ranking, 2002/03

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
CPC	43	7	2	52
LIB	18	10	4	32
NDP	0	0	2	2
BQ	0	1	2	3
Total	61	18	10	89

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B4: Percentage of comments on borders and security by party and ranking, 2002/03

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Proportion of comments
CPC	84%	11%	5%	29%
LIB	44%	24%	32%	38%
NDP	0%	22%	78%	14%
BQ	0%	25%	75%	18%
All parties	42%	20%	38%	100%

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B5: Percentage of comments on trade and economy by party and ranking, 2002/03

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Proportion of comments
CPC	61%	17%	22%	48%
LIB	55%	30%	15%	38%
NDP	0%	0%	100%	5%
BQ	0%	38%	63%	9%
All parties	50%	23%	27%	100%

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B6: Percentage of comments on political relations by party and ranking, 2002/03

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Proportion of comments
CPC	83%	13%	4%	58%
LIB	56%	31%	13%	36%
NDP	0%	0%	100%	2%
BQ	0%	33%	66%	3%
All parties	69%	20%	11%	100%

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B7: Total comments on borders and security by party and ranking, 2004

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
CPC	10	5	0	15
LIB	13	10	7	30
NDP	0	3	14	17
BQ	0	2	10	12
Total	23	20	31	74

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B8: Total comments on trade and economy by party and ranking, 2004

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
CPC	2	8	6	16
LIB	6	5	5	16
NDP	0	2	2	4
BQ	1	4	6	11
Total	9	19	19	47

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B9: Total comments on political relations by party and ranking, 2004

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
CPC	16	5	0	21
LIB	22	5	3	30
NDP	0	1	5	6
BQ	1	3	1	5
Total	39	14	9	62

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B10: Percentage of comments on borders and security by party and ranking, 2004

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Proportion of comments
CPC	66%	33%	0%	20%
LIB	43%	33%	23%	41%
NDP	0%	18%	82%	23%
BQ	0%	17%	83%	16%
All parties	31%	27%	42%	100%

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B11: Percentage of comments on trade and economy by party and ranking, 2004

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Proportion of comments
CPC	13%	50%	38%	34%
LIB	38%	31%	31%	34%
NDP	0%	50%	50%	9%
BQ	9%	36%	55%	23%
All parties	19%	40%	40%	100%

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B12: Percentage of comments on political relations by party and ranking, 2004

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Proportion of comments
CPC	76%	24%	0%	34%
LIB	73%	17%	10%	48%
NDP	0%	17%	83%	10%
BQ	20%	60%	20%	8%
All parties	63%	20%	11%	100%

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B13: Total comments on borders and security by party and ranking, 2005

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
CPC	1	1	2	2
LIB	1	2	6	6
NDP	1	0	3	4
BQ	0	0	5	0
Total	3	3	16	12

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B14: Total comments on trade and economy by party and ranking, 2005

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
CPC	9	3	2	14
LIB	10	6	6	22
NDP	0	1	3	4
BQ	0	2	5	7
Total	17	12	16	45

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B15: Total comments on political relations by party and ranking, 2005

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
CPC	8	1	0	9
LIB	9	2	1	12
NDP	0	1	2	3
BQ	0	0	1	1
Total	17	4	4	25

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B16: Percentage of comments on borders and security by party and ranking, 2005

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Proportion of comments
CPC	50%	50%	0%	17%
LIB	17%	33%	50%	50%
NDP	25%	0%	75%	33%
BQ	0%	0%	0%	0%
All parties	25%	25%	50%	100%

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B16: Percentage of comments on trade and economy by party and ranking, 2005

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Proportion of comments
CPC	64%	21%	14%	31%
LIB	45%	27%	27%	49%
NDP	0%	25%	75%	9%
BQ	0%	29%	71%	16%
All parties	38%	27%	36%	100%

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B17: Percentage of comments on political relations by party and ranking, 2005

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Proportion of comments
CPC	89%	11%	0%	36%
LIB	75%	17%	8%	48%
NDP	0%	33%	66%	12%
BQ	0%	0%	100%	4%
All parties	68%	16%	16%	100%

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B18: Total comments on borders and security by party and ranking, 2006

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
CPC	3	5	0	8
LIB	4	2	3	9
NDP	1	4	10	15
BQ	0	2	1	3
Total	8	13	14	35

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B19: Total comments on trade and economy by party and ranking, 2006

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
CPC	5	4	1	10
LIB	1	6	6	13
NDP	0	3	21	24
BQ	1	6	11	18
Total	7	19	39	65

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B20: Total comments on political relations by party and ranking, 2006

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
CPC	3	3	0	6
LIB	0	0	4	4
NDP	0	2	8	10
BQ	0	0	9	9
Total	3	5	21	29

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B21: Percentage of comments on borders and security by party and ranking, 2006

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Proportion of comments
CPC	38%	63%	0%	23%
LIB	44%	22%	33%	26%
NDP	7%	27%	66%	43%
BQ	0%	66%	33%	9%
All parties	23%	37%	40%	100%

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B22: Percentage of comments on trade and economy by party and ranking, 2006

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Proportion of comments
CPC	50%	40%	10%	15%
LIB	8%	46%	46%	20%
NDP	0%	13%	88%	37%
BQ	6%	33%	61%	28%
All parties	11%	29%	60%	100%

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B23: Percentage of comments on political relations by party and ranking, 2006

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Proportion of comments
CPC	50%	50%	0%	21%
LIB	0%	0%	100%	14%
NDP	0%	20%	80%	34%
BQ	0%	0%	100%	31%
All parties	10%	17%	72%	100%

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B24: Total comments on borders and security by party and ranking, 2007

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
CPC	8	4	0	12
LIB	3	2	3	8
NDP	0	3	4	7
BQ	0	1	0	1
Total	11	10	7	28

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B25: Total comments on trade and economy by party and ranking, 2007

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
CPC	9	4	0	13
LIB	0	6	14	20
NDP	0	1	4	5
BQ	0	1	3	4
Total	9	12	21	42

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B26: Total comments on political relations by party and ranking, 2007

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
CPC	3	6	0	9
LIB	0	4	5	9
NDP	0	1	6	7
BQ	0	0	0	0
Total	3	11	11	25

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B27: Percentage of comments on borders and security by party and ranking, 2007

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Proportion of comments
CPC	66%	33%	0%	43%
LIB	38%	25%	38%	29%
NDP	0%	43%	57%	25%
BQ	0%	100%	0%	4%
All parties	39%	36%	25%	100%

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B28: Percentage of comments on trade and economy by party and ranking, 2007

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Proportion of comments
CPC	69%	31%	0%	31%
LIB	0%	30%	70%	48%
NDP	0%	20%	80%	12%
BQ	0%	25%	75%	10%
All parties	21%	29%	50%	100%

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B29: Percentage of comments on political relation by party and ranking, 2007

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Proportion of comments
CPC	33%	66%	0%	36%
LIB	0%	44%	56%	36%
NDP	0%	14%	86%	28%
BQ	0%	0%	0%	0%
All parties	12%	44%	44%	100%

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B30: Total comments on borders and security by party and ranking, 2008

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
CPC	5	3	1	9
LIB	2	1	1	4
NDP	0	2	2	4
BQ	0	0	1	1
Total	7	6	5	18

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B31: Total comments on trade and economy by party and ranking, 2008

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
CPC	7	14	1	22
LIB	1	10	5	16
NDP	2	18	10	30
BQ	2	11	1	14
Total	12	53	17	82

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B32: Total comments on political relation by party and ranking, 2008

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
CPC	25	4	1	30
LIB	7	13	9	29
NDP	6	7	12	25
BQ	0	4	1	5
Total	38	28	23	89

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B33: Percentage of comments on borders and security by party and ranking, 2008

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Proportion of comments
CPC	56%	33%	11%	50%
LIB	50%	25%	25%	22%
NDP	0%	50%	50%	22%
BQ	0%	0%	100%	6%
All parties	39%	33%	28%	100%

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B34: Percentage of comments on trade and economy by party and ranking, 2008

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Proportion of comments
CPC	32%	64%	5%	27%
LIB	6%	63%	31%	20%
NDP	7%	60%	33%	37%
BQ	14%	79%	7%	17%
All parties	15%	65%	21%	100%

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

Table B35: Percentage of comments on political relations by party and ranking, 2008

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Proportion of comments
CPC	83%	13%	3%	34%
LIB	24%	45%	31%	33%
NDP	24%	28%	48%	28%
BQ	0%	80%	20%	6%
All parties	43%	31%	26%	100%

Source: Parliamentary Hansard, selected years; calculations by the authors.

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